Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols

Andreas Viktor Hess, Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, Anders Schlichtkrull

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In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of 34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Number of pages36
Publication date2021
ISBN (Print)9781728176079
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Event2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium - Virtual conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia
Duration: 21 Jun 202125 Jun 2021
Conference number: 34


Conference2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
LocationVirtual conference
Internet address


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