TY - BOOK
T1 - Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements
T2 - Exemplified by Railway Interlocking Systems
AU - Hansen, Kirsten Mark
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards
identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event
trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety
requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the
safety analysis and the system design use the same system model
and that this model is formalized in a real-time, interval logic,
based on a conventional dynamic systems model with a state over
time. The three safety analysis techniques are interpreted in this
model and it is shown how to derive safety requirements for
components of a system.
AB - Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards
identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event
trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety
requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the
safety analysis and the system design use the same system model
and that this model is formalized in a real-time, interval logic,
based on a conventional dynamic systems model with a state over
time. The three safety analysis techniques are interpreted in this
model and it is shown how to derive safety requirements for
components of a system.
M3 - Book
BT - Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements
PB - Institut for Informationsteknologi, DTU
CY - Lyngby, Denmark
ER -