Abstract
Two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfD) are a remuneration mechanism that stabilizes revenues and leads to better financing conditions for offshore wind farms. Despite the EU Commission's efforts to make two-sided CfDs a mandatory remuneration scheme, many leading offshore wind markets in Europe still apply one-sided CfDs, which, combined with competitive auctions, often result in zero bids and merchant risk exposure. We contribute to the debate on the two-sided CfD effect on financing by quantifying their impact on debt size. Our approach combines a stochastic power price and wind-power feed-in model with cash flow liquidity management in a project financing setting. We show that offshore wind farms with two-sided CfDs experience less financial distress, increasing debt size between 15 and 27 percentage points compared to a project with merchant revenues. The leverage increase could save consumers between 12 and 19 EUR/MWh in electricity generation costs. This emphasizes the importance of continuing revenue stabilization measures to ensure a cost-effective mobilization of investments for financing Europe's energy transition.JEL Classification: G32, G38, Q48, Q42
Original language | English |
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Journal | Energy Journal |
Number of pages | 44 |
ISSN | 0195-6574 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2025 |
Keywords
- Power prize risk
- Debt size
- Project finacing
- Financial distress
- Monte-Carlo simulation
- Offshore wind