RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows

Altug Tosun; Michele De Donno; Nicola Dragoni; Xenofon Fafoutis

doi:10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688

RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows

Altug Tosun, Michele De Donno, Nicola Dragoni, Xenofon Fafoutis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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Abstract

The number of residential proxies as a service has grown as an emerging gray-area business, in which a provider utilises (compromised) hosts inside residential networks in order to provide anonymity services, effectively hiding the IP addresses of their clients behind other, seemingly normal, Residential IP (RESIP) addresses. This paper investigates commercial RESIP proxy service providers and looks into their host recruitment practices, which are often suspicious or borderline legal. In turn, the paper proposes a detection mechanism for identifying RESIP proxy flows on compromised consumer electronic devices, whereby the proxy software may operate without the user’s knowledge or explicit consent.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 39^th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics
Number of pages	6
Publisher	IEEE
Publication date	2022
ISBN (Print)	978-1-7281-9767-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688
Publication status	Published - 2022
Event	2021 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Tuscany Suites & Casinos, Las Vegas, United States Duration: 10 Jan 2021 → 12 Jan 2021 Conference number: 39 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/9427462/proceeding

Conference

Conference	2021 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics
Number	39
Location	Tuscany Suites & Casinos
Country/Territory	United States
City	Las Vegas
Period	10/01/2021 → 12/01/2021
Internet address	https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/9427462/proceeding

Keywords

Residential Proxy
Proxy Detection
Traffic Analysis
IoT Security

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10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688

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@inproceedings{d592f0cd5ade486f834a9f15b0c39fa8,

title = "RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows",

abstract = "The number of residential proxies as a service has grown as an emerging gray-area business, in which a provider utilises (compromised) hosts inside residential networks in order to provide anonymity services, effectively hiding the IP addresses of their clients behind other, seemingly normal, Residential IP (RESIP) addresses. This paper investigates commercial RESIP proxy service providers and looks into their host recruitment practices, which are often suspicious or borderline legal. In turn, the paper proposes a detection mechanism for identifying RESIP proxy flows on compromised consumer electronic devices, whereby the proxy software may operate without the user{\textquoteright}s knowledge or explicit consent.",

keywords = "Residential Proxy, Proxy Detection, Traffic Analysis, IoT Security",

author = "Altug Tosun and {De Donno}, Michele and Nicola Dragoni and Xenofon Fafoutis",

year = "2022",

doi = "10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-1-7281-9767-8",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 39th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics",

publisher = "IEEE",

address = "United States",

note = "2021 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics, ICCE 2021 ; Conference date: 10-01-2021 Through 12-01-2021",

url = "https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/9427462/proceeding",

}

Tosun, A, De Donno, M, Dragoni, N & Fafoutis, X 2022, RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows. in Proceedings of the 39^th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics. IEEE, 2021 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics, Las Vegas, Nevada, United States, 10/01/2021. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688

TY - GEN

T1 - RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows

AU - Tosun, Altug

AU - De Donno, Michele

AU - Dragoni, Nicola

AU - Fafoutis, Xenofon

N1 - Conference code: 39

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - The number of residential proxies as a service has grown as an emerging gray-area business, in which a provider utilises (compromised) hosts inside residential networks in order to provide anonymity services, effectively hiding the IP addresses of their clients behind other, seemingly normal, Residential IP (RESIP) addresses. This paper investigates commercial RESIP proxy service providers and looks into their host recruitment practices, which are often suspicious or borderline legal. In turn, the paper proposes a detection mechanism for identifying RESIP proxy flows on compromised consumer electronic devices, whereby the proxy software may operate without the user’s knowledge or explicit consent.

AB - The number of residential proxies as a service has grown as an emerging gray-area business, in which a provider utilises (compromised) hosts inside residential networks in order to provide anonymity services, effectively hiding the IP addresses of their clients behind other, seemingly normal, Residential IP (RESIP) addresses. This paper investigates commercial RESIP proxy service providers and looks into their host recruitment practices, which are often suspicious or borderline legal. In turn, the paper proposes a detection mechanism for identifying RESIP proxy flows on compromised consumer electronic devices, whereby the proxy software may operate without the user’s knowledge or explicit consent.

KW - Residential Proxy

KW - Proxy Detection

KW - Traffic Analysis

KW - IoT Security

U2 - 10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688

DO - 10.1109/ICCE50685.2021.9427688

M3 - Article in proceedings

SN - 978-1-7281-9767-8

BT - Proceedings of the 39th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics

PB - IEEE

T2 - 2021 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics

Y2 - 10 January 2021 through 12 January 2021

ER -

RESIP Host Detection: Identification of Malicious Residential IP Proxy Flows

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