What does morality require when we disagree?

Martin Marchman Andersen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume16
Issue number1
Number of pages23
ISSN1740-4681
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Cite this

Andersen, Martin Marchman. / What does morality require when we disagree?. In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2019 ; Vol. 16, No. 1.
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What does morality require when we disagree? / Andersen, Martin Marchman.

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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AB - In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures.

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DO - 10.1163/17455243-20170001

M3 - Journal article

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JO - Journal of Moral Philosophy

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