Non-interference is the property of a program not to leak any secret information. In this paper we propose a notion of non-interference for an abstract version of the Java Card bytecode language. Furthermore an information-flow analysis for verifying non-interference is developed and proved sound and correct with respect to the formal semantics of the language. The information-flow analysis can automatically verify the absence of leaks in a program, thus proving non-interference. Based on the definition of non-interference we propose a notion of simple erasure policies. These allow to statically check that confidential information is unavailable after a certain point---and that this unavailability is enforced by the system. This is a crucial requirement for systems like e-commerce or e-voting.
|Title of host publication||6th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS '06)|
|Publication status||Published - 2006|
|Event||6th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS '06) - |
Duration: 1 Jan 2006 → …
|Conference||6th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS '06)|
|Period||01/01/2006 → …|