Memory Offloading for Remote Attestation of Multi-Service IoT Devices†

Edlira Dushku*, Jeppe Hagelskjær Østergaard, Nicola Dragoni

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Abstract

Remote attestation (RA) is an effective malware detection mechanism that allows a trusted entity (Verifier) to detect a potentially compromised remote device (Prover). The recent research works are proposing advanced Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) protocols that are able to trace the Prover’s execution flow to detect runtime attacks. Nevertheless, several memory regions remain unattested, leaving the Prover vulnerable to data memory and mobile adversaries. Multi-service devices, whose integrity is also dependent on the integrity of any attached external peripheral devices, are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. This paper extends the state-of-the-art RA schemes by presenting ERAMO, a protocol that attests larger memory regions by adopting the memory offloading approach. We validate and evaluate ERAMO with a hardware proof-of-concept implementation using a TrustZone-capable LPC55S69 running two sensor nodes. We enhance the protocol by providing extensive memory analysis insights for multi-service devices, demonstrating that it is possible to analyze and attest the memory of the attached peripherals. Experiments confirm the feasibility and effectiveness of ERAMO in attesting dynamic memory regions.
Original languageEnglish
Article number4340
JournalSensors
Volume22
Issue number12
Number of pages28
ISSN1424-8220
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Keywords

  • IoT security
  • Remote attestation
  • Dynamic attestation
  • Multi-service IoT device
  • Memory offloading

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