We consider dynamic congestion in an urban setting where trip origins are spatially distributed. All travelers must pass through a downtown bottleneck in order to reach their destination in the CBD. Each traveler chooses departure time to maximize general concave scheduling utility. At equilibrium, travelers sort according to their distance to the destination. We construct a welfare maximizing tolling regime, which eliminates congestion. All travelers located beyond a critical distance from the CBD gain from tolling, even when toll revenues are not redistributed, while nearby travelers lose. We discuss our results in the context of acceptability of tolling policies.
|Title of host publication||Kuhmo Nectar Conference and Summer School on Transportation Economics|
|Publication status||Published - 2010|
|Event||Kuhmo Nectar Conference and Summer School on Transportation Economics 2010 - Valencia, Spain|
Duration: 5 Jul 2010 → 9 Jul 2010
|Conference||Kuhmo Nectar Conference and Summer School on Transportation Economics 2010|
|Period||05/07/2010 → 09/07/2010|
Bibliographical noteWe thank Richard Arnott for comments. Mogens Fosgerau is funded by the Danish Council for Strategic Research. Support is gratefully acknowledged from PREDIT and ADEME grants to project "Tarification des Transports Individuels et Collectifs à Paris: Dynamique de l’acceptabilité". The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Mini. de l’Ecol., de l’Energie, du Dévelop. durable et de la Mer. This paper has been screened to make sure that no confidential information has been disclosed by the authors.
- Spatial differentiation
- Dynamic model
- Toll policy