Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game

Marco Zugno, Juan Miguel Morales González, Pierre Pinson, Henrik Madsen

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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    Abstract

    We model the retail market with dynamic pricing as a Stackelberg game where both retailers (leaders) and flexible consumers (followers) solve an economic cost-minimization problem. The electricity retailer optimizes an economic objective over a daily horizon by setting an hourly price-sequence, which is then communicated to the end-consumers. In turn, on the basis of such price sequence, consumers optimize a utility function that accounts both for energy procurement costs and for the benefit loss resulting from deferring consumption. The game is formulated as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and cast as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP), which can be solved using off-the-shelf optimization software. In an illustrative example, we consider a retailer associated with both flexible demand and wind power production. Such an example shows the efficiency of dynamic pricing as a way to control the load for minimizing the imbalances due to wind power, assesses the overall economic results for the retailer and the consumers as well as the dynamic properties of consumer flexibility.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date2012
    Number of pages11
    Publication statusPublished - 2012
    Event12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability - Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy
    Duration: 9 Sep 201212 Sep 2012
    http://www.iaeeu2012.it/

    Conference

    Conference12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability
    LocationCa' Foscari University of Venice
    CountryItaly
    CityVenice
    Period09/09/201212/09/2012
    Internet address

    Keywords

    • Demand response
    • Bilevel programming
    • Stackelberg games
    • Wind power
    • Electricity markets

    Cite this

    Zugno, M., Morales González, J. M., Pinson, P., & Madsen, H. (2012). Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game. Paper presented at 12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability , Venice, Italy.
    Zugno, Marco ; Morales González, Juan Miguel ; Pinson, Pierre ; Madsen, Henrik. / Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game. Paper presented at 12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability , Venice, Italy.11 p.
    @conference{195f7a19d9ff468e90e6028086f73598,
    title = "Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game",
    abstract = "We model the retail market with dynamic pricing as a Stackelberg game where both retailers (leaders) and flexible consumers (followers) solve an economic cost-minimization problem. The electricity retailer optimizes an economic objective over a daily horizon by setting an hourly price-sequence, which is then communicated to the end-consumers. In turn, on the basis of such price sequence, consumers optimize a utility function that accounts both for energy procurement costs and for the benefit loss resulting from deferring consumption. The game is formulated as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and cast as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP), which can be solved using off-the-shelf optimization software. In an illustrative example, we consider a retailer associated with both flexible demand and wind power production. Such an example shows the efficiency of dynamic pricing as a way to control the load for minimizing the imbalances due to wind power, assesses the overall economic results for the retailer and the consumers as well as the dynamic properties of consumer flexibility.",
    keywords = "Demand response, Bilevel programming, Stackelberg games, Wind power, Electricity markets",
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    language = "English",
    note = "12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability ; Conference date: 09-09-2012 Through 12-09-2012",
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    Zugno, M, Morales González, JM, Pinson, P & Madsen, H 2012, 'Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game' Paper presented at 12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability , Venice, Italy, 09/09/2012 - 12/09/2012, .

    Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game. / Zugno, Marco; Morales González, Juan Miguel; Pinson, Pierre; Madsen, Henrik.

    2012. Paper presented at 12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability , Venice, Italy.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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    T1 - Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game

    AU - Zugno, Marco

    AU - Morales González, Juan Miguel

    AU - Pinson, Pierre

    AU - Madsen, Henrik

    PY - 2012

    Y1 - 2012

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    AB - We model the retail market with dynamic pricing as a Stackelberg game where both retailers (leaders) and flexible consumers (followers) solve an economic cost-minimization problem. The electricity retailer optimizes an economic objective over a daily horizon by setting an hourly price-sequence, which is then communicated to the end-consumers. In turn, on the basis of such price sequence, consumers optimize a utility function that accounts both for energy procurement costs and for the benefit loss resulting from deferring consumption. The game is formulated as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and cast as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP), which can be solved using off-the-shelf optimization software. In an illustrative example, we consider a retailer associated with both flexible demand and wind power production. Such an example shows the efficiency of dynamic pricing as a way to control the load for minimizing the imbalances due to wind power, assesses the overall economic results for the retailer and the consumers as well as the dynamic properties of consumer flexibility.

    KW - Demand response

    KW - Bilevel programming

    KW - Stackelberg games

    KW - Wind power

    KW - Electricity markets

    M3 - Paper

    ER -

    Zugno M, Morales González JM, Pinson P, Madsen H. Modeling Demand Response in Electricity Retail Markets as a Stackelberg Game. 2012. Paper presented at 12th IAEE European Energy Conference: Energy challenge and environmental sustainability , Venice, Italy.