Abstract
We develop a type system for identifying the information flow between variables in a program in the Guarded Commands language. First we characterise the types of information flow that may arise between variables in a non-deterministic program: explicit, implicit, bypassing, correlated or sanitised. Next we allow to specify security policies in a number of traditional ways based on mandatory access control: defining a security lattice, working with components or decentralised labels, both as pertains to confidentiality and integrity. Offending information flows are those identified by the type system and that violate the security policy; a program is sufficiently secure if it contains only acceptable information flows.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Models, Languages, and Tools for Concurrent and Distributed Programming |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Publication date | 1 Jan 2019 |
| Pages | 455-470 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-030-21484-5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2019 |
| Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 11665 LNCS |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 |
Cite this
Nielson, F., & Nielson, H. R. (2019). Lightweight information flow. In Models, Languages, and Tools for Concurrent and Distributed Programming (pp. 455-470). Springer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Vol.. 11665 LNCS https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21485-2_25