Bidding in sequential electricity markets: The Nordic case

For electricity market participants trading in sequential markets with differences in price levels and risk exposure, coordinated bidding is highly relevant. We consider a Nordic power producer who engages in the day-ahead spot market and the near real-time balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and dispatched volumes are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the balancing market, the agent faces an additional risk of not being dispatched. Taking into account the sequential clearing of these markets and the gradual realization of market prices, we formulate the bidding problem as a multi-stage stochastic program. We investigate whether higher risk exposure can explain the hesitation, often observed in practice, to bid into the balancing market, even in cases of higher expected price levels. Furthermore, we quantify the gain from coordinated bidding, and by deriving bounds on this gain, assess the performance of alternative bidding strategies used in practice.