Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation

Patricia Bouyer; Nicolas Markey; Steen Vester

doi:10.4204/EPTCS.146.7

Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation

Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Steen Vester

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning
Editors	F. Mogavero, A. Murano, M. Y. Vardi
Publication date	2014
Pages	49-55
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.7
Publication status	Published - 2014
Event	2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning - Grenoble, France Duration: 5 Apr 2014 → 6 Apr 2014 Conference number: 2 http://www.strategicreasoning.net/

Conference

Conference	2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning
Number	2
Country	France
City	Grenoble
Period	05/04/2014 → 06/04/2014
Internet address	http://www.strategicreasoning.net/

Access to Document

10.4204/EPTCS.146.7

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title = "Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation",

abstract = "We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.",

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AB - We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.

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DO - 10.4204/EPTCS.146.7

M3 - Article in proceedings

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BT - Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning

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