Route 66: Passively Breaking All GSM Channels

Philip S. Vejre; Andrey Bogdanov

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_28

Route 66: Passively Breaking All GSM Channels

Philip S. Vejre, Andrey Bogdanov

Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

Technical University of Denmark

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

The A5/2 stream cipher used for encryption in the GSM mobile phone standard has previously been shown to have serious weaknesses. Due to a lack of key separation and flaws in the security protocols, these vulnerabilities can also compromise the stronger GSM ciphers A5/1 and A5/3. Despite GSM's huge impact in the field, only a small selection of its channels have been analyzed. In this paper, we perform a complete practical-complexity, ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of all 66 encoded GSM channels. Moreover, we present a new passive attack which recovers the encryption key by exploiting the location updating procedure of the GSM protocol. This update is performed automatically even when the phone is not actively used. Interestingly, the attack potentially enables eavesdropping of future calls.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security and Privacy : 19th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2014. Proceedings
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	2014
Pages	422-429
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-08343-8
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-08344-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_28
Publication status	Published - 2014
Event	19th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy - Wollongong, Australia Duration: 7 Jul 2014 → 9 Jul 2014 Conference number: 19

Conference

Conference	19th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Number	19
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Wollongong
Period	07/07/2014 → 09/07/2014

Series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	8544
ISSN	0302-9743

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10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_28

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title = "Route 66: Passively Breaking All GSM Channels",

abstract = "The A5/2 stream cipher used for encryption in the GSM mobile phone standard has previously been shown to have serious weaknesses. Due to a lack of key separation and flaws in the security protocols, these vulnerabilities can also compromise the stronger GSM ciphers A5/1 and A5/3. Despite GSM's huge impact in the field, only a small selection of its channels have been analyzed. In this paper, we perform a complete practical-complexity, ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of all 66 encoded GSM channels. Moreover, we present a new passive attack which recovers the encryption key by exploiting the location updating procedure of the GSM protocol. This update is performed automatically even when the phone is not actively used. Interestingly, the attack potentially enables eavesdropping of future calls.",

author = "Vejre, {Philip S.} and Andrey Bogdanov",

year = "2014",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_28",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-08343-8",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer",

pages = "422--429",

booktitle = "Information Security and Privacy",

note = "19th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2014 ; Conference date: 07-07-2014 Through 09-07-2014",

}

Vejre, PS & Bogdanov, A 2014, Route 66: Passively Breaking All GSM Channels. in Information Security and Privacy: 19th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2014. Proceedings. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8544, pp. 422-429, 19th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, Wollongong, Australia, 07/07/2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_28

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N2 - The A5/2 stream cipher used for encryption in the GSM mobile phone standard has previously been shown to have serious weaknesses. Due to a lack of key separation and flaws in the security protocols, these vulnerabilities can also compromise the stronger GSM ciphers A5/1 and A5/3. Despite GSM's huge impact in the field, only a small selection of its channels have been analyzed. In this paper, we perform a complete practical-complexity, ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of all 66 encoded GSM channels. Moreover, we present a new passive attack which recovers the encryption key by exploiting the location updating procedure of the GSM protocol. This update is performed automatically even when the phone is not actively used. Interestingly, the attack potentially enables eavesdropping of future calls.

AB - The A5/2 stream cipher used for encryption in the GSM mobile phone standard has previously been shown to have serious weaknesses. Due to a lack of key separation and flaws in the security protocols, these vulnerabilities can also compromise the stronger GSM ciphers A5/1 and A5/3. Despite GSM's huge impact in the field, only a small selection of its channels have been analyzed. In this paper, we perform a complete practical-complexity, ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of all 66 encoded GSM channels. Moreover, we present a new passive attack which recovers the encryption key by exploiting the location updating procedure of the GSM protocol. This update is performed automatically even when the phone is not actively used. Interestingly, the attack potentially enables eavesdropping of future calls.

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Y2 - 7 July 2014 through 9 July 2014

ER -

Route 66: Passively Breaking All GSM Channels

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