DEMO: Towards A Novel Ultrasonic Side-channel Attack on Mobile Devices

Yingli Duan; Weizhi Meng; Wei Yang Chiu; Yu Wang

doi:10.1145/3672202.3673730

DEMO: Towards A Novel Ultrasonic Side-channel Attack on Mobile Devices

Yingli Duan, Weizhi Meng, Wei Yang Chiu, Yu Wang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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Abstract

In this work, we introduce an innovative ultrasonic side-channel attack that can leak users' data on smart devices, through leveraging Browser Extensions in terms of their streamlined access to privileged browser resources. Our attack can covertly monitor users' private data based on attackers' specified commands and facilitate surreptitious data transmission in practice.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2024 Conference
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Publication date	2024
Pages	101-103
ISBN (Electronic)	979-8-4007-0717-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3672202.3673730
Publication status	Published - 2024
Event	ACM SIGCOMM 2024 - Sydney, Australia Duration: 4 Aug 2024 → 8 Aug 2024

Conference

Conference	ACM SIGCOMM 2024
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Sydney
Period	04/08/2024 → 08/08/2024

Keywords

Chrome extension
Data leakage
Phone security
Side-channel attack
Ultrasound

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10.1145/3672202.3673730Licence: CC BY-NC

FulltextFinal published version, 464 KBLicence: CC BY-NC

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title = "DEMO: Towards A Novel Ultrasonic Side-channel Attack on Mobile Devices",

abstract = "In this work, we introduce an innovative ultrasonic side-channel attack that can leak users' data on smart devices, through leveraging Browser Extensions in terms of their streamlined access to privileged browser resources. Our attack can covertly monitor users' private data based on attackers' specified commands and facilitate surreptitious data transmission in practice.",

keywords = "Chrome extension, Data leakage, Phone security, Side-channel attack, Ultrasound",

author = "Yingli Duan and Weizhi Meng and Chiu, {Wei Yang} and Yu Wang",

year = "2024",

doi = "10.1145/3672202.3673730",

language = "English",

pages = "101--103",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2024 Conference",

publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",

address = "United States",

note = "ACM SIGCOMM 2024 ; Conference date: 04-08-2024 Through 08-08-2024",

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AU - Duan, Yingli

AU - Meng, Weizhi

AU - Chiu, Wei Yang

AU - Wang, Yu

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - In this work, we introduce an innovative ultrasonic side-channel attack that can leak users' data on smart devices, through leveraging Browser Extensions in terms of their streamlined access to privileged browser resources. Our attack can covertly monitor users' private data based on attackers' specified commands and facilitate surreptitious data transmission in practice.

AB - In this work, we introduce an innovative ultrasonic side-channel attack that can leak users' data on smart devices, through leveraging Browser Extensions in terms of their streamlined access to privileged browser resources. Our attack can covertly monitor users' private data based on attackers' specified commands and facilitate surreptitious data transmission in practice.

KW - Chrome extension

KW - Data leakage

KW - Phone security

KW - Side-channel attack

KW - Ultrasound

U2 - 10.1145/3672202.3673730

DO - 10.1145/3672202.3673730

M3 - Article in proceedings

SP - 101

EP - 103

BT - Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2024 Conference

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

T2 - ACM SIGCOMM 2024

Y2 - 4 August 2024 through 8 August 2024

ER -

DEMO: Towards A Novel Ultrasonic Side-channel Attack on Mobile Devices

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