Abstract
Static analysis is successfully used for automatically validating
security properties of classical cryptographic protocols. In this paper,
we shall employ the same technique to a modern security protocol
for wireless networks, namely the latest version of the Privacy and Key
Management protocol for IEEE 802.16e, PKMv2. This protocol seems
to have an exaggerated mixture of security features. Thus, we iteratively
investigate which components are necessary for upholding the security
properties and which can be omitted safely. This approach is based on
the LySa process calculus and employs the corresponding automated
analysis tool, the LySaTool.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis |
Editors | Pierpaolo Degano, Ralf Kusters, Luca Vigano, Steve Zdancewic |
Publication date | 2007 |
Pages | 149-164 |
Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Event | Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis - Wrocław, Poland Duration: 1 Jan 2007 → … |
Conference
Conference | Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis |
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City | Wrocław, Poland |
Period | 01/01/2007 → … |