Abstract
Allowing a compromised device to e.g., receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings carries significant privacy risks, but to implement the relying party of a contemporary attestation protocol in a computationally constrained sensor is not feasible, and the network reach of a sensor is often limited. In this paper, we present a remote platform attestation protocol suitable for relying parties that are limited to symmetric-key cryptography and a single communication channel. We validate its security with the ProVerif model checker.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP |
Volume | 1 |
Publisher | SCITEPRESS Digital Library |
Publication date | 2024 |
Pages | 701-708 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-989-758-683-5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Event | 10th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Rome, Italy Duration: 26 Feb 2024 → 28 Feb 2024 |
Conference
Conference | 10th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
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Country/Territory | Italy |
City | Rome |
Period | 26/02/2024 → 28/02/2024 |
Keywords
- Remote Attestation
- Device Security
- Model Checking