Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation

Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, Steen Vester

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning
EditorsF. Mogavero, A. Murano, M. Y. Vardi
Publication date2014
Pages49-55
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning - Grenoble, France
Duration: 5 Apr 20146 Apr 2014
Conference number: 2
http://www.strategicreasoning.net/

Conference

Conference2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning
Number2
CountryFrance
CityGrenoble
Period05/04/201406/04/2014
Internet address

Cite this

Bouyer, P., Markey, N., & Vester, S. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation. In F. Mogavero, A. Murano, & M. Y. Vardi (Eds.), Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning (pp. 49-55) https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.7