Adressing Delays on a Rail Network with a Decentralised Incentive Scheme

Ole Kveiborg

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Abstract

This paper discusses the potential use of a theoretical regulatory instrument in a setting where the individual choice of quality have spill over effects on other individuals. This instrument is called the compensation mechanism. The analysis is carried out in a specific rail set-up, where quality causes delays, which those suffering from the delays are not compensated. The compensation mechanism ensures an optimal choice of quality by the rail operators without having an outside regulatory body setting standards or levying externality taxes. The paper discusses some relevant issues in relation to a practical use of such a decentralized incentive based scheme.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings from 10th World Conference on Transport Research
VolumeCD-rom
Publication date2004
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes
Event10th World Conference on Transport Research Society - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: 4 Jul 20048 Jul 2004
Conference number: 10
http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=842536

Conference

Conference10th World Conference on Transport Research Society
Number10
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period04/07/200408/07/2004
Internet address

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