Supply chain collaboration has the potential to address issues of ineffciency and lack of coordination that often drives down the competitiveness of supply chains. However, collaboration in supply chains is dicult due to ever increasing complexity and con icting objectives prevalent in supply chains, and a growing challenge is to be able to identify the optimal conguration of collaboration that benets the supply chain as a whole. The inherent complexity of supply chains has lead to the emergence of so-called orchestrators to help coordinate supply chains and enable collaboration. In this paper we address a specic problem that an orchestrator might face: given a set of potential coalitions that could form in a given supply chain, together with the means by which collaborative benets should be allocated, which coalition should form? We propose a new methodology based on what we call leading coalitions to address this coalition selection problem, which borrows concepts from cooperative game theory to ensure stability and fairness of the nal selection. The proposed methodology is applied to linear production processes where agents collaborate by pooling their resources, and a computational study is performed on a large set of instances in order to gain insight into the working of the methodology.
|Series||Tilburg University. Center for Economic Research. Discussion Paper (Online)|
- Supply chain collaboration
- Cooperative bargaining
- Nucleolus selections
- Linear production processes