Electricity Market Equilibrium Under Information Asymmetry

Vladimir Dvorkin, Jalal Kazempour, Pierre Pinson

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We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the probability distribution of this uncertainty is not identical at the day-ahead stage. We show a high sensitivity of the equilibrium solution to the level of information asymmetry and demonstrate economic, operational, and computational value for the system stemming from potential information sharing.

Original languageEnglish
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number6
Pages (from-to)521-526
Publication statusPublished - 2019


  • Asymmetry of information
  • Distributed optimization
  • Electricity market
  • Equilibrium
  • Existence and uniqueness
  • Uncertainty


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