Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements

Praveen Gauravaram; Katsuyuki Okeya

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8

Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements

Praveen Gauravaram, Katsuyuki Okeya

Hitachi, Ltd.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

The forthcoming NIST's Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) competition to select SHA-3 hash function requires that each candidate hash function submission must have at least one construction to support FIPS 198 HMAC application. As part of its evaluation, NIST is aiming to select either a candidate hash function which is more resistant to known side channel attacks (SCA) when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA than the other submitted alternatives. In response to this, we perform differential power analysis (DPA) on the possible smart card implementations of some of the recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a fully analyzed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC versions of some recently proposed hash and compression function modes. We show that the recently proposed BNMAC and KMDP MAC schemes are even weaker than NMAC/HMAC against the DPA attacks, whereas multi-lane NMAC, EMD MAC and the keyed wide-pipe hash have similar security to NMAC against the DPA attacks. Our DPA attacks do not work on the NMAC setting of MDC-2, Grindahl and MAME compression functions.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information and Communications Security : 10th International Conference, ICICS 2008 Birmingham, UK, October 20 - 22, 2008 Proceedings
Editors	Liqun Chen, Mark Ryan, Guilin Wang
Number of pages	436
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	2008
Edition	10
Pages	111-127
ISBN (Print)	978-3-540-88624-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8
Publication status	Published - 2008
Event	10th International Conference on Information and Communication Security - Birmingham, United Kingdom Duration: 20 Oct 2008 → 22 Oct 2008 Conference number: 10

Conference

Conference	10th International Conference on Information and Communication Security
Number	10
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Birmingham
Period	20/10/2008 → 22/10/2008

Series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Number	5308
ISSN	0302-9743

Keywords

hash functions
Applied cryptography
HMAC
side channel attacks

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10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8

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Gauravaram, Praveen ; Okeya, Katsuyuki. / Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements. Information and Communications Security: 10th International Conference, ICICS 2008 Birmingham, UK, October 20 - 22, 2008 Proceedings. editor / Liqun Chen ; Mark Ryan ; Guilin Wang. 10. ed. Springer, 2008. pp. 111-127 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; No. 5308).

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abstract = "The forthcoming NIST's Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) competition to select SHA-3 hash function requires that each candidate hash function submission must have at least one construction to support FIPS 198 HMAC application. As part of its evaluation, NIST is aiming to select either a candidate hash function which is more resistant to known side channel attacks (SCA) when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA than the other submitted alternatives. In response to this, we perform differential power analysis (DPA) on the possible smart card implementations of some of the recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a fully analyzed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC versions of some recently proposed hash and compression function modes. We show that the recently proposed BNMAC and KMDP MAC schemes are even weaker than NMAC/HMAC against the DPA attacks, whereas multi-lane NMAC, EMD MAC and the keyed wide-pipe hash have similar security to NMAC against the DPA attacks. Our DPA attacks do not work on the NMAC setting of MDC-2, Grindahl and MAME compression functions.",

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Gauravaram, P & Okeya, K 2008, Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements. in L Chen, M Ryan & G Wang (eds), Information and Communications Security: 10th International Conference, ICICS 2008 Birmingham, UK, October 20 - 22, 2008 Proceedings. 10 edn, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, no. 5308, pp. 111-127, 10th International Conference on Information and Communication Security, Birmingham, United Kingdom, 20/10/2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8

Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements. / Gauravaram, Praveen; Okeya, Katsuyuki.
Information and Communications Security: 10th International Conference, ICICS 2008 Birmingham, UK, October 20 - 22, 2008 Proceedings. ed. / Liqun Chen; Mark Ryan; Guilin Wang. 10. ed. Springer, 2008. p. 111-127 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; No. 5308).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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Gauravaram P, Okeya K. Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements. In Chen L, Ryan M, Wang G, editors, Information and Communications Security: 10th International Conference, ICICS 2008 Birmingham, UK, October 20 - 22, 2008 Proceedings. 10 ed. Springer. 2008. p. 111-127. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; No. 5308). doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_8

Side channel analysis of some hash based MACs: A response to SHA-3 requirements

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