Okeya has established that HMAC/NMAC implementations based on only Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) PGV scheme and his two refined PGV schemes are secure against side channel DPA attacks when the block cipher in these constructions is secure against these attacks. The significant result of Okeya's analysis is that the implementations of HMAC/NMAC with the Davies-Meyer (DM) compression function based hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 are vulnerable to side channel attacks. In this paper, first we show a partial key recovery attack on NMAC/HMAC based on Okeya's two refined PGV schemes by taking practical constraints into consideration. Next, we propose new hybrid NMAC/HMAC schemes for security against side channel attacks assuming that their underlying block cipher is ideal. We then show that M-NMAC, MDx-MAC and a variant of the envelope MAC scheme based on DM with an ideal block cipher are secure against DPA attacks.
|Title of host publication||INDOCRYPT 2007 : 8th International Conference on Cryptology in India|
|Editors||Kannan Srinathan, Pandu Rangan, Moti Yung|
|Place of Publication||Berlin Heidelberg|
|Publication status||Published - 2007|
|Event||8th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology - Chennai, India|
Duration: 9 Dec 2007 → 13 Dec 2007
Conference number: 8
|Conference||8th International Conference on Cryptology in India|
|Period||09/12/2007 → 13/12/2007|
|Series||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
Bibliographical noteThis content in the paper is supported by The Danish Research Council for Technology and Production Sciences grant no. 274-05-0151 and partly supported by National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan.
- Side channel attacks