rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices

Koen Pieter Tange; David Howard; Travis Shanahan; Stefano Pepe; Xenofon Fafoutis; Nicola Dragoni

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_14

rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices

Koen Pieter Tange, David Howard, Travis Shanahan, Stefano Pepe, Xenofon Fafoutis, Nicola Dragoni

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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Abstract

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol supports a fast zero round-trip time (0-RTT) session resumption mechanism, enabling clients to send data in their first flight of messages. This protocol has been designed with Web infrastructure in mind, and requires these first messages to not change any state on the server side, as it is susceptible to replay attacks. This is disastrous for common IoT scenarios, where sensors often transmit state-changing data to servers. As bandwidth is a huge concern in the IoT, the field stands to benefit significantly from an efficient session resumption protocol that does not suffer from these limitations. Building on the observation that in IoT scenarios the set of clients is often bounded and fairly static, we propose rTLS (ratchet TLS), an efficient 0-RTT session resumption protocol that dramatically decreases bandwidth overhead, while adding forward secrecy and breakin resilience, and is not susceptible against replay attacks.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 22^nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Place of Publication	9783030610777
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	2020
Pages	243-258
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_14
Publication status	Published - 2020
Event	2020 International Conference on Information and Communications Security - Virtual event Duration: 24 Aug 2020 → 27 Aug 2020

Conference

Conference	2020 International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Location	Virtual event
Period	24/08/2020 → 27/08/2020

Keywords

Network
Security
IoT
IIoT
TLS
Protocol

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10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_14

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title = "rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices",

abstract = "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol supports a fast zero round-trip time (0-RTT) session resumption mechanism, enabling clients to send data in their first flight of messages. This protocol has been designed with Web infrastructure in mind, and requires these first messages to not change any state on the server side, as it is susceptible to replay attacks. This is disastrous for common IoT scenarios, where sensors often transmit state-changing data to servers. As bandwidth is a huge concern in the IoT, the field stands to benefit significantly from an efficient session resumption protocol that does not suffer from these limitations. Building on the observation that in IoT scenarios the set of clients is often bounded and fairly static, we propose rTLS (ratchet TLS), an efficient 0-RTT session resumption protocol that dramatically decreases bandwidth overhead, while adding forward secrecy and breakin resilience, and is not susceptible against replay attacks.",

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author = "Tange, {Koen Pieter} and David Howard and Travis Shanahan and Stefano Pepe and Xenofon Fafoutis and Nicola Dragoni",

year = "2020",

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language = "English",

pages = "243--258",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security",

publisher = "Springer",

note = "2020 International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2020 ; Conference date: 24-08-2020 Through 27-08-2020",

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Tange, KP, Howard, D, Shanahan, T, Pepe, S, Fafoutis, X & Dragoni, N 2020, rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices. in Proceedings of the 22^nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security. Springer, 9783030610777, pp. 243-258, 2020 International Conference on Information and Communications Security, 24/08/2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_14

rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices. / Tange, Koen Pieter; Howard, David; Shanahan, Travis et al.
Proceedings of the 22^nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security. 9783030610777: Springer, 2020. p. 243-258.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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rTLS: Lightweight TLS Session Resumption for Constrained IoT Devices

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Keywords

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