A Cache Timing Analysis of HC-256

Erik Zenner

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    In this paper, we describe a cache-timing attack against the stream cipher HC-256, which is the strong version of eStream winner HC-128. The attack is based on an abstract model of cache timing attacks that can also be used for designing stream ciphers. From the observations made in our analysis, we derive a number of design principles for hardening ciphers against cache timing attacks.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationSelected Areas in Cryptography : Workshop Proceedings
    EditorsR. Avanzi, L. Keliher, F. Sica
    PublisherSpringer
    Publication date2009
    Pages199-213
    Publication statusPublished - 2009
    EventSelected Areas in Cryptography: 15th Annual International Workshop - Sackville, Canada
    Duration: 14 Aug 200815 Aug 2008
    Conference number: 15

    Workshop

    WorkshopSelected Areas in Cryptography: 15th Annual International Workshop
    Number15
    Country/TerritoryCanada
    CitySackville
    Period14/08/200815/08/2008
    SeriesSpringer Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
    Number5381

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