South-South Development Cooperation and Soft Power. The case of Brazil's foreign policy and technical cooperation

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South-South Development Cooperation and Soft Power
The case of Brazil's foreign policy and technical cooperation

by

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'Untying aid, by restoring choice to the impoverished recipient countries would, at one swoop, increase the value of aid, remove a distortion to world commerce and enhance the dignity of the aid process that has been sullied by the mercantilist attitudes of some in the developed world.' (Statement by Mr. Donald J. Johnston, OECD Secretary-General, WTO ministerial meeting, 30 November, 1999.)
Acknowledgements

My PhD started three and a half years ago. It has been an exciting, sometimes exhausting but overall fantastic journey that enabled me to open my academic horizon, meet wonderful people and touch other cultures and regions of the world. This PhD has been challenging in so many ways. I owe it therefore to different set of people who showed support, patience and friendship and without whom this PhD would not have been the same.

First of all my supervisors, Miriam Hinostroza, James Haselip and Arne Wangel. I am thankful for their support, always leaving the door open to answer my doubts and sometimes what must have appeared to be incongruous questions. Also, already at an early stage Professor Bruno Ayllón Pino expressed interest in my project and gave me the contacts and information I needed to move forward. This academic relationship has now turned into friendship which makes an important additional bonus to my PhD.

As of friendship, support and occasional stress-relief breaks, there is not enough space to list all the people who helped me go through this process. However, I feel I have to name some very important persons: my office mate and PhD fellow, Maryna Karavai, for her positive attitude and useful comments, Zyaad Boodoo, another PhD fellow, for reading and re-reading drafts always with constructive and positive feedback (or that is at least how I remember it), and finally my best friend, Sonja, who made sure I did not completely fall into the abyss of research by helping maintaining a social life.

Last but not least, I want to thank my boyfriend, Casper, and my family who practically had to do all of the above and more, always showing interest on my PhD topic. They literally spent hundreds of hours listening to unceasing flows of joy, complains, excitement and doubts for the past three and a half years. I am particularly grateful to Casper for his love, support, patience and for making me 'look up' in the most difficult moments of this PhD study.
Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to advance scientific knowledge on South-South Development Cooperation and on the understanding of southern countries’ ambitions in contributing to international development, taking Brazil as a case. The main research question addresses the reasons behind Brazil’s participation in development cooperation and how these international political ambitions influence the project model of its South-South Development Cooperation, called technical cooperation. This was done by investigating the manifestations of ‘soft power’ in Brazilian development cooperation activities in three articles elaborated during the research.

Considering the dearth of information about South-South Cooperation, the first article critically reviews the construction and principles of South-South Cooperation and its main instrument, South-South Development Cooperation. The need for rapid solutions to the problems caused by climate change have accelerated the debate about the effectiveness of development aid and prompted the search for alternatives to the northern aid model. By drawing a distinction with the ‘traditional’ aid approach, South-South Cooperation is gaining more and more relevance in the aid debate on the model of project implementation. Several approaches and principles such as horizontality, demand-driven or mutual benefit originate from the southern countries’ claims and shape their international development narrative. The first article therefore advances the understanding of the southern countries’ narrative on international development by categorising the values and approaches put forward within South-South Cooperation and South-South Development Cooperation. This categorisation provides a framework that enables further investigation on the southern participation in development cooperation.

The second and third articles apply the theory of soft power to study Brazil’s ambitions in participating in development cooperation. Elaborated by Joseph Nye, soft power theory asserts that a country can gain or maintain power by making its image attractive to other countries. To date, empirical research has focused on the results of a soft power strategy
rather than on soft power creation, both at the agent’s and the subject’s end. These articles provide empirical evidence at both ends of soft power generation (the agent’s actions and the subject’s perception), enabling further development on the conceptualisation and implementation of South-South Development projects. Specifically, the second article investigates how the Brazilian government under President Lula (2003-2011), in this case the agent, conceptualised its 'soft empowerment' with the help of its cooperation agency by influencing its organisation, sectors and targets and by increasing its budget with the objective of constructing positive outcomes. The findings therefore support Nye’s assumptions of international relations by showcasing that Brazil (the agent) relied on the suppositions that its image has a role in the achievement of its wishes. Addressing the subject’s end (in this case the 'recipients'), the third article demonstrates that the perceived manifestation of South-South Cooperation principles produced a positive image of Brazil among the 'recipients', thus offering empirical support to the idea that obtaining soft power is dependent upon image and perception. It also establishes that the 'recipients' emphasize the style rather than the content or completion of the project' activities. This reveals the priority given by the 'recipients' to the respect demonstrated for the principles of South-South Cooperation in development cooperation projects.

This thesis thus confirms the key element of context in soft power, i.e. that soft power was obtained not because of the resource used (development projects) but how this resource was used. Furthermore, this research underlines the importance of the subject’s positive reception of the agent’s attractive actions without which a country’s soft power is non-existent. Therefore this thesis maintains that soft power theory should shift its current analytical focus from the agent to the subject and enhance the analysis on the role of subject’s perceptions in the creation of ‘soft empowerment’.

Dansk résumé

Formålet med afhandlingen er at bidrage til videreudvikling af forskningen omkring syd-syd udviklingssamarbejde og forståelsen af de sydlige landes ambitioner i dette samarbejde ved at undersøge anvendelsen af såkaldt 'blød magt' i landenes udviklingsprojekter.
Afhandlingen afdækker de underliggende bevæggrunde for Brasiliens deltagelse i syd-syd udviklingssamarbejde samt hvordan Brasiliens ambitioner i dette samarbejde influerer på den foretrukne model for landets syd-syd-udviklingssamarbejde, kaldet teknisk samarbejde.


Ved at bygge på disse principper omkring syd-syd samarbejde var Brasilien i stand til at fremkalde et positivt billede udadtil og syd-syd udviklingssamarbejde var ét af instrumenterne i udenrigspolitikken, der blev anvendt for at opnå denne profilering. Et lands profilering relaterer sig til Joseph Nyes teori, der er fremsat indenfor litteraturen omkring internationale relationer kaldet 'blød magtanvendelse', som argumenter for, at et land kan opnå eller bibeholde politisk magt ved at profilere sig positivt overfor andre lande og derved opnå deres støtte og opbakning. Der er dog indenfor denne litteratur en general mangel på empiriske studier omkring resultaterne af et lands anvendte blød magt strategi både i forhold til afsenderne og modtagerne.

I afhandlingens anden og tredje artikel gennemføres en empirisk undersøgelse af magtanvendelse i syd-syd udviklingssamarbejde, der lægger vægt både på afsenderne og
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Abbreviations

ABC  Brazilian Cooperation Agency
APCI  Peruvian International Cooperation Agency
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Association
CASA  South American Community of Nations
CGEE  Centre for Strategic Studies and Management
CTCN  Climate Technology Centre and Network
DEVIDA  National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs
EMBRAPA  Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
Fiocruz  Oswaldo Cruz Foundation
GHG  Greenhouse Gases
IBSA  India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum
IFIs  International Financial Institutions
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INIA  Peruvian National Institute of Agricultural Innovation
INIAP  Ecuadorian National Autonomous Institute for Agricultural Research
INTA  Costa Rican Institute of Agricultural Innovation and Technology
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR  International Relations discipline
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MRE  Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MRV  Monitoring, Reporting, Verification
ODA  Official development assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC  Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
SALs  Structural Adjustment Loans
SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programmes
SENAI  National Service for Industrial Training
SETECI  Ecuadorian Technical Cooperation Secretariat
SSC  South-South Cooperation
SSDC  South-South Development Cooperation
TCDC  Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries
UN  United Nations
UNASUR  Union of South American Nations
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WB  World Bank
1. Introduction

The rapidly changing climate that the world is currently witnessing demands fast and effective responses. In this area, South-South Cooperation (SSC) in technology transfer has been promoted as a new solution to the transition to low-carbon development in developing countries.

However, little has been written about the origins and characteristics of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), nor, at the theoretical level, about southern countries' motivations in becoming involved in development cooperation in terms of how they conceptualise their participation. Additionally, the principles and implementation models of southern countries' projects are not fully comprehended elsewhere. Within the northern aid community there is a misconception about SSC, due partly to a lack of transparency regarding southern activities and difficulties in characterizing them, and partly to a lack of understanding of the 'philosophy' of SSC on the part of northern donors. This has created an important gap in the development studies literature, as well as being a major drawback in the integration of SSC into international development cooperation activities. This dearth of information leads to the heart of SSDC: why and how do southern countries develop projects?

SSDC might be a mechanism that is able to facilitate technology transfer. However, without any empirical research supporting the conceptualisation of SSC, it is difficult to understand how its facilitation will operate and what solutions it will provide to the mitigation of climate change. Given the need for rapid actions on climate change, it is essential to comprehend SSC in terms of both southern countries' motivations and the characteristics of their model of it before promoting it in international development programmes.

To understand why and how southern countries participate in international development cooperation, this thesis undertakes a study of southern countries' narratives in SSC and
investigate the case of Brazil as a southern 'donor'. This investigation looks both at how Brazil conceptualises SSDC in its foreign policy and how Brazilian development cooperation projects are perceived by their 'recipients'. Brazil’s participation in international development cooperation is examined using the International Relations (IR) theory of soft power.

The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the different concepts at stake and the current status on climate change. Specifically, this section introduces the increasing presence of SSDC in international development, the international actions undertaken in the mitigation of climate change, the role of clean technologies developed by southern countries and finally the importance of biofuels, which have been developed by Brazil, in this country’s foreign policy. Section 3 explains the role of soft power theory in IR and shows how it can be applied to characterizing Brazil’s political ambitions in relation to SSDC. Section 4 corresponds to the research design section of the thesis by presenting the research questions, the structure of the research and the methods used. Section 5 represents the core analysis of the thesis by discussing the articles’ findings and providing conclusions concerning their implications for both the development studies and IR (soft power) disciplines. The limitations of the research and the need for further research is described in Section 6, while the author’s perspective on the contribution of the Brazilian project model in combating climate change is presented in Section 7. After the references (Section 8) and annexes (Section 9), the three articles elaborated during the research project are presented.

1 The SSC narrative demands excision of the term 'donor' and 'recipient' from SSDC activities. However, the term 'recipient' is used throughout the text not to perpetuate northern donors' jargon but because the term 'partner' might be unclear to the reader, as it refers to both 'donor' and 'recipient' in the SSC vocabulary.
2. Conceptual context

2.1 South-South Development Cooperation

With the end of colonialism and the start of the Cold War, aid policy was directed towards ‘winning the hearts and minds of peoples and governments of developing countries’ (UNDP, 2009: 171). It was a war of ideology, of communism versus capitalism, the latter taking the shape of neoliberalism in the 1970s, with the increased importance of Hayek’s and Friedman’s economic theories. With neoliberals taking over northern governments in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) respectively implemented their Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). According to Riddell (2007), these instruments were characterised by conditionalities regarding governmental reforms. In 2000, the WB explained that the adjustment decade left some difficult legacies in the recipient countries (World Bank, 2000). But the political and security dimensions of aid have not vanished with the end of the Cold War (Eurodad, 2006; Woods, 2008; Fukuda-Parr, 2011). According to the UN Special Unit for SSC (SU-SSC, 2009), they are ‘still influencing the shape, form and content of development cooperation’ (SU-SSC, 2009: 172).

Northern aid has been criticised for being donor-driven, inefficient and for reflecting underlying geopolitical dynamics and commercial interests (ActionAid International, 2006; Rowlands, 2008; Chandy and Kharas, 2011; SEGIB, 2011). The conditionalities have been

2 As Peck and Tickell depict it, ‘the new religion of neoliberalism combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of competitiveness with profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 381). Its technocratic form, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (a term coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson), consists of ten policy actions such as financial liberalization, an open market, the privatization of state enterprises and the directing of public expenditure towards neglected but economically interesting fields (Williamson, 2004: 196). The author would later give an alternative version of his definition, the consensus then referring to ‘the policies the Bretton Woods institutions apply toward their client countries or perhaps the attitude of the U.S. government plus the Bretton Woods institutions’ (Williamson, 2004: 199).

regarded as one of the indicators reflecting the asymmetries in relations between northern donors and southern 'recipients', while the donor-driven approach has been criticized as disregarding the needs of southern countries (Woods, 2008; Sato et al., 2011). Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan issued a statement (Akram, 2007) on behalf of the group of 77 and China in 2007 that reflects this loss of credibility in the developmental intentions of northern donors’ aid:

‘For the large part, the development assistance offered – multilaterally and bilaterally – is not responsive to national policies and plans, since it is mostly earmarked to donor determined sectors and projects. Moreover, such development financing is often accompanied by conditionalities; it is tied to procurement from the donor country and often expended largely on expensive consultants and experts from UN agencies or donor organizations. (...) In these circumstances, how can the contribution of UN system and other partners be considered to be responsive to national development plans and strategies of the developing countries?’

Recently, in the different SSC rounds and meetings⁴ southern countries have considered SSC to be a solution to their vulnerability to global issues, especially through SSDC. They openly use SSC for its ‘political dimension, giving them greater participation and say at multilateral institutions and fora, and economic dimension, especially in its commercial and financial aspects’ (SEGIB, 2009: 23). The Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation at the Bandung Conference in 1955, the 32nd Session of the General Assembly of United Nations in 1977 and the Buenos Aires Action Plan in 1978 are considered the major events in the development of SSC (Comisión del Sur, 1991; SEGIB, 2009; Sato, 2010; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; SEGIB 2011). The principles state that cooperation among southern countries is non-conditional, works on a mutual-benefit basis, is demand-driven, brings together practical know-how relating to similar socio-cultural and economic backgrounds and operates in a horizontal manner.

⁴ SEGIB (2009: 24-27; 2010: 16-19) and Ojeda (2010: 96-98) give a list of the different events and decisions (more than seventy of them) that have marked SSC over the years. The Buenos Aires Plan of Action was signed by 138 states in September 1978 with the objective of promoting technical cooperation among developing countries. The number of participating countries permits to envision the unanimity of the southern countries’ support to SSC.
Historically some countries have been more involved in SSDC than others (Davies, 2008; Woods, 2008; Walz and Ramachandran, 2011), notably China, which was already present in Africa in the 1960s. However, the participation of southern countries in development cooperation has increased lately in terms of both projects and 'aid volumes' (Sanahuja, 2010; Park, 2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). In a survey conducted by UNDP (2009), beneficiaries and international institutions listed the following countries as the major developers of SSC: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, India, China, Singapore and Malaysia.

Brazil has a distinctive role in SSC not only for its past experience (it was one of the first southern countries to establish a cooperation agency), but also because the country is trading on SSC principles in its development cooperation discourse, also called the 'solidarity' foreign policy. Indeed, Brazil states that its development cooperation is neither commercially interested nor conditional\(^5\). For instance, in 2004, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) provided political guidelines for its technical cooperation: follow 'recipient' country’s national priorities, ensure the sustainability of implemented projects, and concentrate efforts on replicating passed success stories. Furthermore, Brazil’s economic rank, its image as a southern representative, its increasing presence internationally, whether in negotiations or in multilateral alliances (including but not limited to MERCOSUR, G20, G8, G4, IBSA, BRICS, CASA and UNASUR) make it a recognized and trusted partner of both northern and southern countries (Schläger, 2007; Hurrel, 2010) and thus a relevant example in the study of southern countries’ development cooperation.

2.2 Climate Change and Clean Technologies in Brazil

The world is facing intense changes to its climate caused by accumulated anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere after decades of contaminating human activities. There is now a scientific consensus that the global temperature will increase in the coming decades (IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2013). While climate change is a global phenomenon, its consequences will be uneven in nature, intensity and distribution. The

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\(^5\) See ABC website: www.abc.gov.br
2007 IPCC report asserts that the most affected areas and regions will be the Arctic region, small islands, Africa and Asia. The negative impacts of global warming such as droughts, floods, hurricanes and lengthy heat waves will mainly be concentrated in the southern hemisphere. These already weak countries, which are striving for development, will be even more destabilized by these impacts, and as a result their efforts to end poverty will be undermined. Consequently, climate change is a critical issue for southern countries.

Thus many environmental programs are being implemented and conferences held all over the world in order to reduce GHG emissions or adapt to the expected changes. The establishment in 1992 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was one of the political solutions intended to address climate change, in which different mechanisms and approaches are discussed and agreed upon. In its Articles 4.1, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7, the UNFCCC stipulates that Annex 1 countries are responsible for promoting and cooperating in the transfer of technologies capable of reducing GHG emissions. One of the mechanisms used was the Clean Development Mechanism, established by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. While its contribution to sustainable development (one of the mechanism’s main objectives) has been questioned (Olsen, 2007; Nussbaumer, 2008), it has been pointed out that it is the only market mechanism that fosters clean technology transfers (Schneider et al., 2008). Nonetheless, Brewer (2007) lamented the focus on traditional North-South technology transfers and the disregarding of South-North and South-South solutions for clean technology transfers. According to him, developing countries are among the world leaders in climate-friendly technologies. He noted that Brazil, China and South Africa are already the leaders in four technologies that are relevant to climate change mitigation: coal gasification, coal-to-synfuels, hydrogen produced from coal, and biofuels.

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6 The definition adopted here is the one given by the IPCC (2000: foreword-3): ‘...a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research/education institutions (...)... the broad and inclusive term “transfer” encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries. It covers technology transfer processes between developed countries, developing countries, and countries with economies in transition. It comprises the process of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose and adapt to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies.’
In 2010, at the 16th Conference of the Parties, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the implementing arm of the Technology Mechanism, was established with the purpose of supporting technological cooperation and assist developing-country parties to the Convention in their request for technology transfers. In order to meet this objective, the CTCN forms partnerships with relevant stakeholders to stimulate knowledge sharing. SSC is considered one of the ways of promoting this exchange. Although this new form of support has long been observed internationally, it is particularly relevant in respect of technology transfers because emerging economies are developing enough capacity (both financial and technological) to assist other countries in the developing world and because these southern countries often share similar climatic conditions, levels of development and needs (UNDP, 2009).

While Brazil showed a certain opposition to the inclusion of forestry at the Kyoto negotiations (Viola, 2004) and has issued pledges to observe environmental justice and historical responsibility (Milanez and Ferraz da Fonseca, 2011) in the environmental negotiations, under President Lula the country was a strong supporter of international scientific cooperation and multilateral research and development in renewable energy (Visentini and Reis da Silva, 2010). From being a veto country, Brazil has shifted towards active participation and is raising innovative solutions and policies on the international scene (Barros-Platiau, 2010). During the debates on the design of the CTCN, Brazil promoted SSC to foster technology transfer (Machado-Filho and Poppe, 2011). Additionally, Brazil used the debate on the CTCN and on the technology mechanisms during UNFCCC meetings and conferences to emphasize the non-Annex 1 countries' capacities in environmental technologies, especially since Brazil has produced innovative solutions in that sector, such as its successes in biofuel policies (Machado-Filho and Poppe, 2011) and environmental funds (Barros-Platiau, 2010). Barros-Platiau (2010) explained this participation using the image of the 'model exporter for the South' that Brazil wants to create for itself.

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7 The other component of the Technology Mechanism is the Technology Executive Committee. See UNFCCC website: http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TEM_home
8 See CTCN website: www.unep.org/climatechange/ctcn/
9 I.e., to the Kyoto Protocol.
Indeed, due to its experience and growing financial resources, Brazil has made progress in
developing its own industries and technologies, such as flex-fuel vehicles, green cultivation
(Zero Tilling), biofuels and landfill techniques. A comprehensive study\textsuperscript{10} by Jannuzzi and
Poppe (2011) describes the technologies mastered by Brazil: biomass, hydro, 1st and 2nd
generation ethanol, low-temperature solar thermal energy conversion, charcoal and social
technologies (for example, replacement of firewood). Brazil mainly emphasizes its
development assistance in technical cooperation, from agriculture to nanotechnology, from
waste management technologies to hydropower know-how (Rowlands, 2008). Indeed,
Brazil has increased its contribution to development cooperation (IPEA, 2010; IPEA, 2013).
The ex-director of the Department of Energy at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (MRE)
asserted that the increasing international demand for cooperation with Brazil was the
result of the success of the leading technologies\textsuperscript{11} that the country has managed to develop
(Fereira Simões, 2008). For Silva and Andriotti (2012) the high demand for scientific and
technology cooperation is especially due to the fact that, for its 'recipients', Brazil
represents a counterpoint to the verticality of northern cooperation. In addition, Brazil
finds itself in a unique situation as a semi-continental country with different climates and
different levels of development, thus enabling it to appreciate the needs and challenges of
many developing countries (UNDP, 2009).

\subsection*{2.3 Brazil and biofuels}

In March 2007, the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United States of America\textsuperscript{12} signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, 2007) to promote biofuels worldwide, particularly
in the American region. The strategy was to develop the use of biofuels at three different

\textsuperscript{10} The study also describes the technologies that should be developed under North-South, triangular and
South-South cooperation.

\textsuperscript{11} Already, Brazil has signed 36 bilateral agreements in cooperation in energy and biofuel, especially between
2003 and 2013.

\textsuperscript{12} Brazil and the USA represent 89\% of world biofuel production. Together with the EU, China, Thailand,
Canada, India, Colombia and Australia, they represent 98\% (Kloss, 2012: 63).
levels: first on a global scale, in the form of international forums of awareness and the elaboration of uniform standards; secondly with third countries through technical assistance in order to produce the benefits of biofuels and involve the private sector; and finally bilaterally, with the objective of advancing research on the next generation of biofuels. This strategic partnership is part of what has been called ‘ethanol diplomacy’, a term coined by US President George W. Bush at the same meeting (Almeida, 2009). ‘Ethanol diplomacy’ aims to expand biofuel production globally and create a commodity out of it. As Schutte and Barros (2010), two technicians at IPEA, and Kloss (2012) explained, the amplification and consolidation of the ethanol market were conditioned to the transformation of biofuels into a commodity. They added that this could be done by increasing not only the number of consumers worldwide, but also the number of producing countries. The objective of ethanol diplomacy was the commoditisation of biofuels (Schutte and Barros, 2010: 36).

President Lula da Silva proved to be at the forefront of this foreign policy. Efforts were made to avoid technical barriers by making ethanol a universal product, encouraging other countries to produce crops for biofuel by signing MoUs; and contradicting the discourse of ‘ethanol hunger’. Brazil was and still is the leader in sugarcane biofuel production and will be able to satisfy the global demand for biofuel by 2019 (Barbosa, 2010). Nonetheless, the Brazilian government also knows that energy security does not mean moving from one monopoly source of energy (today fossil fuels) to another produced by a single country. This is why the decision was taken to spread knowledge about biofuels with the aim of diversifying the producers and thus making the markets more stable (Ferreira Simões, 2008; Barbosa, 2010; Schutte, 2012). According to Ferreira Simões (2008), the creation of the Energy Department in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) was directed to this purpose.

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13 For example, the round table on sustainable palm oil, sustainable soya, the Better Sugarcane initiative or the round table on sustainable biofuels.
14 Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research.
15 In her article, Cruz Johnson (2010) counted 22 bilateral agreements on energy and in some cases biofuels between 2004 and 2008. Barbosa (2010) assessed the number of MoUs at 60 in technical cooperation agreements regarding sugarcane in Africa (for biofuels, but also agricultural development) up to 2009. I counted 36 agreements on the Itamaraty website for the period 01-01-2003 to 01-11-2013. See: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/divisao-de-atos-internacionais
There was another point that President Lula stressed: the universality of this source of energy. In his speech at the International Forum on biodiesel, he said: 'We want to ensure that we all speak the same language and allow biofuels to become a commodity produced and exported by the largest number of countries in the world' (Lula da Silva, 2008). The MRE and its Department of Energy stated that 100 to 120 countries had the potential to be biofuel producers (Fereira Simões, 2007; Barbosa, 2010), and President Lula talked of biofuels as the 'democratization' of energy compared to the status quo of dependence on fossil fuels (Beltrame, 2008). Biofuels were introduced as a source of energy that would enable a transition to a low-carbon economy, ensure social benefits (in terms of employment) and guarantee energy security (Schutte, 2012). Lula’s Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, played an important part in Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy as well. He advertised the energy source by saying that ethanol had no impact on food production in Brazil and added further that 'producing biofuels has helped Brazil to grow and become socio-economically richer and environmentally cleaner' (MRE, 2010b: 193). In terms of international visibility, some authors have noted that, beyond the objective of creating an international biofuel market, ethanol diplomacy was intended to consolidate Brazil’s profile throughout the world (Ribando Seelke and Yacobucci, 2007; Cruz Johnson, 2010).

Nonetheless, the USA and Brazil encountered strong resistance globally over the competition of biofuel crops with food security and their debatable potential for GHG emissions reductions. While this section does not aim to involve itself in the debate over food versus energy security, the predominance of economic interests on the part of Brazil, the relevance of biofuels for GHG emissions reductions relevance nor the success of the country’s ethanol diplomacy, it is important to note the role that this diplomacy has played in Brazilian technical cooperation projects. As Schutte (2012) remarked, ethanol diplomacy was complemented with Brazilian SSDC.

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16 A more recent study (Barbosa, 2010) revises this number taking into account countries that possess both climatic conditions and the rule of law for producing sugarcane ethanol. This list contains but is not limited to: Dominican Republic, Cuba, San Cristobal and Neves, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Bhutan, Sri Lanka among others.

17 For more information, see Ribando Seelke and Yacobucci, 2007; Mathews, 2007; Dauvergne and Neville, 2009; White and Cyro Costa, 2009; Barbosa, 2010; OECD/IEA; 2011; Jannuzzi and Poppe, 2011; Schutte, 2012.
Indeed, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA) decided to collaborate in spreading biofuel expertise (Schutte, 2012) first to Latin American countries, rapidly followed by activities in Africa (Almeida, 2009). The former Director of the Energy Department of the MRE (2006-2008), Antonio José Ferreira Simões, explained that the increasing number of biofuel projects in technical assistance was the result of the success of the development of this technology in Brazil since the 1970s (Ferreira Simões, 2008). Indeed, the 1975 Proálcool programme\(^{18}\), started by the government to stimulate and expand the production of ethanol through different agricultural, research, market regulation and infrastructure initiatives, lessened the impact of the oil crisis in the country. This effort is maintained nowadays with the ProRenova programme, where BNDES\(^{19}\) provides Reais 4 billion to finance the renovation and extension of sugarcane plantations. By the end of the 2000s, the development of flexible-fuel vehicles (or FFVs) in Brazil had been a resounding success (Nass et al., 2007). Adding to the success story, Ferreira Simões (2008) noted that, since 2000, the use of ethanol in Brazil managed to replace fuel imports equivalent to USD 61 billion, more or less the total of Brazil’s foreign debt (Ferreira Simões, 2008). This is, of course, information that is attractive to developing countries.

\(^{18}\) For a full review of the history of Brazilian biofuels, see Nass et al., 2007.

\(^{19}\) The Brazilian Development Bank.
3. Theoretical Framework: Soft Power and Brazilian International Cooperation

3.1 Sources of power: the Realist ‘hard’ view

Until recently, the study of power in the International Relations discipline \(^{20}\) (IR) was the domain of the realists (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Schmidt, 2007; Gallarotti, 2010). Indeed, liberal and constructivist theorists did not give explicit attention to power, although several studies have been carried out on the normative and social processes that influence interests and the definition of ideas (Hayden, 2012) through identity, culture and institution-building. The realist analysis is focused on a state’s behaviour in acting to ensure its power and security (understood here as freedom from all threats) in order to protect the state’s interests and survival. In other words, in the context of IR, realist theorists explain each state decision internationally with reference to the aim of gaining more power and of ensuring its security.

\(^{20}\) In IR theory, three main schools of thoughts stand out in analysing international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism. The first two are part of a positivist current in which the analytical focus is at the state level. Constructivism is considered a post-positivist current integrating other levels of analysis from gender to third-world emancipation. Realists understand the world at the international level as anarchic, that is, countries will act selfishly to consolidate their security and power. As such, realists maintain that the state is in a constant struggle for power and that nothing is done without relative gains. On the other hand, liberals believe that in a globalised world peaceful relationships can be attained by a complex interdependence, that is, countries will have no benefit in declaring war with other countries with which they trade and with whom social relations are strong. In this view there are many incentives for countries to cooperate, and absolute gains are considered a satisfactory benefit. Moravcsik (1997) summarises the differences between these two theories by saying that ‘for liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics – not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities’ (1997:513). In contrast to these two schools of thought, constructivism works on the assumption that international relations are historically and socially constructed, therefore a country’s interests and identity are sufficient to explain its international behaviour. Unlike the two first theories, constructivism places the emphasis on the social meanings that have shaped the variables studied by realists (e.g. military power) and liberals (e.g. trade relations). Reus-Smit provides a distinction between the liberal and realist rationalist points of view on the one hand and constructivism as a critical theory on the other: ‘Ontologically, they criticized the image of social actors as atomistic egoists, whose interests are formed prior to social interaction, and who enter social relations solely for strategic purposes. They argued, in contrast, that actors are inherently social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed, the products of inter-subjective social structures’ (2005: 193).
The origins of realism date back from Machiavelli’s *The prince* and Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. The essence of these texts informs the realist’s view of ‘anarchy’, which is understood as being synonymous with a state of nature marked by competition and diffidence. Indeed, the realist’s interpretation of international relations is that, at the international level, and in the absence of any higher ruler, states are forced to interact in circumstances of anarchy. ‘Anarchy’ in IR designates the lack of a central authority, but in realist theory it ‘implies the absence of any authoritative institutions, rules or norms above the sovereign state’ (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 18) and therefore assumes a state of conflict at the international level. Taking their cue from Hobbes, the classical realists assume that a state will behave as a person in a stateless environment would, that is, selfishly and seeking to secure its power (Donnelly, 2013). Structural realism theory, also called neorealism, does not assess states’ behaviour as a natural reaction for reasons of survival but as an adaptation to the structural constraints of the global system that organises them (Schmidt, 2007). In the structuralist current which started in the late 1970s, states are not genuine ‘egoists’ but act according to the anarchy that surrounds them and behave in accordance with the changes that occur in the distribution of capabilities (Donnelly, 2013). In an environment with no central power, states enter into a ‘balance of power’. Nonetheless, both currents, classical and structural realism, agree over the importance of the consolidation of power and security. The realist view is based on a zero-sum game where wealth cannot be expanded and where a state only becomes richer if it takes wealth from another state. This is different from what liberals call absolute gain, where a state is satisfied by its individual gains and indifferent to the gains of others. Thus the implication is that realism views wealth as meaningful only in relative terms. Therefore realism presumes a state of conflict, liberalism a state of cooperation (Powell, 1991).

In a world of anarchy, where states are constantly searching to increase their power, realists talk about capabilities, that is, material forms of power such as population, military or economic power, also called the element-of-national-power approach (Schmidt, 2007). States use these means to consolidate their power and security, which are essential to safeguarding a country’s sovereignty. States that are aware of this power struggle will regard any moral or solidary discourse or actions as suspicious because, in the realist’s
mind, a state will never act other than in its own best interests\textsuperscript{21}. Realist studies of foreign aid portray this view: for them, foreign aid is used to secure political or commercial gains (Morgenthau, 1962; Wang, 1999; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). A famous sentence by Hans Morgenthau, the father of modern realist theory in IR, sums it all up: ‘a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation’ (Morgenthau, 1962: 306).

Therefore, the focus on the materiality of the state’s capabilities has forced the realists to look solely at the visible and hard expressions of power – putting it simply, ‘counting guns and bombs’ (Bilgin and Elis, 2008: 8). For Mearsheimer, one of the spokesmen of contemporary realism, ‘power is based on particular material capabilities that a state possesses’ (2001: 55). These capabilities are based on ‘tangible assets’ such as money, technology and personnel, all deployed to strengthen military potential. Waltz (1979) talks about assets such as the size of the population, resource endowment and economic capability. Indeed the realist conceptualisation of power, which has also been the mainstream definition of power in IR for a long period\textsuperscript{22}, has been described as follow: ‘how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40). Many realists have fallen into the trap of the ‘vehicle fallacy’, forgetting that ‘power is a capacity, and neither the exercise nor the vehicle of that capacity’ (Lukes, 2007: 84). A famous example is the U.S. army’s defeat by the less numerous and military inferior Vietnamese. As Ringmar summarises it, ‘How much power we have is not determined by the extent to which we can dominate others as much by what it is that we can get done’ (2007: 190).

The exclusive focus on the scope of power and the neglect of non-visible forms of power have been the main criticisms raised against the realist definition of power (Bilgin and Elis, 2008) as well as against the entire IR discipline (Lukes, 2005). Lukes (2005) deplores the

\textsuperscript{21} For a comprehensive study of moral in foreign aid, see Hattori, 2003.

\textsuperscript{22} Since the end of World War II and the failure of the IR liberals to predict it, Realists have re-gained the centrality of IR studies.
fact that many writers have only viewed power as the capacity to threaten and have disregarded the possibility of power being used as a vehicle of others' interests.

Two major studies, by Digeser (1992) and Barnett and Duvall (2005), have tried to unpack power by defining it under four categories based on the works of Lukes (1974), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Foucault's reflections on power. In the work of Digeser (1992), power in international relations is unfolded in what he calls 'faces of power'. This is based on the original work of Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) 'two faces of power', which was further developed by Lukes and his radical view of power (1974), which in Digeser's article is referred to as the third face of power. Digeser's contribution comes with an analysis of Foucault's understanding of power as creating another layer of power, namely the fourth face of power. Briefly, the first two faces of power reflect the power relationship between country A and country B, where country A exercises its power over country B by making the latter do something it would not do otherwise, or else where country A prevents country B from doing what country B wants to do. These two faces of power are concerned with direct coercion. In Lukes’ third face of power, country B may willingly fulfil country A’s wishes. In his analysis of Foucault’s work, Digeser concludes that another face of power exists: a power that does not presuppose the subjects (A and B) as given but as socially constructed ‘through our practices and interactions’ (Digeser, 1992: 982). This face of power is the most conceptually abstract of the four and presupposes that power is not found in the exercise of state-interested relations but that the state’s interests are already shaped by a discursive process, which here constitute the source of power.

In a similar but conceptually more general taxonomy, Barnett and Duvall (2005) talk about compulsory, institutional, structural\(^{23}\) and productive powers. Compulsory power is defined as a power that ‘allow[s] one to shape directly the circumstances or actions of another’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 49). This power can be diffused unintentionally and is not limited to material resources. Institutional power consists of ‘actors’ control of others in

\(^{23}\) Here 'structural' does not refer to Structural Realism per se even though this theory is based on the pressure exercised by the structures the states are engaged in. Other IR theories, such as constructivism, believe that structures have a role on state decision / or any other entity.
indirect ways’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 51). Structural power is exercised by the structure in which states are engaged, meaning that ‘the social relations capabilities, subjectivities, and interests of actors are directly shaped by the social positions they occupy’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 53). The most common example given to illustrate structural power is that which exists between master and slave. Productive power ultimately shapes social identities and capacities through discursive processes and practices. Similar to some extent to structural power, productive power is more diffuse and can be seen as post-structural, since the concept focuses more on discourse and systems of knowledge as transforming social meaning. The two authors give as illustration the subject categories that world politics produces: “civilized”, “rogue”, “European”, “unstable”, “Western”, and “democratic” states are representative of productive power, as they generate asymmetries of social capacities’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 56).

In the political science discipline (of which IR is a component), these different faces of power or concepts of power suggest another dimension of power than the realist’s perspective of international relations based solely on coercion. They encompass other assumptions that can be linked more to constructivist and liberal views within IR. Indeed, while realists maintain that world politics are driven by configurations of capabilities, the liberal IR theorists explain states’ international behaviour as being consistent with their preferences, which are themselves shaped by ideas, interests and institutions (Moravcsik, 1997). The varied interpretations of state’s behaviour are at the root of Barnett and Duvall (2005) urging scholars to find better explanations for modern world politics. For them, such explanations cannot be restricted to the conventional vision of power that Mearsheimer understands as a sum of material capabilities.

3.2 Soft empowerment

Lately, studies have been carried out to give develop other concepts of power analytically, especially the place of ideas in the theory of Neoliberal Institutionalism (also referred to as Neoliberalism), where, contrary to the liberal trend in IR, ideas are constructed and not
given. While IR neoliberalism also asserts a belief that states act within the anarchical structure of the international system according to their interests, it insists upon the possibility of cooperation through building up norms and institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism insists on the supranational governance that states live in today and on the role of these international institutions in international politics. One assumption of neoliberal institutionalism is that ideas have a role to play in political outcomes, particularly those of foreign policy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). According to Goldstein and Keohane (1993), the ‘idea’ has been disregarded or relegated to a minor role in both the realist and liberal trends within IR.

One particular scholar, Joseph Nye, also a neoliberal institutionalist academic, has revived the debate by challenging the realists’ definition of power with his concept of soft power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Bilgin and Elis, 2008; Vuving, 2009; Gallarotti, 2011; Kearn, 2011). In his works ‘Bound to lead’ (1990a) and ‘Soft power’ (1990b), Nye introduced a new source of power, namely soft power, which is antithetical to the notion of ‘hard power’, that is, military and economic constraints. This concept captures the assumption that, if a state builds a positive image of itself, other states will be drawn to it. Nye refers to attraction, Gallarotti to endearment, but no matter what term is chosen, this kind of power pertains to co-optation, in opposition to the coercive power relationship of the realist paradigm.

24 Neoliberalism in IR must be distinguished from the economic branch of neoliberalism. While the two theories are based on relative game theory as a way of explaining states’ behavior, they pertain to two different academic disciplines and explain two different phenomena. As Peck and Tickell describe economic neoliberalism, ‘the new religion of neoliberalism combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of competitiveness with profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 381). Its technocratic form, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (a term coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson), it consists of ten policy actions such as financial liberalization, an open market, the privatization of state enterprises and the directing of public expenditure towards neglected but economically interesting fields (Williamson, 2004: 196).

25 As Bially Mattern (2005) reminds us, earlier scholars have studied the non-visible sources of power, such as Foucault, Bourdieu or Gramsci. But the relative simplicity of soft power assumptions acquired an influence over policy-makers more easily, leading to analytical development of the soft power concept. The increasing importance of soft power has also been explained by today’s media coverage, which boosts public diplomacy (Hayden, 2012), and the state of interdependence in globalisation and the growth of democracy (Gallarotti, 2011).
Gallarotti explains hard and soft power with reference to differences in what can be called behavioural outcomes:

‘whereas hard power extracts compliance principally through reliance on tangible power resources (either symbolic use through threat or actual use of these resources), soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations’. (2010: 23)

This concept of power has been related to Lukes’ third face of power (Vuving, 2009; Gallarotti, 2010; Lukes, 2005), but also to some extent to Barnett and Duvall’s triple distinction between institutional, structural and productive power (Hayden, 2012). Here Lukes’ vision of power and Nye’s soft power are joined in the idea that power is not only about threats but can also be used to satisfy mutual interests. Indeed, Nye’s (1990b) concept of soft co-optive power responds to the idea that ‘if a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes’ (1990b: 169). The state achieves this goal by using other means than hard and economic power to acquire legitimacy on the international scene (such as FDI, peace operations, and cultural or development cooperation). Public diplomacy mobilises different soft power resources to ‘communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their governments’ (Nye, 2008: 95). Thus soft power works on the underlying interests and preferences of the other country (Kearn, 2011). While some will call this manipulation and others persuasion, the way the agent influences the subject’s interests and preferences is central to soft power. As Hayden (2012) notes, influence is both an outcome (shaping others’ interests) and a behaviour (no coercion but co-optation). Table 1 in the next page summarises the foreign and domestic policies and actions that contribute to a state’s soft empowerment according to Nye.
Table 1. Foreign and domestic policies and actions influencing soft power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>International</strong></th>
<th><strong>Domestic</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for international laws, norms, regimes, and other institutions</td>
<td>Culture (social cohesion, quality of life, liberalism, opportunity, tolerance, lifestyle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental reliance on cooperation and a reluctance to solve problems unilaterally</td>
<td>Political institutions (democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism/pluralism, effectively functioning government bureaucracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for international treaties and alliance commitments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to sacrifice short-term national interests in order to contribute toward multilateral solutions to international problems</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic openness</td>
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Source: Gallarotti's table of sources of soft power (Gallarotti, 2010: 28).

Because soft power deals with maintaining a positive image subjective to states themselves as well as other actors, the concept has been allocated to constructivism by the author himself (Nye, 2004) because of it has hints of a neoliberal vision of power (Gallarotti, 2010) without contradicting the realism paradigm (Nye, 2011). Nye adds that ‘soft power is not a form of idealism or liberalism. It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes’ (2007: 170). What Gallarotti calls 'soft empowerment' (Gallarotti, 2010) is built up using sources such as domestic and foreign policies and national qualities like the country’s culture, but also sources that could point at hard forms of power such as military actions. As Nye (2008) explains it, ‘a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness’ (2008: 94). Nye also gives examples of the types of resources that can be used: “Basic resources include culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy and a competent military. Sometimes these resources are specially shaped for soft power purposes. Such shaped
resources include national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, assistance programs, training programs, and various other measures' (2011: 99).

In 2011, Nye offered a more comprehensive definition of soft power as being 'the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes' (2011: 21). Therefore, soft power has to be understood with reference to the context in which such power is being exercised and the strategies used rather than the resources in play (Nye, 2006; Nye, 2011), or as Vuving puts it, 'not the softness of resources but the soft use of them' (2009: 19). For example, Nye (2006) stresses the admiration that military power brings the US: 'The impressive job of the US military in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami (...) helped restore the attractiveness of the United States' (2006: 3). Additionally, Nye (2011) analyses the military help of the USA, Brazil, Israel and China after Haiti’s earthquake as a demonstration of how preferred outcomes can be produced by a perceived benignity, itself enhancing attraction. By admitting the possible use of material resources of power, Nye's soft power cannot be completely described through the eyes of constructivist or liberal IR theories (Hayden, 2012).

3.3 The scope and limitation of soft power

Different terms surface out of the discussion of soft power: interests, influence, attraction, legitimacy, preferences and subjectivity. Nye’s work has been criticised for not being sufficiently well-argued, resulting in Ferguson’s statement that ‘the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft’ (2003: 4). Other scholars have come up with more constructive comments. Kearn (2011) lamented Nye’s lack of explanation about the role of actors in soft power and Nye's combination of attraction as a force and as an action, leading to a shift ‘from influencing interests and preferences to directly manipulating behaviour’ (2011: 73), which would counter voluntary decision-making. In addition, Kearn (2011) observes Nye’s downplaying of the importance of the interaction between the message and the audience: ‘attempting to understand, even in a very general way, how certain policies are going to be
interpreted and understood in a given state is a daunting task’ (2011: 79). Nye (2007) recognised that his definition of power is agent-focused and that it does not put enough emphasis on the subject. Later on, he highlighted that "The production of soft power by attraction depends upon both the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target’ (2011: 92).

Additionally, Hayden (2012) explains the confusion surrounding the soft power concept with reference to the fact that Nye refers to soft power both as a resource and as an outcome:

‘For Nye, soft power suggests both a post hoc measure of effectiveness in achieving foreign policy objectives, as well as implies a means to achieve these political goals by leveraging the assets that cultivate “attraction”’ (2012: 5)

When it comes to criticisms of the validity of Nye’s vision of co-optation and attractiveness, Bially Mattern (2005) is the scholar who has contributed the most to unveiling the inconsistencies in Nye’s work. First, she remarks that Nye’s ‘attraction’ is embedded in two different ontologies of natural condition (in his description of the universally accepted values of democracy and peace) and social construct (when the principal objective of soft power is to influence other countries’ interests and preferences in order for them to model their behaviour on that of the leading state)27. Bially Mattern (2005) continues by showcasing the problem of distinguishing between persuasion and manipulation and the circular logic of legitimacy and attraction, resulting in a coercive aspect of international argumentation. Her title says it all: ‘Why soft-power isn’t so soft’. However, her analysis seems to forget that the ambition of soft power lies in the construction of a good image, attraction being the cornerstone of influence shaping. The example she uses of G. W. Bush’s administration’s discourse regarding the ‘war on terror’ demonstrates soft power resources being used coercively (Hayden, 2012), therefore completing the assumption that

26 Italics in the original.
27 Bilgin and Elis (2008) draw the same conclusion.
it is not the power resources that makes a difference but the way these resources are deployed.

To counter this misunderstanding regarding the distinction between resources and behaviour, Nye (2006, 2007) re-directs the focus to the context of its use. He explains: ‘Whether soft power produces behaviour that we want will depend on the context and the skills with which the resources are converted into outcomes’ (Nye, 2007: 170). Thus the confusion does not lie with the state’s behaviour but on the resources: ‘command power’ and ‘co-optive power’ give a clear idea of the difference between hard state behaviour and soft behaviour. But in Nye’s concept of soft power, the state can actually use tangible resources. As noted earlier, the military can be used in a soft way (Hayden, 2012). Therefore, the difference between soft and hard power relates not to the tangibility of the resources but to the context of their use (Gallarotti, 2011). To overcome this dilemma, Vuving (2009) distinguishes between power resources (which can produce both hard and soft power) and power currencies (a property that causes power). For him, then, soft power has three generic power currencies: beauty, benignity and brilliance. The 'beauty' currency represents the country's values and ideals, which ultimately generate credibility and legitimacy. 'Benignity' as a soft power currency is what one would call generosity and altruism towards other countries or groups. And finally 'brilliance' mirrors the success of a country, whether by virtue of its military might, its powerful economy or its blissful culture or peaceful society. All these currencies contribute to soft empowerment.

A step forward: the integration of soft and hard power

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), while Nye’s view of power has revived debate on the realists’ power definition, he also posits an alternative and forces scholars to take sides. Kearns’s article, ‘The hard truth about soft power’ (2011), reflects this concern about the sustainability of soft power as a foreign policy strategy. This author notes that, while soft power might have a long-term impact, hard power is the only sort that can address interstate relations in a short time, which makes it a more efficient tool. While it is true that soft power is more diffused, it is of wider scope than hard power, which is in immediate
terms more efficient but limited by time and space. The reasoning behind hard power being more efficient mirrors a concern for the over-reliance on just one mode of power. For that reason, more comprehensive frameworks of the concept of power have been developed more recently, covering understandings of both hard power and soft power: Nye’s smart power28 (combining hard power and soft power), Gallarotti’s cosmopolitan power (a theoretical development of smart power), or to a lesser extent Mead’s combination of soft, sharp and sticky power (Mead, 2004). This proved to be a challenge for IR theorists, since Gallarotti claims that his cosmopolitan power employs ideas of power from the three main paradigms of IR, namely realism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Several examples of smart power are given in Nye’s latest book (2011), the most illustrative one being the example of China, a great economic and military power investing in soft power diplomacy.

The study of soft power

Nye’s concept of soft power is embedded in an America-centric formula in which neoliberal ideas are salient (positive image through free trade, liberal politics etc.)29. This is explained by the fact that Nye started his analysis of non-visible power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of the United States’ aura in the 1990s. Nonetheless, scholars have undertaken the analysis of soft power in other countries (Gallarotti, 2010; Hayden, 2012; Lee, 2010; Ipek, 2013).

However, while providing extended reflections on how actors understand soft power or the facets of soft empowerment, these studies overlook the subject’s understanding. Lukes (2005) judges Nye’s notion of soft power to be too agent-centred and urges scholars to look both at agents and subjects in analysing soft power. Specifically he recommends examining the following question:

28 "The intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defence, development, and other tools of so-called “hard and soft” power”(Nye, 2011: 209).
29 Here it is important to understand that neoliberal economic values are by no mean elements of soft power in a general sense. What Nye lists as elements of attraction like free trade, capitalism or human rights are specific to the American image abroad. A different country could stress other aspects than these ones. Therefore the neoliberal soft power theory in IR is not necessarily attached to neoliberal economic values (although economic neoliberalism promotes cooperation and interdependence, both being important for soft power to work).
‘exactly how do agents succeed in winning the hearts and minds of those subject to their influence? How exactly do those with power shape the preferences of those subject to their power? (...) to what extent, in what ways and by what mechanisms do powerful agents influence others’ conceptions of their own interests?’ (2005: 492)

The significance of outcomes can only be reflected in power’s impact on subjects’ interests. Nonetheless, studies of the exercise of soft power have been centred on the agent, namely the state, rather than the perception of the subject.

Hayden (2012) analyses how the soft power concept is understood by agents in his analyses of Venezuela, Japan, China and the United States30. Indeed, each actor justified its use of soft power differently: Venezuela and the role of the national TV channel Telesur in the state’s demonstration of power, Japan and its ‘cool’ pop culture, China and the promotion of Confucius Institutes to justify its rise as a global power, and the US and its revisionist public diplomacy strategy. Ipek’s (2013) study of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) examines how normative beliefs may influence the foreign policy instrument of soft power. In his article, he reveals how principled and causal beliefs changed Turkey’s development aid, whereby the redefinition of Turkey’s role in historical and geographical Eurasia and the new policy of the ‘trading state’ played a major role in the strategic use of soft power through the expansion of TIKA activities. Not only does this study respond to a gap in the examination of foreign aid in IR (Pauselli, 2013), it also provides the academic community with more information about how agents understand soft power in their activities. Nonetheless, there is still a lack of clarity regarding the subjects’ perceptions. As Kearn puts it:

‘states that lead humanitarian missions, provide foreign development aid, and support multilateral institutions are likely to engender respect and admiration from like-

30 Note that Hayden aims to analyse these different cases within the discipline of communication strategy and not IR, therefore putting emphasis on public diplomacy.
minded fellow members. But to what extent does it really provide them with tangible power?" (2011: 72)

Furthermore, Kearn is also concerned about the subject’s reaction to soft power outside a rule-governed and mutual-interested environment. For him, states that are not interdependent and that do not share the same institutional and ruling views have few incentives to believe that soft power is a valid foreign policy strategy. He concludes by saying that the use of soft power by non-western countries would probably cause doubts about their intentions.

3.4 Brazilian soft empowerment

Dauvergne and Farias (2012) use Nye’s arguments on soft power to illustrate Brazil’s soft diplomacy. This soft power strategy is illustrated by what Konijn (2013) characterises as a gain of credibility through Brazil’s image branding. Various scholars looking at Brazilian foreign diplomacy generally agree that Brazil is using two platforms to implement this ‘charm offensive’: participating in the international scene, and giving a voice to developing countries by reinforcing alliances and cooperation between southern countries (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; de Almeida, 2008; White, 2010; Hirst, 2012; Ayllon, 2012a; Silva and Andriotti, 2012; de Mello e Souza, 2012).

Indeed, under the Lula administration, Brazil had an active international presence in terms of participation and negotiations (Vigenani and Cepaluni, 2007; Ayllon, 2010; Soares de Lima and Castelan, 2012, Inoue and Costa Vaz, 2012; Christensen, 2013). Costa Vaz (2012) sees the BRICS alliance as an opportunity for Brazil to move closer to the centre of international politics. This view can also be observed in Pereira and de Castro Neves' article: 'In order to increase Brazil’s leverage in international multilateral arenas, such as the United Nations, IMF, World Bank and WTO, considerable attention was given to a strategy that became known as South-South diplomacy, or emerging powers coalition' (Pereira and de Castro Neves, 2011: 8).
In the context of foreign aid, the aspects of soft power are even more salient. Indeed, under Lula's government, diplomats and development actors were encouraged to pursue a solidarity agenda (Ayllon and Leite, 2010), a universalist approach promoting regional integration (belief in a South American identity) and cooperation with developing countries (Saraiva, 2010; Mendelski de Souza, 2011; Silva and Andriotti, 2012; Christensen, 2013; Konijn, 2013). Lula talked about 'brotherhood', while Chancellor Amorim referred to 'solidarity' to explain Brazil's cooperation activities (MRE, 2010b). 'Solidarity' and 'solidarity diplomacy' were central to President Lula's foreign policy (Amorim, 2010; Ayllon, 2010; IPEA, 2010). The country has continued to work on raising its profile under President Rousseff. Even though her mandate started with a dramatic decrease in external relations and official presidential visits, in May 2013, during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the African Unions Organization (now the African Union), the current President declared that Brazil was currently negotiating debt cancellations with twelve African countries amounting to a total of almost US 900 million (Rousseff, 2013). This is a reflection of the solidarity discourse, emphasising the importance of equal relations between Brazil and African countries. For Burges, while bringing in the fraternity discourse as a source of development actions, southern donors, including Brazil, are providing cooperation in order to "advance strategic objectives, whether it be regional security, market access, resource access, international support, or simple increases in global prestige" (Burges, 2012: 244). The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has declared that:

"The technical cooperation developed by Brazil was expanded following the guidelines of the policy of densification of the South-South dialogue as an instrument of foreign policy of the Government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. This cooperation aims to strengthen bilateral relations between Brazil and the rest of the world, raising the country's profile on the world stage" (MRE, 2010a: Chapter 7.1.1).

How was this soft power strategy constructed? What were the elements of identity and the preferences that influenced Brazil’s rhetoric of solidarity? In terms of the agent’s identity,

31 Universalism in Brazilian foreign policy has appeared to counter the Americanism of Brazilian foreign policy. Its significance is that it increases the range of collaborating countries (Inoue and Costa Vaz, 2012).
Brazil’s links with developing countries were generated through the construction of a southern identity using characteristics such as a common heritage, former developing-country status and having been a recipient of northern aid (Iselius and Olsson, 2012). The same authors conclude that this identity discourse is *'a means for Brazil to obtain legitimacy, credibility and trustworthiness in promoting an approach towards development engagement'*(2012: 52). The manner in which audiences were rendered as subjects in Brazil’s development cooperation activities is equally important. When the Brazilian foreign ministry emphasises the importance of the horizontality and demand-driven approaches of development projects, it also insists on calling recipient countries ‘partners’. This has led to the excision of the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ from Brazil’s jargon of cooperation (Puente, 2010). Brazilian identity and Brazil’s rhetoric in its development cooperation were both constructed by means of its affiliation with the SSC movements. Indeed, it is a reflection of the early statements of southern movements (such as the 1955 Bandung Conference, the creation of the G77 in 1964 or the Buenos Aires Action Plan in 1978) initiated in response to the newly independent southern countries and their desire to change what they thought was an unbalanced world order. Brazil integrated these values over the years of SSC summits and, under Lula, used the solidarity discourse as part of its cooperation activities in order to foster a common southern development.

While Brazil has been the subject of studies in terms of its increasing involvement in development cooperation, few have looked at its cooperation activities using a soft power analysis. While discourse and foreign policies analyses have touched on the scope of Brazil as an agent, only one study so far has looked at subjects’ perceptions, in our case, of the ‘recipient’ countries of Brazilian development cooperation (Nogueira and Ollinaho, 2013). To contribute to the academic debate on forms of attraction and behaviour in soft power, an investigation of Brazil’s understanding of a good soft empowerment strategy in development cooperation and its ‘recipients’ perceptions of Brazilian activities would be highly valuable. As Hayden (2012) recommends when presenting his methodology of assessing the public diplomacy of four different countries:
‘Any soft power catalog of routes to influence for international actors could be augmented by assessing how agents act upon their perceptions [of] soft power in ways that anticipate the possibility of outcomes’ (2012:48).

Such an investigation of Brazilian soft power would also respond to two elements of attraction. As Nye (2011) explains, ‘the production of soft power by attraction depends on both the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target’ (2011: 92).
4. Research design

4.1 Research questions

The aim of this PhD thesis is to understand the origins and motivations of Brazilian participation in development cooperation and the extent to which they have influenced the model of its development cooperation projects, especially in the area of its leading technology, namely biofuels. This aim can be summarized in the form of an overall research question:

What are the reasons behind Brazilian participation in development cooperation with southern countries, and to what extent have these reasons influenced Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation project model?

This overall research question will be divided in three sub-questions addressed in three academic articles:
1. What is the academic debate surrounding the concept of “South-South cooperation”?
2. How does Brazil conceptualise its development cooperation, and what is the role of SSDC in its foreign policy?
3. To what extent do Brazil’s biofuel projects correspond to the SSC rhetoric, and how has this influenced ‘recipients’ perceptions of Brazil?

4.2 The structure of the thesis

To respond to the research question, the thesis is structured into three parts corresponding to three articles.

Studying the construction of South-South Cooperation

The thesis research first looks at the reasons behind the construction of SSC, how it led to the use of SSDC and how development cooperation is described. The objective is to categorise SSC principles from the literature, describe the principles and main approaches followed in SSDC and understand southern countries’ perspectives on international
development. In addition, it lays the basis for the analysis of the two investigations that follow.

*Investigating Brazil’s soft power strategy and its influence on the country’s SSDC*

The study here is of Brazil, a southern country that is part of the SSC movement, and of its development cooperation as an instrument of its foreign policy. The aim of this article in the thesis is to examine the influence of Lula’s soft-power foreign policy of solidarity on the official narrative applied to Brazilian cooperation and development cooperation projects. In this way, the article provides empirical evidence of soft power behaviour, that is, of Brazilian participation in development cooperation, which claims to follow the SSC principles of cooperation being driven by demand and horizontality. In addition, this study enables the author to obtain an overview of Brazilian activities abroad and facilitates the selection of a case study in the third article.

*Exploring the design and implementation of Brazilian development projects and their influence on Brazil’s soft empowerment*

Finally the thesis ends by exploring the Brazilian project cycle in three Latin American countries to determine whether the rhetoric of Brazilian foreign policy about SSDC fits reality as seen from the ‘recipient’s’ perspective. It examines the project cycle in three Southern American countries, from project idea to implementation. In terms of theoretical research in the study, this article provides empirical evidence of the manifestation of soft power in the way the Brazilian SSDC model has improved Brazil’s image in the ‘recipient’s’ mind.
The structure of the thesis and the different articles are set out in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Structure of the thesis.
## 4.3 Methods

Table 2. Article’s objectives, methods and references

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Article 1 | - Understand the political construct behind SSC  
- Find common principles for SSC  
- Determine the characteristics and recent evolution of SSDC | Narrative literature review | Jesson et al. (2011), Eisenhart (1989), Bryman (2012), Meth and Williams (2006 in Desai and Potter) |
| Article 2 | - Look at Brazilian discourse on SSC in its foreign policy  
- Compare it to the soft-power theory  
- Give empirical evidence of soft-power behaviour  
- Investigate the relationship between soft power and SSDC  
- Study the Brazilian SSDC activities and analyse the overall results with the discourse | Triangulation method: official documents analysis, semi-structured interviews and secondary data | Kvale (1996), Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), Desai and Potter (2006) |
| Article 3 | - Determine whether or not Brazil’s project implementation process reflects the country’s rhetoric in South-South Cooperation.  
- Analyse the ‘recipient’ countries’ perceptions of Brazil as a cooperation partner, and show how the model of development cooperation has affected Brazil’s soft empowerment.  
- Give empirical evidence of soft power changes of perception  
- Determine whether there is a relationship between the ethanol diplomacy and the biofuel projects carried out by Brazil in three Latin American countries. | Critical Case Study:  
- Project document analysis  
- Literature review on biofuels and ethanol diplomacy  
- Semi-structured interviews / Conceptual interviews  
Article I

The study first aims to comprehend the concept of SSC and investigate its origins. Since no agreed definition exists, the contribution is to review the southern academic literature, the grey literature on aid debates and the reports on and statements from the initial conferences of the SSC movement. A literature review has been defined as 'a library or desk-based method involving the secondary analysis of explicit knowledge, so abstract concepts of explicit and tacit knowledge are explored' (Jesson et al., 2011).

In the space of emergent theory, it is crucial to review the literature in order to compare findings, but most importantly to validate the corroborations uncovered in the case study (Eisenhart, 1989). While identifying gaps, the literature review also enables them to be put into practice in future fieldwork (Meth and Williams, 2006). According to Bryman (2012) a literature review plays the role of helping the researcher identify inconsistencies in relation to future findings. In addition, Bryman sees literature itself as a possible theory: ‘the relevant background literature relating to a topic fuels the focus of an article or book and thereby acts as the equivalent of a theory’ (Bryman, 2012: 22). This literature review is essential to understanding the origins of the claims of SSC and the definition of its principles. In addition, it enables future studies of the Brazilian approach to cooperation and its project cycle model to be carried out.

The article specifically chooses a narrative form of literature review over a systematic one. The difference between the two is that 'traditional [or narrative] reviews are exploring issues, developing ideas, identifying research gaps, whereas systematic reviews are compiling evidence to answer a specific research or policy problem or question, using a protocol' (Jesson et al., 2011: 76). The intention in choosing a narrative review is to ensure a more open and interpretative approach to the findings. Moreover, using the scientific methods of systematic review is prevented by the fact that the body of work originates from different sources, from international organisation reports to peer-reviewed articles. In choosing a narrative literature review, the article follows what is called a conceptual review. According to Jesson et al. (2011), this type of review 'aims to synthesise areas of conceptual knowledge that contribute to a better understanding of the issues' (2011: 15).
Due to a relative lack of academic research in SSDC compared to mainstream traditional aid studies, grey literature is given equal weight in the narrative review, which, after all, reflects the perceptions of southern 'donors'. In addition, in the study of southern narratives, statements, decisions, reports and academic literature are given a priority, even though northern-based articles are also used in the third section on the estimated contribution of southern countries to international development.

Article II
When it comes to examining Brazil's political aspirations and its use of SSDC, the research uses three different methods. The methodology chosen is triangulation. We understand triangulation as ‘the different methodological perspectives complement[ing] each other in the study of an issue, and this is conceived as the complementary compensation for the weaknesses and blind spots of each single method’ (Flick, 2006: 37). The main advantage of this methodology is that ‘it can produce a more complete, holistic and contextual portrait of the object under study’ (Ghauri, 2004: 115). The different set of data is secondary data from the Brazilian institution and other international organs working on data collection, a review of the literature on Brazil’s international activities and its foreign policy in SSC, and interviews with different Brazilian stakeholders using what is called a conceptual approach. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), ‘the questions in conceptual interviews explore the meaning and the conceptual dimensions of central themes, as well as their positions and linking within a conceptual network’. In this way, the interviewer is able to uncover the respondent's discourse model, in other words his or her assumptions about the themes being covered.

The two weeks of fieldwork (January 2013) consisted in conducting semi-structured interviews with different Brazilian cooperation practitioners. The definition of semi-structured interviews chosen for this article is that provided by Kvale (1996): ‘it has a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions. Yet at the same time there is an openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up the answers given and the stories told by the subjects’ (1996: 124). The interviews targeted actors working in public institutions involved in technical cooperation and to a lesser extent academicians. Ten high-ranking officials or managers working on international cooperation
in Brazilian institutions involved in development activities, such as ABC, IPEA, the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty), SENAI, EMBRAPA and FIOCRUZ32, were interviewed. In addition, academics from the University of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro State University and the Centre for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE) were consulted, as well as development cooperation consultants. The questions cover the themes of SSC, the project cycle and data collection (see Annex 1 for the interview questions).

**Article III**

Even though qualitative methods have been criticized for their problems in introducing the small-scale study to generalized theories and for being potentially tainted with the researcher’s bias, they also ‘capture underlying meanings, the unexpected and sensitive issues’ and are good to uncover ‘processes and causality’ (Mayoux, 2006: 120-121). The use of case studies research is best applied to the study of a current phenomenon requiring the development of theory and knowledge (Ghauri, 2004), as it is the case in this thesis. Even though this research method has been criticised for its disputed contribution to theory building and testing and to scientific development, Flyvbjerg provides exhaustive counter-arguments to what he calls ‘misunderstandings’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The case study is usually chosen for its ability to advance the understanding of a research phenomenon (Ghauri, 2004: 109).

The case study method was then selected to analyse the implementation of Brazilian development cooperation projects. Yin (2009) defines the case study as a method that ‘tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what results?’ (Yin, 2009: 17), while Gerring (2004) stresses the importance of this method in exploring phenomena. For Ghauri (2004), single cases are good in explaining or questioning an established theory, whereas the multiple case approach explores the variability of a theory. Even though Yin (2009) stresses the vulnerability of the single case-study approach for the potential questionability of a study based on one perspective, he also considers that a single case can be used to evaluate whether the propositions of the theory are correct or whether other explanations can be

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32 SENAI is the Brazilian National Service for Industrial Training; FIOCRUZ is the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, one of the world’s main public health research institutions.
found that are more relevant to the analytical explanation of the phenomenon (Yin, 2009). Because the investigation here is to see how the 'recipients' of Brazilian development cooperation appraised the SSDC principles of demand-driven cooperation and horizontality at the level of project implementation, the single case approach is preferred.

The aim here is to select projects with what is called a ‘critical cases’ approach. In sampling strategies for case study, Patton (1990) categorises them into seven types of sampling: extreme or deviant cases, typical cases, maximal variation in the sample, intense cases, critical cases, sensitive cases and convenient cases. The study uses a critical case approach or what Flick (2006) defines as an extreme case, where ‘the field under study is disclosed from its extremities to arrive at an understanding of the field as whole’ (Flick, 2006: 131) or, in somewhat easier terms, ‘to achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type ‘If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230).

Selected cases are what Flyvbjerg (2006) would call the ‘most likely’ cases (against ‘least-likely’) because they are the most appropriate for the falsification of propositions (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 231). The objective of this method is to deduce from the study whether the falsification or verification of the hypothesis should logically be relevant to all cases. Understanding the limitations of such a method, Patton also stressed its advantages: 'While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases, logical generalizations can often be made from the weight of evidence produced in studying a single, critical case' (1990: 174-175). Applying a critical cases analysis, if the study of the implementation process of the three biofuel projects shows a demand-driven and horizontality approach in a sector in which Brazil has the most incentives to influence cooperation (see Section 2.3 on ethanol diplomacy), then one can assume that this applies to all other technical assistance projects involving Brazil.

Because the demand-driven and horizontality approaches to the projects and the 'recipients' experiences cannot be apprehended in project documents, an interview method is chosen. Indeed, ‘In-depth interviews are particularly suitable when a researcher wants to understand the behaviour of decision-makers in different cultures’ (Ghauri, 2004: 111). To be able to study the characteristics of horizontality and the demand-driven approach (representing the core of the Brazilian discourse on SSDC) and to analyse
manifestations of soft power, the method of semi-structured interviews is preferred. This is considered the best tool for evaluating ‘recipients’” experiences, given the inaccessibility of data and the fact that surveys are usually limited in their explanations of patterns or opinions (Willis, 2006). As Willis puts it, ‘interviews are an excellent way of gaining “factual” information’ (Willis: 2006: 146), and in the absence of accessible information, they permit one to ‘examine processes, motivations and reasons for successes or failures’ (Willis, 2006: 146).

The primary research on the Brazilian project cycle has been conducted by studying the ‘recipients’” perspectives of three different biofuel projects implemented by Brazil from among a list of ten biofuel projects33 on the MRE website under complementary agreement34. Three projects were selected in three countries: Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru. The other seven projects were disregarded because there was no response from the ‘recipient’ countries’ institutions involved in the project (four), because the projects involved triangular cooperation (one) or because they were not consistent with capacity-building projects (two). In each country, three kinds of interviewees were targeted: the institution in charge of the project (project managers and project participants of INTA, INIAP, DEVIDA and INIA); the country’s cooperation agency (SETECI in the case of Ecuador and APCI in Peru); and the National Think Tank on biofuel and academics in Peru and Ecuador (informal interviews). These semi-structured interviews are following a deductive approach in which three themes have already been chosen: cooperation as demand-driven, horizontality, and experience of Brazil as a cooperation provider (see the list of questions in Annex 2). This thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012) is an a priori approach because it is based on the previous articles’ theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study. Like Ryan and Bernard, I define the term 'themes' as ‘the fundamental concepts we are trying to describe’ (2003: 87). To conduct this analysis I use the thematic-identification

33 According to other sources (MRE, 2007, and ABC website), there have been 21 biofuel projects since 2007 (the year when ethanol diplomacy started). However, the information available in these two sources is very general, sometimes not stipulating an end date, nor a budget. This is why the information on complementary agreements was considered more reliable.

34 In Brazilian law, each project has to be approved by the Foreign Ministry or at the Presidential level of each country in a document called in Portuguese the Ajuste complementar, namely a complementary agreement which is added to the technical cooperation agreement that regulates projects between the two countries. Later on, a project document is written.
technique of 'cutting and sorting' (Ryan and Bernard, 2003), which aims at identifying quotes that appear important in the transcripts and arranging them in piles. The interview transcripts were therefore enumerated for purposes of anonymity, and quotes were colour-coded according to the theme they covered and the country the quotes were collected in. In a descriptive approach, analysis of the interviews is directed to the presentation of the project process and to 'recipients'' experiences.
5. Discussion of research findings

The principal objective of this thesis is to answer the overall research question of why and how southern countries participate in development cooperation, taking Brazil as a case. As discussed in the articles, the literature on both South-South Cooperation (SSC) and soft power lack the support of strong empirical research. This thesis aims to fill this gap first with a study of the construction of SSC and the southern countries’ SSC narrative. Secondly, Brazil’s participation in international development is explained using the soft power analysis of Brazilian South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). In this thesis, I assert that the deliberate focus on SSDC principles and approaches in Brazilian development cooperation led to Brazil’s 'soft empowerment' due to the positive reaction it produced among the 'recipients'.

This is based on the findings of three articles. The first article studies the construction of SSC and the principles and approaches of SSDC as presented by the southern countries. The second and third articles focus on Brazilian development cooperation: the second article on Brazil’s conceptualisation of development cooperation under Lula’s government, and the third article on the implementation of three Brazilian projects and the experiences of the 'recipients'. Two academic disciplines touch the study of Brazilian SSDC: development studies in respect of research into foreign aid, and international relations in respect of the study of southern countries’ ambitions in relation to their participation in international development (here informed by the soft power theory). The sections below present the articles' findings and provide analytical and theoretical development to these two disciplines.

5.1. Implications for development studies

5.1.1 State of the debate

As explained in Section 2.1, the study of foreign aid in development studies has recently been focused on the analysis of the results of northern foreign aid and of the debate about
possible ways to improve it. The causes of foreign aid failure have been identified as the donor-driven aspect of northern aid (ActionAid International, 2006; Newby, 2010), the persistence of tied aid (Riddell, 2007; Clays et al., 2008), the focus on growth as a main indicator for poverty reduction (Fukuda-Parr, 2011), the persistence of conditionalities (Eurodad, 2006; Ranis, 2007; Riddell, 2007), the lack of follow-up in the activities undertaken (Easterly, 2002) and the lack of priority given to low-income countries (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; SU-SSC, 2009).

In this discourse over the failure of northern aid, Hughes and Hutchison (2012) go a step further by asserting that traditional aid ignores the needs of the beneficiary countries because of the donor's very conception of development: 'Donor discourse retains the idea that development “is a public good”: a set of policies that, although varied in its impact, will ultimately benefit everyone over the long term' (2012: 22). They explain the donors' conception of development as being guided by the liberal assumptions which correlate access to a market with the reduction of poverty. Therefore, according to Hughes and Hutchison (2012), donors view the possible divergence between their priorities and the recipient's wishes as a temporary issue which will be overcome with the recipients' economic development. The mismatch with local priorities is thus believed not to be ideologically and structurally motivated, but to reflect a lack of long-term vision on the part of the recipient countries. According to Ziai (2011), this depoliticised view of development, where 'under'-development is seen as a technical problem, lingers in the UN's millennium development goals (MDGs), which remain trade-oriented and do not aim to reform the world order.

Conditionality and the donor-driven approach are aspects that best reflect the asymmetries in donor-recipient relations. Authors such as Woods (2008), Morais de Sá e Silva (2010) and Sato et al. (2011) have shown that developing countries are increasingly demanding aid that respects their own national priorities. Already in 2006, Manning (2006) was reporting that developing countries were strongly pressing for the ownership agenda (Manning is referring to the design of the Paris Declaration). Therefore, efforts were made during the OECD-DAC fora on 'aid effectiveness' to integrate the southern countries' demands and address the causes of failure mentioned above. As a result, some fundamental
points of southern countries’ requests have been included in the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership Agreement, such as the principle of national control over technical cooperation, mutual responsibility and the reduction of conditionalities (Schulz, 2008). To make development aid less burdensome and more appropriate for the developing countries themselves and to ensure the achievement of the MDGs, the northern aid debate focuses on 'aid effectiveness'. It advocates the harmonisation of northern countries' activities, the alignment of their objectives and the measuring of their outcomes in developing countries.

While southern countries’ ambitions in international development do not involve replacing the OECD-ODA (SEGIB, 2009; South Centre, 2009), SSDC is a mechanism in its own right (Betancourt and Schulz, 2009) that does not follow OECD-DAC standards (Pickup, 2012). The southern countries’ approach has been elaborated in foundational southern meetings such as the Bandung Conference in 1955, the 32nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1977 and the Buenos Aires Action Plan in 1978 establishing technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). The narrative expressed in these meetings mainly consists of putting the recipient at the centre of the development project, respecting the recipient’s sovereignty and promoting mutual development through southern cooperation.

Since 1978, southern development cooperation, called South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), has been acquiring more and more importance in terms of both its influence on the aid debate and its international presence. The fact that SSDC has been developed outside the northern structure has caused a lot of concerns to northern donors about its effects on international development. Nowadays, there exists a perception among northern donors that SSDC will undermine the efforts put in place to ensure 'aid effectiveness' and their achievements in terms of policy reforms and the good governance of developing countries, by assuming that southern ‘donors’ will prioritise their own commercial interests (Manning, 2006; Sanahuja, 2007; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; Ayllon, 2012b; Amamor, 2013). According to Manning (2006), by overlooking the sustainability of implemented projects, SSDC could produce another round of ‘over-
ambitious or unproductive’ projects. Furthermore, SSDC may fragment aid delivery and make coordination difficult because of donor proliferation (Sanahuja, 2007), as well as producing unfair company competition and free rides on debt relief (Naim, 2007). However, these assertions are not based on any empirical evidence (Woods, 2008; UN-ECOSOC, 2008; Paulo and Reisen, 2010). This is because very few studies have been carried out to understand the values of SSC and their applicability in development cooperation.

More and more attention has been paid to SSC in multilateral institutions’ plans of action for the achievement of the MDGs. But there is still a misunderstanding when northern donors view SSDC as similar to North-South cooperation, the only difference lying in the geographical focus. Indeed, as explained by H.E. John W. Ashe at the opening of the 18th session of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, northern donors and UN institutions still have only a partial knowledge of the practicalities of SSDC (Ashe, 2014). The contribution of this thesis is twofold: on the one hand it lays the groundwork for the understanding of SSC and SSDC as a whole (first article), while on the other hand it describes the SSDC model of implementation for one specific country, Brazil (third article).

5.1.2 Analytical insights of the thesis for development studies

The first article lists the different aspects which constitute the basis and motivations behind the SSC movement and categorises the guiding principles of and approaches to SSDC. To this end, the first article uses a narrative literature review to comprehend the southern countries’ rationale regarding SSC and SSDC.

In terms of SSC, a categorisation of the different concepts that take part in the definition of SSC was needed. Contrary to what northern donors understand by SSC, it became apparent from the literature review that southern countries include other dimensions than solely the geographical dimension to their cooperation. This categorisation integrates the origins, goals and values that permeate the concept. It highlights how in some cases SSC can be very different from the northern understanding of international cooperation. These elements are presented in the article under:
- basic values (for example, non-interference in domestic affairs),
- goals (for example, southern countries’ self-reliance),
- structure (for example, the inclusion of development cooperation processes as part of SSC),
- capacity (for example, SSC being limited to areas in which the 'donor' country possesses the necessary expertise)
- forms and areas of actions (for example, the inclusion of trade in SSC activities).

With regard to SSDC, the article identifies six different principles and approaches put forward by southern countries in respect of their development cooperation (see Table 3 below).

**Table 3: Principles and approaches of SSDC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles and approaches</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for sovereignty, no conditionality and non-interference in domestic affairs</td>
<td>On principle, southern countries do not intervene in other countries' affairs due to the importance they give to sovereignty. This implies that southern countries do not impose conditions on their cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual benefits</td>
<td>The objective as stated in the different SSC conferences is to jointly foster the development of developing countries. 'Win-win' is not only acceptable, but also promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontality</td>
<td>In the exchanges, relations are symmetrical, meaning that both partners enjoy the same prerogatives at every step of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand-driven approach and ownership</td>
<td>The projects always originate in the 'recipient' country's request. This presupposes that the project is already 'owned' by the 'recipient'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness and</td>
<td>The technical cooperation emanates from the expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
adaptability of technical cooperation and knowledge sharing

one southern country possesses. In addition, the technique or technology is appropriate due to similar economic, cultural and climatic conditions in both partner countries.

Regional focus

Because of the above (similar cultures, history, climate and economy), SSDC is developed principally at the regional level.

These principles and approaches are anchored in a historical origin of independence from colonial rule and a search for mutual development on the basis of respect for the 'recipient's' sovereignty. While each country has a different approach to SSDC and chooses which of the principles and approaches it wants to focus on, the first article establishes the different parameters that should be taken into consideration when referring to SSDC. The implication for development studies relates to the categorisations described above as an analytical lens and conceptual framework which foreign aid researchers can use to discuss those values and principles in light of the results of their research 'on the ground'. This framework for understanding can provide a useful tool in the study of the expressions of SSC and SSDC values and principles. Particularly, this thesis shows that SSDC approaches and principles do not conflict with the principles promoted at the fora on 'aid effectiveness'. For instance, the reduction of conditionalities or respecting national control over technical cooperation both respond to the first and fourth principles presented above. The northern donor community and southern countries are both heading in the same direction in placing more and more importance on the role of the 'recipients'. The article's findings lay the ground for more exchanges between these two types of development assistance.

However, as also discussed in Park (2011), while there are similarities in terms of principles, more importantly, there are differences in terms of implementation processes. This thesis also supports Park's study by pointing out a major contradiction between southern and northern approaches to development cooperation. As argued in the previous section, the fora on 'aid effectiveness' aim to harmonise northern ODA activities, align their objectives and measure the results. This approach is by essence in opposition to the
principles and approaches of SSDC presented in Table 3. First, due to the fact that SSDC is demand-driven, the 'donors' cannot harmonise their activities or plan their objectives. The implementation of activities is dependent upon the 'recipient's' requests and its own evaluation of its needs. Secondly, southern countries do not refer explicitly to measurement or monitoring. This can be explained by reference to several reasons. Some southern countries have only recently started participating in SSDC and therefore have not elaborated a project cycle model. Other states, which are already overwhelmed with national socio-economic problems, choose not to publish their participation in the development of other developing countries to avoid protests from their own populations. However, the main reason lies in the very essence of the SSC narrative: the procedures of control and assessment by the 'donor' countries are viewed as intrusive and as not respecting the 'recipient' country's sovereignty.

Therefore, on the basis of the fact that SSDC is neither planned nor monitored, it cannot participate in the northern community's efforts to ensure 'aid effectiveness'. As Park (2011) notes, to ensure accountability, northern donors will demand transparency and results that are assessed using indicators, whereas southern providers will showcase the success of a project by stressing its mutual benefits to each partner and by fiercely insisting on respect for sovereignty.

However, analysis of SSDC provides a more lucid discussion about ownership and the donor-driven approach. As explained in the preceding section, northern aid has been criticised for implementing projects in developing countries, whether the latter expressed the need for it or not (Chandy and Kharas, 2011; Hughes and Hutchison, 2012). The persistence of the donor-driven approach described by these authors expresses a real contradiction with the values promoted in the OECD-DAC rounds: because the harmonisation of actions and alignment of objectives are still defined by the northern donors, little place is left for the recipient countries’ wishes, which hence 'impact' on the

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35 Here, the analysis refers to bilateral aid where the actions are defined by the donor country itself. In multilateral agencies, the objectives and actions are supposedly defined by the member countries. There are studies that nonetheless point out the lack of representativeness of southern countries in multilateral agencies plans (Park, 2011). This under-representation implies that even though southern countries are involved and rely in general on UN institutions, they still show some reluctance regarding the Bretton Woods institutions (SU-SSC, 2009).
country’s ownership. This analysis has also been made by Davies (2008) in collecting feedback from ‘non-DAC providers’ about the Paris Declaration: she refers to a ‘legitimacy gap’ in the aid-effectiveness fora because the non-DAC donors perceived the process as being largely led by DAC donors and multilateral agencies. Vandemoortele (2011) explains that this leadership is justified through a northern donors’ discourse which maintains that northern countries represent the model for development. Northern control over a project’s scope and distribution has been one of the mains reasons why SSDC has been praised: SSC narratives are based on the centrality of the role of the ‘recipients’ and the excision of the terms ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ (Chaturvedi et al., 2012; Mawdsley, 2012). This praise is confirmed by the empirical findings of the third article presented below.

First, the third article of the thesis contributes to the understanding of SSDC by providing empirical evidence of the implementation of SSDC projects. It was conducted through the study of three Brazilian biofuel projects in Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru. The *comision mixta*, a joint committee gathering together the Brazilian and ‘recipient’ parties in the project, plays an important role in the project design. It is used as a regular platform where the ‘recipient’ countries present their project proposals and where the parties examine and discuss the project’s opportunities. In the particular case of Ecuador, it is in the course of the same meeting that the projects are formulated and signed off. The Costa Rican project showed the least demand-driven approach, though the recipients still reported good experiences in their work with Brazil. However, the study shows that Ecuador demonstrates the most horizontal and ‘recipient’-driven project due to its institutional strength and its political focus on sovereignty. The *comision mixta* represents a sophisticated institutional setting in which both regularity (every two years) and attendance (the Brazilian delegation consists of the ABC personnel and the technical experts of each Brazilian institution involved in the respective project) underline the priority the Brazilian government gives to the implementation of development cooperation activities. The project cycle presented in the third article reiterates the importance of the ‘recipient’s’ involvement in SSDC activities. This description is particularly relevant for development actors. Indeed, it shows how to ensure the recipient’s ownership of a project. Given the promotion of ownership in the northern aid debates, the example of the *comision*
mixta provides the basis for how to approach project design in a different manner. This also offers an important insight into the criticism directed towards SSDC. As already discussed, one of the aims of 'aid effectiveness' is to harmonise activities in order to make foreign aid less burdensome to developing countries' limited institutional capacities. One of the criticisms raised against SSDC is that the entry of 'new' actors into development cooperation will undermine the work achieved on aid fragmentation (Sanahuja, 2007). The description of the project design above gives the development aid debate another path with which to ensure the effective delivery of development projects. By leaving the project idea to the 'recipient' and building an institutional setting that permits the 'recipient', and not the donor, to assess its needs every two years, the Brazilian model of project implementation produces a solution to 'aid effectiveness' through its harmonisation component. This harmonisation is secured by the 'recipient' country. Sato et al. (2011) came to the same conclusion about the contribution of SSDC to the improvement of development assistance. The authors note that the problem of fragmentation might not be the lack of coordination but the lack of competition. The latter could be compensated by the activities of the 'emerging donors'.

Secondly, the findings also support the studies about the central role of the 'recipient' in the SSDC narrative and the importance of this role for the 'recipients'. The interviews show that they praised Brazilian SSDC for the demand-driven and ownership approaches it followed, despite what can be called serious deficiencies in the projects. This suggests that the recipients prioritise the model of cooperation over the results. Project delays are the most visible example of these deficiencies. All the complementary agreements and project documents had been signed between 2007 and 2009 (with the exception of Ecuador, which, due to the breaking off of diplomatic relations, only signed the project document in 2011). As of September 2013 (for some countries, almost five years after the project document was signed), all projects were still awaiting the shipments of and experiments with the selected crops. Nonetheless, the findings of the interviews emphasize the satisfaction of being in at the start and involved at every step in the project, coupled sometimes with disregard for the delays. The southern countries’ expression of the need to respect their national priorities identified in the work of Woods (2008) and Sato et al. (2011) is also
empirically supported in the third article. This enthusiasm for these demand-driven projects, even though they are questionable regarding their 'efficiency', shows the frustration with a donor-driven model of cooperation. While countries such as Brazil will not be able to ride the demand-driven wave for long without improving the delivery time of its projects, the analysis calls for a serious debate about the ownership approach in northern development aid. Indeed, by prioritising the demand-driven approach in its development cooperation, Brazil is one step ahead in answering one of the 'recipients' requests in 'aid effectiveness' and thus differentiating itself from northern donors. But it is fair to assume that the enthusiasm described by the project participants in the three biofuel projects will soon cool if Brazil does not improve the delivery time of its projects. This implication for Brazilian SSDC will be particularly significant in the analysis of Brazil 'soft empowerment' discussed in Section 5.2.

Finally, the findings of the third article support the view that the concern expressed in the literature about the tied-aid and commercial interest character of SSDC (Hilsum, 2005; Tull, 2006; Six, 2009) does not show itself in the case study on the Brazilian projects. The case study of biofuel projects implemented by Brazil shows that the horizontality and demand-driven approaches still apply, even when the scope of activities involves strong Brazilian commercial interests. As discussed in Section 2.3, Brazil is the world leader in biofuel technology and has a foreign policy dedicated to the promotion and scaling up of biofuel activities, called ethanol diplomacy. The logic of the critical case presented in Section 4.3 asserts that, 'While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases, logical generalizations can often be made from the weight of evidence produced in studying a single, critical case' (Patton, 1992). Following this logic, the level of horizontality and demand-driven approaches in Brazilian projects should be even higher when no particular commercial interests are at stake.

However, one element of SSDC can be perceived as tied aid in the northern understanding of the term: SSDC is delivered by southern countries using their own expertise. Consequently, the assistance is 'tied' to the use of the 'donor' country's experts. The tying of activities to northern consultants and personnel is nonetheless discouraged in North-South cooperation because of the consultancy industry that tied aid creates (Dichter and Grieve,
2003) and because of the increase in project costs (Riddell, 2007; Clay et al., 2008). However, in the context of SSDC, use of the 'donor' countries' expertise is at the root of SSDC principles. As explained in categorizing SSDC earlier, the 'capacity' category binds SSDC activities to the southern 'donor's' areas of expertise. Therefore, it is this expertise that the 'recipients' are requesting.

5.1.3 Concluding remarks

The empirical implications of the first and third articles allow development studies academics and aid actors to gain a better understanding of the rationale behind and the support for SSDC. From the analysis conducted in the two articles, it is apparent that there exists a need for the 'recipients' to participate in a project's development from the inception stage. Brazil, which is also an aid recipient, understood the need for a distinct project implementation model where the 'recipient' is at the centre of the process. This approach explains its praise. The analysis therefore reinforces the importance of ownership for the 'recipients'. The latter spoke highly of this approach despite the project's deficiencies, showing a frustration with what they consider the donor-driven aspect of traditional aid. The value that 'recipients' place on being at the centre of project implementation is a major issue that should be prioritised by northern donors in the debate on 'aid effectiveness'.

While the northern aid community relies more and more on result-based approaches, SSDC insists on placing the emphasis on the demand-driven approach. Therefore northern aid requires plans of actions to reach these results, while the demand-driven aspect of SSDC prevents such planning, at least from the 'donor's' side. This represents a significant difference between southern and northern approaches to development cooperation in terms of both planning and monitoring activities, as well as in the power relations with respect to project implementation. Notwithstanding this divergence of approaches, the two worlds of northern aid and SSDC can learn from one another; the major limitation of SSDC being assessing the project's results. As the study of the three projects shows, project assessment is essential to improve the assistance provided and is in the interests of both

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36 This focus on results is augmented by the northern donors' commitment to the MDGs, which quantify the achievements in different sectors of development aid.
the 'recipient' and the 'donor'. While pointing to the northern debate's contradiction between ownership and harmonisation and the alignment of actions and objectives, the analysis stresses the lack of assessment activities in SSDC as its main flaw. The present research contributes to the debate about the benefits of SSC and SSDC (and its effects on 'aid effectiveness') and establishes that SSC cannot be integrated with OECD-DAC standards.

But instead of stressing the 'incompatibility' of the two approaches, the description of SSDC and the research findings presented above provide a conceptual perspective that should help the agenda of 'aid effectiveness' (regarding the ownership and demand-driven issues). The thesis advances the debate about 'aid effectiveness' by exploring how the demand-driven aspect and the project model of Brazilian SSDC provide solutions that ensure the harmonisation of activities. In this perspective, the harmonisation is achieved by the 'recipient' itself. As discussed in the next section, the recipient-driven approach of SSDC is significant in the study of Brazil's 'soft empowerment'.

5.2. Implications for soft power theory

5.2.1 The state of the debate

As discussed in Section 2, realist and neoliberal theories in IR have conflicting views of how states influence international relations and other states' decisions.

Realists assert that states secure their power by using their material capabilities, such as military (threat) and economic (inducement) powers. Power is defined as something tangible. The realist view of power reflects what Bachrach and Baratz (1992) call the two faces of power: namely the power to make a country do something it would not do otherwise, or the power to prevent a country from doing what it wants to do. Realists therefore have a coercive view of state relations.

In opposition to this, neoliberals in IR theory maintain that state decisions are shaped by preferences and values, therefore stressing the role of ideas in international relations. In
this respect, Nye’s soft power theory is particularly relevant in the way it places the emphasis on the role of co-optation in preference-shaping. This co-optation is obtained by influencing the subject’s interests and preferences with the positive image that the agent possesses or intentionally produces. Nye (1990b) described this co-optation by stating ‘If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes’ (1990b: 169).

To conclude, ‘for liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics – not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities’ (Moravcsik, 1997:513).

The findings of the thesis weaken realist theory and provide empirical evidence for the theory of soft power by demonstrating that coercion and material capabilities are not the only way to influence other countries’ decisions. The findings empirically show that the Brazilian government also based its decisions on the same approach to international relations as described in Nye’s soft power, that is, Brazil assumes that attraction can have an effect on its ability to obtain what it wants. This is illustrated by the Brazilian government’s objective under Lula of producing a positive image through its development cooperation. This represents a major contribution to the international relations discipline because of the input it provides to the role of ideas and preferences in state decisions. Preferences are not only shaped by fear or inducement, they are also based on attraction to values and successes.

The contribution to international relations set out above, as well as the contribution to the theoretical development of the soft power theory, is presented in more detail in the section below.

5.2.2 The theoretical and analytical insights of the thesis

As was explained in Section 2, soft power entails two analytical levels: it is a theory describing an international relations phenomenon (a state can obtain preferred outcomes thanks to its capacity to influence other states’ decisions through co-optive means) and it is a description of a process leading to an outcome (how a country uses a resource in a soft
way to gain power). In this thesis, the second analytical level, namely the process of 'soft empowerment', is scrutinised by studying the strategy undertaken by Brazil to produce a positive image of itself and the reception of this strategy by the subjects targeted by Brazil.

Various observers, such as Bially Mattern (2005) and Kearns (2011), have highlighted the lack of clarity in Nye’s theory when it comes to distinguishing the different manifestations of soft power: it is considered a natural condition (the country or agent already has a stockpile of values and successes which consequently generates attraction), a behaviour or behavioural outcome (the actions a country undertakes to improve its image) and an outcome (the power that is translated into legitimacy and credibility given by the subject). Because Nye posits a dichotomy in seeing a country’s attraction as both a natural condition and a social construct, little analytical development has been achieved on the role of actors and the 'how' of soft power (Lukes, 2005). While Nye recognises the necessity of developing this aspect, there is at the moment a lack of analytical development in this respect.

This thesis addresses this analytical limitation of Nye’s theory by exploring Brazil’s use of the soft power currencies of 'brilliance', 'beauty' and 'benignity' in Brazilian SSDC and showing how this use was interpreted by the project 'recipients' (subject). The study of the agent’s behaviour and the subject’s reception was conducted by analysing official documents published by the Brazilian government and public entities under President Lula (2003-2011) and by conducting and analysing interviews with Brazilian actors involved in development cooperation and the 'recipients' of three Brazilian projects. The research concludes that the use of the horizontal and demand-driven approaches of SSDC in Brazil’s 'solidarity' foreign policy was not only conceptualised by Lula’s government (2003-2011) with the objective of creating soft power: it also contributed to Brazil's actual soft empowerment thanks to the image created among the 'recipients' of its SSDC. The findings of this research therefore validate the soft power theory by providing empirical evidence of

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37 As already described in Section 2, these three power currencies are those that contribute to attraction and therefore influence a country’s soft power. The 'beauty' currency represents the country's values and ideals, which ultimately generate credibility and legitimacy. The 'benignity' as a soft power currency is what one would call the generosity and altruism towards other countries or groups. And finally 'brilliance' mirrors the success of a country, whether it is in terms of its military might, its powerful economy, its blissful culture or its peaceful society. All these currencies contribute to soft empowerment.
the multifaceted manifestations of soft power at the level of the resource, behaviour (second article) and outcome (third article).

The findings presented in the second article establish that the objective of producing a positive image has been achieved by promoting a southern identity narrative of mutual development and solidarity in SSDC conceptualisation and activities (adding to the 'beauty' and 'benignity' currencies). It became apparent that, under Lula’s administration, efforts were made to acquire a positive image through the solidarity approach of the SSDC. Indeed, the analysis shows that the Brazilian government shaped its cooperation agency, ABC, by emphasising the applicability of the horizontal and demand-driven approaches. This was translated into the organisation of the work plan, which prioritized projects with a positive image element, the increase in ABC’s budget and the model of project design. In addition, the Brazilian government increased the number of development cooperation projects, the financial contribution to technical cooperation trebling between 2005 and 2009. The article’s results also demonstrate the demand-driven character of Brazilian activities by showcasing the large scope of activities and countries covered by Brazilian development cooperation (as an example, Brazil participated in projects in 99 countries in 2010). Thus, the article’s findings demonstrate how Lula and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took part in designing ABC’s guidelines and increasing SSDC activities in order to gain a positive image in the ‘recipient’ countries. In this respect, the article supports the soft power theory that states consider co-optation to be a valuable way of fulfilling their interests. This is overwhelming evidence that states do assume that their behaviour and image have an ‘impact’ on world politics. The then foreign minister Amorim explicitly stated this objective: ‘We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours promotion of the development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good for peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil herself, in political as well as economic terms’ (Amorim, 2010: 225).

Another critique this thesis raises against realism theory is that, in the solidarity approach of its foreign policy (pledging the horizontality of exchanges and the non-financial aspect of development cooperation projects), Brazil has directed assistance away from its regional and security considerations. The second article shows that projects developed with a non-
priority approach with countries in Africa and Latin America had an equal share of development projects by 2009. Therefore, this finding reinforces Nye's description of power in international relations in the way it shows that a country's decisions are not only motivated by short-term benefits and security guarantees, as maintained by the realists (see Section 3.1). As such, this research supports the claim that countries rely on the assumption that the image they project has a positive influence on their preferred outcomes, as asserted in the analysis of power made by Nye in his research. As Nye declares, soft power is expressed by 'the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes' (2011: 21).

However, the present research also identifies the complexity of soft power outcomes as a key issue that can weaken the theory of soft power. This is because there can be confusion between soft power's primary outcomes (the legitimacy, credibility and attraction created or maintained by the state's soft power currencies) and the preferred outcomes (the outcomes which arise from this legitimacy, credibility and attraction, usually constituting support, preference-shaping or agenda-setting).

In terms of primary outcomes, this thesis has developed the analysis of subject's perceptions, which in this case means Brazilian projects' 'recipients' perceptions of Brazil. Subjects' perceptions are an element of soft power that has been overlooked by Nye himself, as well as by academics studying soft power (see Section 3.3). However, it is the standpoint of this thesis that there is no soft power if the intended attraction is not received positively by the subject. The subject's perception is by consequence essential to the exertion of soft power. The agent-centred analysis of soft power made by Nye has also been criticized by Lukes (2005), who specifically asks 'exactly how do agents succeed in winning the hearts and minds of those subject to their influence?' (2005: 492). By answering this question, this thesis has strengthened the soft power theory and its overlooking of the role of the subject. Indeed, the third article argues that Brazilian development cooperation produced soft power through the way it influenced the perspective of the subject, here the participants in Brazilian SSDC projects. The analysis shows that soft power has had a long-term influence on 'recipients' positive perceptions of Brazil in the way the 'recipients'
downplayed the deficiencies of the projects and communicated their desire for future cooperation projects. In this respect, the article provides empirical evidence of Brazil’s 'soft empowerment' in the 'recipients'' perceptions of the demand-driven and horizontal approaches of the Brazilian project model. It also endorses the power currencies put forward by Vuving (2009) in his research.

The three soft power currencies of 'brilliance', 'benignity' and 'beauty' contributed to the 'soft empowerment' of Brazil in these projects. First, Brazil is favoured among the 'recipients' with an image of success in respect of biofuel technology. This element resulted in the perception that Brazil, and especially EMBRAPA, was the right partner to choose in this sector of activities. By benefiting from an image of being the leader in biofuel technology, and thus trading upon the power currency of 'brilliance', the 'recipients' were convinced that EMBRAPA would be the best partner for enhancing the capacity of their institutions. Secondly, respect for the demand-driven approach and the freedom permitted in the design and implementation of the projects were interpreted by the 'recipients' as altruistic and generous – both essential factors of the power currency of 'benignity'. In analysing the transcripts, and as explained in the previous section, it appeared that the 'recipients' emphasized the respect given to these SSC values in development cooperation and placed much greater importance on the way the projects were designed than their actual results. By answering the 'recipients' needs and respecting SSC values, Brazil secured the power currency of 'beauty'. This finding supports the importance that Nye places on the context of soft power rather than the resources used in its exercise. As Nye explained, ‘Whether soft power produces behaviour that we want will depend on the context and the skills with which the resources are converted into outcomes' (Nye, 2007: 170). It is not the resource used that matters (in this case, development cooperation projects) but the way it was implemented (here, the symmetrical exchanges and responsibilities in the project besought by the developing countries). In other words, Brazil did not gain soft power in relation to the three 'recipient' countries because of the development projects themselves. The reason for the 'soft empowerment' lies in the solidarity narrative highlighted in the exchange and the importance given to the horizontality and demand-driven approaches. If the 'recipients' had concluded that the projects were under Brazilian
control, it would have undercut Brazil’s soft power potential in the 'benignity' and 'beauty' currencies. As explained before, this 'benignity' currency was created through the 'recipients' perceptions that they were in at the start of the projects and in control of project design and implementation. Therefore, if the 'recipients' had thought that the projects were being steered by Brazil, the generosity and the implementation of SSC values would have turned into a manipulation of the project to answer Brazil’s interests and a lack of respect for SSC values. As discussed in Section 5.1, SSDC principles include the demand-driven approach and the horizontality of the exchanges. SSC was originally built assuming a North-South divide and later became an alternative model to the practice of northern donors' development cooperation. It is important for southern countries that the solidarity and mutual development promoted by the SSC narratives can be found in SSDC practice. The respect for SSC values in practice thus implies a strong contributory factor to soft power and represents a practice influencing the process of preference-shaping in the way it influenced the recipients’ views of Brazil. In that respect, the study provides insights into what Lukes is calling for in research, namely a listing of the practices and arrangements which are disempowering or empowering in their effects on the 'shaping of preferences' (2007: 95). Lukes draws a distinction between changing incentives by using coercion, inducements or shaping interests, and the conditions and the mechanisms influencing these changes. He adds that no analytical development is made in soft power theory regarding how these causal processes undermine the subject’s ability to judge and decide (the exercise of power or indoctrination) or to expand this ability (processes which enhance the freedom of choice in the subject’s decision-making). Lukes continues by saying that, by regrouping these two types of causal processes, soft power theory fails to make a distinction between practices that empower or disempower the subject respectively. It could be argued that Brazilian soft power currencies have limited the free exercise of judgement by the 'recipients': in shaping the 'recipient's' preferences, the use of SSC values in development cooperation activities could be interpreted as an example of a practice that disempowers the process of decision-making according to Lukes. On the other hand, by providing a different cooperation model, it could be argued that Brazil empowered the 'recipients' by giving them the ability to make a choice more freely about cooperation (an informed decision), the solidarity foreign policy embodying a new concept of cooperation.
This, however, is an aspect of knowledge in studies of power that this thesis has decided not to cover: the post-structuralist argument here reflects a level of power that is far from that exercised consciously by states. In addition, the author himself argues that empowering and disempowering practices are difficult to investigate in reality: each state action has simultaneously a manipulation and a knowledge strengthening element which influences both the empowerment and disempowerment in decision-making. The analysis of this thesis is directed to the study of changes in incentives, not to whether these changes are disempowering or empowering for the subject. Brazil’s soft empowerment through the use of the soft power currencies of 'brilliance', 'beauty' and 'benignity' mirrors this change in incentives and represents a good example of soft power’s primary outcome.

However, in terms of preferred outcomes, the findings regarding Brazil’s soft empowerment does not allow to formulate any conclusions as to how and where this soft power will be expressed in international politics, or if it will ever be expressed clearly. This is an aspect of soft power that this thesis decided not to examine because the possible preferred outcomes of soft empowerment are hard to delineate and require a macro-level analysis involving a different data collection strategy. Nye describes the daunting task of studying these preferred outcomes by stating: "Going further to project attraction, frame agendas, and persuade others is even more difficult. As we have seen, the causal paths are often indirect, the effects often take time to ripen, some of the general goals to which soft power is directed are diffuse, and governments are rarely in full control of all the instruments" (Nye, 2011: 100).

Nonetheless, given the analytical development of soft power theory undertaken in this study, it becomes clear that soft power is more structural in its manifestations than a clear-cut coercive cause-effect power, as the discussion above about empowerment or disempowerment in state decisions implies. Soft power shapes states’ preferences and therefore their decisions, but it can never be clearly delineated. If a state were to link soft power to a direct benefit, the thread of co-optation would be lost. The power relationship would be converted into an exchange of give and take or into coercive actions. However, soft power follows what Digeser (1992) called the third face of power, where one country willingly fulfils another’s wishes. There is no give and take there: soft power enables the
'willingly' and therefore works on idea-shaping rather than direct coercion. This is a difficult cause-effect to investigate empirically. Puente (2009) has linked the African recipients of Brazilian SSDC to their voting in support of Brazil’s claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, this thesis takes the position that state decisions are motivated and shaped by different ideas and preferences, and a country’s attraction – in Puente’s case the 'benignity' currency experienced by African 'recipients' – is only one of them.

5.2.3 Concluding remarks

From the analysis undertaken in the three articles, I conclude that the aim of Brazil’s foreign policy of solidarity was to acquire a positive image for itself, thus demonstrating a country’s behaviour in soft power terms and providing an explanation of southern countries’ ambitions in SSDC, and that the perceived horizontality and demand-driven approaches in the eyes of the 'recipients' contributed to the Brazil’s 'soft empowerment'. In this respect, the analysis is also innovative in using the SSDC principles as a resource and approach contributing to soft power. While soft power studies have been carried out, they have mainly targeted North American foreign policy and more recently Scandinavian countries’ involvement in human rights and peace-keeping operations and China’s development of cultural centres. This thesis therefore not only represents a change of subject – development cooperation projects instead of analysis of foreign policy or cultural diplomacy – but also the geographical scope of the research, showcasing the values that are important to southern countries.

In light of the research findings, the analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy of solidarity is consistent with the assumptions raised in the soft power theory. In my view, this is the only international relations theory that can explain the promotion of SSDC initiated by President Lula and its consistence with Brazil’s foreign policy objective of playing a greater role in world politics. In this thesis, I argue that Brazil embraced the tenets of soft power theory by deciding to improve its image through the use of SSDC principles and approaches in its projects, and that this strategy has produced a positive image among the interviewed
'recipients'. While the findings validate the main theoretical suppositions, they are empirically limited. I detail the limitations and need for future research linked to development studies and soft power in the following section.
6. Limitations and future research

In terms of the study of soft power in this thesis, the major limitation lies in the way it showcases one particular instrument, SSDC, used at a particular moment under Lula’s government, and in relation to a restricted set of subjects, namely the interviewed participants. The change in Brazil’s SSDC strategy under Rousseff’s government, as disclosed in May last year, could have damaging consequences for Brazil’s soft power. The current Brazilian President (Dilma Rousseff) has declared that the ABC will shortly not only cover technical cooperation but also integrate trade and investment into cooperation activities. This means that the research findings are empirically limited because they only apply to technical cooperation projects carried out by Brazil under President Lula’s administration.

In addition, Brazil’s policy of ‘soft empowerment’ by using SSDC principles in its development cooperation does not automatically imply that this model of soft empowerment can be used by all southern countries entering into development cooperation. As explained earlier, each southern country has its own approach to SSC, and, depending on how and why it uses it, the results could differ greatly. Soft power responds to a complex relationship between the agent’s behaviour and the subject’s reception of the agent’s message or, as Nye (2011) put it: "The production of soft power by attraction depends upon both the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target’ (2011: 92). This thesis has depicted the behaviour and reception of a soft power strategy solely through the eyes of one country, Brazil, and a restricted set of targets, namely the interview respondents of the projects in each of the three countries selected. These interviewees represent a relatively small fraction of Brazil’s target audience. It would be relevant to apply the same research approach to the participants in other projects.

Moreover, as explained above, President Rousseff’s declaration concerning the intended changes in development cooperation presupposes another foreign policy use of SSDC, where trade and investment take an increasing role in technical cooperation. The perceptions of ‘benignity’ and ‘beauty’ that are essential to the production of soft power
might be tainted by this new strategy. Therefore, further research is necessary in terms not only of the new Brazilian strategy of development cooperation, but also of the possible changes to Brazil’s image that the Rousseff government will project. There is currently a policy debate going on in Brazil that should provide more insights into Brazil’s future engagement in SSDC (Leite et al., 2014).

In terms of development studies, much more can be uncovered about other practicalities of Brazilian SSDC in other projects and regions. The second article establishes the data gap with regard to Brazil’s SSDC activities. The overall information on SSDC published by the Brazilian authorities forces researchers to look at Brazilian SSDC at the project level. In the third article, while the projects studied reflect a certain coherence in the model of implementation, it is important to note that the three countries are all part of Latin America. This region is a priority for Brazilian foreign policy in terms of its stability, economic integration and Brazil’s quest of international recognition. Therefore, the Brazilian approach to development cooperation with Latin American countries is guided by a concern to maintain good relations with its neighbours and to ensure their support for its regional leadership aspirations. But Brazil’s foreign policy approach might be different in other countries, influencing the way its development cooperation projects are implemented. Thus further research is necessary in other regions.

In addition, this thesis has only touched Brazil’s conception of SSDC and therefore does not provide any insights into other southern ‘donors’ such as China, Mexico or India, in terms of neither their ambitions regarding their participation in development cooperation nor their ‘recipients’ perceptions of the development cooperation they have received. The findings of the first article permit further research ‘on the ground’ of rhetoric versus reality. This is especially necessary given the increasing contribution of SSDC to the aid debate, the development of developing countries and the ongoing uncertainties regarding SSDC data.

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38 Cornetet (2014) has already noted the low priority given to international affairs in Rousseff’s government.
7. **Outlook: the role of South-South Cooperation in clean technology transfer programmes**

Beyond the empirical and theoretical contributions to development studies and international relations presented in Section 4, the research undertaken for this thesis provides important insights into the application of SSC in climate mitigation and adaption actions. Two important considerations must be taken into account: one that presupposes a barrier to its application, and another that might bring solutions to the problems of clean technology transfers. The first is the absence of or little importance given to monitoring and evaluation within the SSDC project cycle (which might hinder northern countries' interest in the use of SSC). The second considers the SSC input in 'recipient' ownership and in the adaptability of southern countries' clean technologies in other developing countries.

With regard to the first consideration, while the description of SSC values and SSDC principles and approaches should enable development cooperation agencies to understand southern countries' perspectives, it is particularly important to note that, based on the research undertaken in the first and third articles, SSDC does not have a tradition of monitoring and evaluating its activities. Part of the SSC narrative explains that a project's success is secured by its ownership and demand-driven origins. Or, putting it more bluntly: if the 'recipient' country requests the assistance of another country, it means there is a need. In addition, because the 'recipient' country is in at the start of the project, it is in its interests and is its responsibility to make sure that the project is completed satisfactorily. This SSDC approach to monitoring, together with the MRV\(^{39}\) requirements that are necessary to assess mitigation and adaptation efforts, will make the integration of SSDC into climate change activities challenging.

However, related to the second consideration, both in terms of content (southern countries, especially the 'emerging economies', developing sophisticated clean technologies) and style (putting the 'recipient' at the centre), it is my opinion that SSDC provides innovative paths

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\(^{39}\) Abbreviation for 'Measuring, Reporting and Verifying' or the measures used in national reports and inventories for international verification. This process is considered particularly important in the international process that is intended to address climate change, as highlighted in the Bali Action Plan.
of transfers of clean technology. More importantly, because it mainly involves capacity-building and technical cooperation, SSDC is particularly suited for clean technology transfers. This is especially the case when one of the main barriers to these transfers resides in the problem of the adaptability of northern technologies to the climatic and economic conditions in developing countries. While climate change is a global phenomenon, southern countries, especially in Asia and Africa, are and will be particularly affected by its negative impacts. Solutions for adaptation and mitigation will have to be adapted to local situations in terms of economic capacity, climate specificity and cultural identity, three characteristics which the SSC narrative emphasizes. Platforms and networks such as the CTCN are right to engage with the 'South' and in hoping to find solutions based on their experiences and values.
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9. Annexes

Annex 1: Interview questions Article II

The interviews were following the questionnaire below. Even though the questions were asked in different languages (Portuguese, Spanish, English or French), the interviewer respected the form and the reasoning flow of the original questionnaire version.

**Questions to the Brazilian institutions (only for ABC*, EMBRAPA#, &IPEA)**

**South-South Cooperation reasoning:**

1. What do you understand by SSC?
2. Would you think it differs from NSC? If yes then how does it differ?
3. To what extent do you think SSC varies? ex. Brazil and China
4. What is a good example of a SSDC project?
5. What kinds of activities constitute Brazilian DC?
6. Do you integrate technology transfer in technical cooperation?
7. How would you define technology transfer?
8. How is technology Transfer it manifested in Brazil?
9. Is it different from NSC technology transfer projects? If yes, why?
10. Why do you think SSDC projects increased so radically since 2003? (Brazilian SSDC has trebled since 2005- IPEA, 2010)?
11. What are the incentives for Brazil to enter into technical cooperation activities?
12. Are all Brazilian cooperation projects going through ABC?
13. *What are Brazil's sectors of expertise for cooperation?
14. Would you say that Brazilian SSC follows pre-established objectives and priority areas (geographic and thematic) defined by Brazilian diplomacy?
15. Have there been significant changes in the cooperation priorities over the last 5 years?
16. If yes, how are the changes reflected?
   - Additional financial resources?
- Numbers of projects?
- Partner countries priority?

17. *With how many countries does Brazil cooperate with?

18. *What lessons learned – if any - from traditional North-South cooperation did Brazil integrate and apply to its cooperation model/project cycle? (ex of UNDP, Puente, 2010)

19. Looking ahead, how do you assess the future importance of SSC in your country in terms of financial contribution or numbers of projects in the cooperation world?

20. *& Do you think that the Brazilian SSC model should be integrated into the traditional aid model (like for instance the OECD DAC model)? Why?

21. Critics (for instance Manning and Naim) of SSC consider that it only brings fragmentation in aid. What do you think of such statement?

22. Brazil’s development assistance is often referred to as ‘opaque’ in the academic literature. Do you agree with this? Explain your answer

**Project Cycle:**

23. How is contact initiated for a cooperation project involving Brazil?

24. How are the Brazilian experts counterpart identified?

25. How are development partners’ needs identified?

26. Who are the national actors involved in the cooperation negotiation process?

27. Are there conditions attached?


29. Can you talk me through the different steps of a typical project cycle?

30. How long does a typical project last?

31. Is M&E a standard step of SSC project? I have read that it is not a standard procedure.

**Data collection:**

32. *What influence has ABC on the cooperation project design?
33. *How many projects were conducted last year?

34. *I have had a hard time finding detailed information about Brazilian South-South Cooperation. The ABC website and the IPEA 2010's report are the only official sources and the published information is superficial. Could you explain why?  

35. The project costs described in those sources are very low. Could you explain why?  

36. *#I plan to focus on clean technology transfer projects made by Brazil in South America as case studies. I know that 3 biofuels projects are carried out in Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay. In relation to this I would like to ask some questions:  
- Could I get access to the project documents?  
- Could you give me the contact details of your cooperating partners in charge of those projects in the 3 countries?  
- Were all those projects initiated by the 'recipient' country?  
- When and where did the project negotiations start?  
- Why was Brazil interested in cooperating with those countries?  
- Where there any conditions attached to the projects?  
- Following project implementation, was the requesting partner in any way dependent on Brazil’s products or experts?  

37. *Do you have other activities carried out in South America involving the transfer of low carbon technologies? If yes, which ones? Can I get access to the documents?  

38. Is there any other entity or person who I should talk to?  

39. Do you accept to be quoted or listed in the interviewee's contacts?
Annex 2: Interview questions Article III

Originally in Spanish, the interview questions followed the framework described below. More emphasis was put on a specific question category, depending on the interviewee and the level of his/her participation to the project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is it demand-driven?</td>
<td>By whom was defined the need to develop your knowledge in the field of biofuels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can you tell me the story behind the project? What was the specific problem you were trying to solve? (crop selection, sustainable environmental development etc)?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From where did the idea of collaborating with Brazil come from?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why did you choose Brazil?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How was the first contact with Brazil made?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is it horizontal?</td>
<td>Who was involved in the Project design?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was it a requirement from the ABC that you participate to the Project cost?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How was the Project implemented/coordinated?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the project adapted and effective?</td>
<td>In your opinion, what was the principal objective of the Project? Was this objective achieved? Were there changes during the course of the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In your opinion, what are/were the pros and cons of the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it unconditional?</td>
<td>Were there conditions attached to the implementation of the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Technology Transfer happened? Experience with Brazil</td>
<td>What is the contribution of this Project in terms of capacity building in biofuels? (expertise, institutional setting, production, industry, regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think you've acquired the necessary knowledge about biofuel or do you think more is to be learned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you plan to implement similar projects in the future with Brazil?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Article I
The evolution of South-South Development Cooperation: guiding principles and approaches

Abstract. For the past decade, South-South Cooperation has gained the interest of the development community in terms of both its 'impact' on traditional aid and the integration of its values in the work of multilateral institutions, making it the new 'buzz' word of the aid community. However, very few studies have been carried out to understand the rationale of South-South cooperation and the overall approaches followed in its development assistance activities or 'South-South Development Cooperation'. Therefore this article explores the origins and development of the concept of South-South cooperation from the perspectives of southern countries and shows how these origins affect the implementation model of their development projects. The research uses a narrative literature review focusing on southern countries’ understandings of both South-South cooperation and South-South Development Cooperation, thus enabling two sets of categorization: one for the conceptual elements in the definition of South-South Cooperation outside its geographical component, the other for the guiding principles and approaches of South-South Development Cooperation.

Introduction

After the end of the colonial period, a majority of southern countries\(^1\) joined a movement that started with the Bandung Conference\(^2\) and resulted in what has since been called South-South Cooperation (SSC). In a world where development cooperation is said to be tainted with neo-liberal ideologies and commercial interests and driven by donors' priorities\(^3\), southern countries reacted by offering an alternative, namely 'South-South

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\(^1\) The member countries of the G77 are a good representation of that majority.

\(^2\) Also called the Afro-Asian Conference, the conference regrouped 29 countries from the two continents to promote cultural and economic cooperation.

\(^3\) For a review of northern donors’ development project studies and criticism of them, see Gore, 2000; Birdsall, 2004; Riddell, 2007; Clay et al., 2008; SU-SSC, 2009b; Fukuda-Parr, 2011.
Development Cooperation' (SSDC). These southern countries have been described in the literature as ‘emerging donors’, in contrast to members of the OECD-DAC\(^4\) (Woods, 2008); or as ‘new donors’, though most of them have been involved in development assistance since the 1960s, like China (Davies, 2008; Woods, 2008; Walz and Ramachandran, 2011); and finally as ‘non-traditional donors’ or ‘non-DAC donors’, though southern countries consider their aid to be rather a partnership than donor-recipient association (Davies, 2008; Chin and Quadir, 2012). Indeed, the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ are regarded by southern countries as notions from the colonial past, and their exclusion from the SSDC vocabulary forms an important part of the SSC narrative (Chaturvedi et al., 2012; Mawdsley, 2012). In using the term ‘development assistance’ or ‘SSDC’, this article refers to developing countries’ activities in development assistance.

There exists a perceived risk in the DAC community that SSDC will undermine the work achieved by the DAC countries in conditioning traditional aid allocation to democratic and human rights reformist countries\(^5\), some categorising SSDC as ‘rogue aid’ (Naim, 2007). The lack of a clear definition of SSC, its alleged support for non-democratic states, the fragmentation of aid, and the danger of compromising ‘aid effectiveness’\(^6\) are the main criticisms that northern donors have raised against SSC (Manning, 2006; Sanahuja, 2007; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; Ayllon, 2012b), even though these criticisms are not made with an empirical basis (Woods, 2008; UN-ECOSOC, 2008; Paulo and Reisen, 2010). The comparison with northern aid being made in development studies by applying the same aid indicators as the DAC also shows a misunderstanding of the SSC concept since the principles applied by SSC are often different from those followed by the DAC (for example, non-interference and the demand-driven approach), and the scope of SSC activities is

\(^4\) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC).

\(^5\) Indeed, some draw the conclusion that new donors do not behave any differently than what they call the ‘old donors’ in terms of allocating their development aid to fragile or non-democratic states (Dreher et al., 2011). The same conclusion was drawn by the UN-ECOSOC study (2008), namely that, with the exception of Myanmar, non-DAC countries have targeted the same beneficiaries as the OECD/DAC top ten countries.

\(^6\) Aid effectiveness started being a concern for northern donor countries at the OECD-DAC First High Level Forum in Rome in 2003 and was reaffirmed in the next three forums. ‘Aid effectiveness’ encompasses the harmonisation of northern countries' activities, the alignment of their objectives and the measure of their results in developing countries.
broader, encompassing, for example, trade and foreign direct investment. Also northern donors' concerns as to whether SSDC has a negative impact on democratization efforts draws mainly on just one assistance provider, i.e. China, for its tendency to target African natural resources and its cooperation with non-democratic states such as Zimbabwe or Sierra Leone (Hilsum, 2005; Tull, 2006; Six, 2009). While the overall contribution of SSDC has been discussed (Park, 2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011), few studies have been carried out providing an overview of how southern countries define their cooperation, mainly due to the lack of transparency and availability of information, but also because of the difficulty in categorising SSC given the diverse interests, concepts and mechanisms in use (UN-ECOSOC, 2008; Davies, 2008). This, together with the difficulty the majority of northern countries experience in apprehending the 'philosophy' of South-South Cooperation (Ayllon, 2012b; Cabral et al., 2014), has led to a misconception of southern development projects and their impact on recipient countries. The recent statement by the Brazilian permanent representative at the High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation in May 2014 is illustrative of the misunderstanding of SSC among multilateral institutions (Patriota, 2014). Because there is no universally accepted definition (SEGIB, 2009; Davies, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010), there is a serious dearth of information for the development studies discipline. A comprehensive understanding of SSC is essential given the recent interest in and even 'anxiety' to obtain the 'new donors' endorsement of the OECD-DAC aid-effectiveness high-level forum accords (Mawdsley et al., 2013), the inevitable loss of dominance of western countries in framing the development debates (Six, 2009) and the integration of SSC into UN activities. This article reverses this academic gap by providing a comprehensive critical analysis of what has been written so far on the origins and scope of SSDC. Specifically, the aim is to explore how southern countries define SSC and determine the characteristics of SSDC.

The fundamental understanding of the principles and characteristics of SSDC from the perspective of the southern countries is therefore the principal contribution made in this article. By categorizing these principles and characteristics, the aim is to provide future

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7 SSC is one of the core areas of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 (UNDP, 2013).
studies of SSDC with a basis with which to compare the southern countries’ discourse with the implementation of the existing projects, especially given the anticipated increase of SSDC (Park, 2011). Section 2 reviews the different definitions and principles of SSC and SSDC raised in the literature and southern countries’ narratives. Section 3 explores the construction of and increase in SSDC.

**Methodology**

The article provides a narrative literature review\(^8\) of different peer-reviewed articles and reports from the grey literature, such as reports from international organisations in charge of an SSC topic or official statements from southern countries’ representatives. Due to a relative lack of academic research on SSDC compared to mainstream traditional aid studies, the grey literature is given equal weight in the narrative review, working on the assumption that these reports and statements reflect the SSC’s perception of southern 'donors'. Both the analytical study of the principles of SSC and the discourse on which the SSC movement bases itself follow an approach that gives priority to the southern countries’ understanding of their own cooperation. Throughout the text, comparisons will sometimes be made with the northern understanding of development cooperation, not with the objective of assessing the effectiveness of the two models respectively but in order to make the difference in southern cooperation appear more clearly. The article specifically examines one subset of SSC, namely SSDC, and not the other aspects of SSC such as foreign direct investment (FDI) or trade. Indeed, to frame the analysis of SSC and the southern countries' narratives about SSDC and northern traditional aid, the article focuses on SSDC as the only sector of SSC that operates outside the northern structure (the study of SSC FDI and trade might be relevant in terms of their recent increase, but the rules and structure are the same for all actors, whether from the 'North' or the 'South'). The point is that SSDC takes place outside the OECD-DAC and that southern donors emphasise the distinction between their

\(^8\) The article specifically chose a narrative over a systematic literature review. The difference between the two is that 'traditional [or narrative] reviews are exploring issues, developing ideas, identifying research gaps, whereas systematic reviews are compiling evidence to answer a specific research or policy problem or question, using a protocol' (Jesson et al., 2011:76). The intention in choosing a narrative review was to ensure a more open and interpretative approach to the findings.
model and the northern aid model. It should be noted that only a few southern countries publish how much they contribute to development cooperation, which explains the limitation on information in the section about SSDC volumes.

I. The South-South Cooperation concept and the principles and approaches claimed for South-South Development Cooperation

There is no universally accepted definition of SSC (SEGIB, 2009; Davies, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010). Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that SSC refers to cooperation between developing countries (South Centre, 2005; Davies, 2008; Ayllón, 2009). Some sources stress that, in addition to bilateral cooperation between two southern governments, cooperation exists between ‘economic enterprises or even individual citizens’ (South Centre, 2005; UNDESA, 2010), even though the civil society in these countries is rarely involved in the process (Vaes and Huyse, 2013). Others distinguish on the grounds of the level of development, defining SSC as cooperation between middle-income southern countries and similar or less developed southern countries (Corbin, 2006; Ojeda, 2010). Conversely, Davies (2008) emphasizes the heterogeneity of the southern group of countries, from poor to rich emerging countries. However, different characteristics have been pointed out in the literature with which to grasp the concept of SSC in the way it differs in terms not only of the geographical limitation in its name, but also of other elements categorised as follows: basic values, goals, structure, capacity, and forms and areas of actions.

- **Basic values.** SSC is based upon the principles attached to it: equality and solidarity among partners (SEGIB, 2009; South Centre, 2009), mutual development, and benefit or non-interference in internal affairs (SEGIB, 2009; Better Aid, 2010).
- **Goals.** SSC can also be defined by clear political objectives: the intentions have been described as the realisation of the development goals (UNCTAD, 2010; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011), the safeguarding of southern countries’ interests by gathering forces in international negotiations (Lechini, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010), the pursuit of
soft empowerment (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Ayllón, 2012a; de Mello e Souza, 2012), economic independence and self-sufficiency (Corbin, 2006; South Centre, 2009), the creation of an alternative structure for knowledge sharing and the enhancement of southern relations (UN-CTCDC, 1978; G77 and China, 2009), and/or the strengthening of regionalism (Lechini, 2009; Dreher et al., 2011).

- **Structure.** SSC covers the processes, institutions and mechanisms put in place to promote cooperation among developing countries (UNCTAD, 2010; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011), thus subsuming a broader sense of collaboration than traditional forms of international cooperation (Ayllón, 2009).

- **Capacity.** Since SSC is based on sharing knowledge and experience, it is said to operate only in the sectors of activities in which the country has acquired knowledge, experience and best practices (Tejasvi, 2007; Davies, 2008; Ayllón, 2009; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2009; Ojeda, 2010).

- **Forms and areas of action.** SSC comprehends different forms and areas of action such as economic (trade, investment, finance, regional integration), technological and political cooperation and cultural exchange (Tejasvi, 2004; Corbin, 2006; Ayllón, 2009; Ojeda, 2010; Davies, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010; UNDESA, 2010; Better Aid, 2010).

Each of these characteristics has a limitation or additional factor that makes it distinguishable or even exclusive from a traditional approach, the SSC in trade being impossible to include in a northern international cooperation sense. This inclusion of South-South trade in SSC has been one of the factors that led to the misunderstanding and even criticism of northern donors against SSC. In other words, SSC and SSDC have been put in the same basket in the northern understanding of them, SSC being categorised as equivalent to the OECD’s official development assistance (ODA). This criticism of South-South trade from northern donors relies on the OECD conception that trade should not play a part in traditional aid. This neglects the fact that SSC is not development assistance but cooperation at every level, trade included. The development assistance component of SSC, i.e. SSDC, is indeed one important subset of SSC intended to stimulate collaboration among southern countries and to be distinguishable from the OECD-DAC system in many of its
aspects (Betancourt and Schulz, 2009). It depicts the strength of the attachment to the principles and approaches defined by southern countries over the years.

One finding of the literature review is that there are as many SSDC approaches as there are southern countries involved in development cooperation. Nonetheless, from the analysis of the different sources of the literature and discourses, southern countries are guided by the principles and approaches listed below, even though they are not always equally weighted. For instance, China puts more emphasis on respect for sovereignty and mutual benefits, while Brazil insists on horizontality and the demand-driven approach, and Mexico mainly focuses on regional development. Therefore, the list below showcases all the principles and approaches that SSC actors claim to be following while involved in development cooperation. Some are synonymous with the 'basic values' and 'goals' of SSC described above, SSDC being a subset of SSC. However, SSDC involves additional approaches that are translations of these basic values into practice, that is, in SSDC projects. Early southern statements, such as the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 1978, the G-77 summits and other SSDC literature provide a narrative of SSDC principles and approaches:

- **Respect for sovereignty, no conditionality and non-interference in domestic affairs.** By general agreement, southern countries do not interfere in partner country's internal affairs. SSDC would have no conditions attached to its projects (TT-SSC, 2010), such as government reforms or governance requirements (Rowlands, 2008). This is a pivotal image that southern partners use to contrast their cooperation from what they consider 'a neo-colonial and power wielding

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9 The same conclusion was drawn in vom Haum et al.'s (2012) article on determining the behavior of middle powers and in Konijn's (2013) article on the emergence of SSC.

10 Some have tried to categorize southern donors according to the values and goals they follow. Walz and Ramachandran (2011) divide southern donors into three models (DAC model, Arab model and Southern model), while Zimmerman and Smith (2011) divide them in three groups (emerging donors, South-South Cooperation and Arab donors).

North’ (Eyben, 2013). This element of respect appears at the macro-level, while the 'horizontality' of SSDC reflects an approach to project implementation.

- **Mutual benefits.** The benefits of SSDC projects are supposed to be mutual, and commercial ties are considered acceptable. As Mawdsley remarks, ‘*this foregrounding of mutual benefits establishes the receiver’s ability to reciprocate, and therefore the status this affords*’ (2012:264). Not surprisingly it promotes a narrative in which the country also advances its own national self-interest (Quadir, 2013), as stressed by countries such as China.

- **Horizontality.** Cooperating countries implement development projects together at every level of the implementation process on the basis of equal power and following beneficiaries' needs. This horizontal relationship creates a strong political commitment and strong partnership: ‘*success in South-South cooperation is built on ownership, political support, and strong leadership*’ (TT-SSC, 2010:14). Countries such as Brazil highlight this approach in their development cooperation guidelines.

- **Demand-driven and ownership.** The beneficiary's needs are at the root of the SSDC projects12. Here the notions of 'donor' and 'recipient' do not exist. This approach makes the 'recipient' feel like an equal partner and therefore enables it to decide whether or not the project is valuable (Park, 2011). This would create national support and the political will to develop the project. It also goes along with the recipient bearing part of the project’s costs13 and success. This approach has also been a request made by the recipients of NSC in previous OECD-DAC rounds14.

- **Effectiveness and adaptability of technical cooperation and knowledge sharing.** SSDC mainly focuses on technical cooperation, where it is acknowledged that its implementation is more effective15. This is particularly true in the infrastructure and production sectors, areas that northern donors have recently put

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12 ‘(...) 80 percent of the beneficiaries said that the South-South cooperation they receive is very demand-driven’. See SU-SSC, 2009a: 69.
13 In Latin America, ‘(...) in a majority of cases (47%) the provider assumed a greater proportion of the cost (ranging from 60% to 85%); and in 11% the recipient actually bears the greatest burden (ranging from 65% to as high as 90%)’. See SEGIB, 2011, p. 55.
14 See discussions about the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action or the Busan Partnership Agreement, for example, Schulz, 2008 and Mawdsley et al., 2013.
15 ‘As the most obvious characteristic of South-South learning, efficiency has been highlighted by several experiences as significant added value’. See TT-SSC, 2010, pp. 24.
aside to focus on the MDGs (UN-ECOSOC, 2008). The appropriateness of the technology transfer due to the partners sharing a similar climate or level of development is considered to be one of the main characteristics of SSDC (Bobiash, 1992) and is part of southern countries’ narrative.

- **Regional focus.** Apart from big southern providers like China and Brazil, for example, SSDC and other southern flows are mainly regional (Chahoud, 2007). Southern countries involve regional partners (TT-SSC, 2010) and make the development cooperation more relevant and adapted to the regional context (Park, 2011), especially when countries share common challenges, ties, history and language (Fordelone, 2009; SEGIB, 2009).

Most of these aspirational principles and approaches are nowadays discussed or applied in the DAC system. Some fundamental points from the southern agenda have been included in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and Busan Partnership Agreement (respectively the OECD-DAC third and fourth High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness), such as the principle of national control over technical cooperation, the reduction of conditionalities and mutual responsibility (Schulz, 2008). As argued in the next section, these principles represent the translation of a historical construction that originally sprang from a wish to create an alternative model than the traditional aid paradigm. This model of cooperation is intended to take a larger share of the aid debate, given the increasing SSDC commitments.

**II. The construction of South-South Cooperation and the increasing share of southern development assistance**

SSC provides a clear sign that southern countries agree on the objective of promoting their development paradigm and establishing common grounds for their activities. Indeed, the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation at the Bandung Conference in 1955 was the first expression of this southern movement (Comisión del Sur, 1991). The Non-Aligned Movement, created in Belgrade in 1961 and the G-77 group, created in 1964,
were the inception of different initiatives\textsuperscript{17} to change the international trade order marked by the independence of ex-colonial countries’ and at the origin of the creation of the SSC. The first mention of SSC objectives in its SSDC dimension emerged at the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Session of the General Assembly of United Nations in 1977 in respect of the organisation of technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC), to be held a year later in Buenos Aires, its objectives being described as ‘the furthering of national and collective self-reliance of developing countries and the enhancement of their creative capacity to solve their development problems’ (UN, 1977). What followed is considered the second stepping stone in SSC’s history, namely the Buenos Aires Plan of Action signed by 138 countries in September 1978, with the objective of promoting the TCDC described above. SSDC was regarded as a priority in SSC exchanges at an early stage. The increasing importance of these southern gatherings and statements was accompanied by southern countries’ perceptions that SSC could be a solution to their vulnerability to global issues, and they openly used it for its ‘political dimension, giving them greater participation and say at multilateral institutions and forums, and economic dimension, especially in its commercial and financial aspects’ (SEGIB, 2009: 23). As UNDESA\textsuperscript{18} notes, ‘SSC has become much more prominent in international discussions in the last decade, as rapid economic growth by major Southern economies has led to a greater role in international economic affairs’ (UNDESA, 2010: 71).

One of the results showcased to assess the influence of the SSC and its claims\textsuperscript{19} has been the involvement of southern 'donors' in the OECD-DAC debate and the integration of ownership, untied aid and a more inclusive model (OECD, 1996; Schulz, 2008; Ayllón, 2012b; Chin and Quadir, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2013). While twenty non-DAC actors report their ‘aid’ flows to the DAC, the principal SSDC providers do not (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). This is because they have no desire to adopt the Paris Declaration principles the way they are implemented by OECD-DAC members (SU-SSC, 2009b; Park, 2011; Pickup, 2012).

\textsuperscript{17} For more information, see Chaturvedi et al., 2012, pp. 16-20.
\textsuperscript{18} The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
\textsuperscript{19} Outside SSDC, another result is the progress in terms of participation and voting rights in multilateral institutions (Development Committee, 2010; Zimmermann et al., 2011) and resistance to northern trade reforms (Vieira and Alden, 2011).
Because, in theory, SSDC follows a demand-driven approach and respects sovereignty, there is no mention of the Paris Declaration principles of harmonisation or monitoring in SSDC since the planning of activities and the demand-driven approach are not compatible. To minimise burdens on the recipients and to showcase results, southern countries place the emphasis on less bureaucratic procedures\(^{20}\) and simple, short-term turnkey projects and long-term capacity-building (Park, 2011). The mutual accountability and ownership guarantee the relevance and success of the projects, while traditional aid is clearly framed by OECD conventions. However, by designing an alternative implementation process and principles, southern countries have managed to revive the aid debate at the DAC level, even though southern development assistance volumes may not be high enough to change the aid architecture altogether (Quadir, 2013).

As the SEGIB (2010) points out in its report, the main southern cooperation agencies are attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their respective countries, thus ensuring that cooperation is coordinated with the country's foreign policy and thus making it more likely to be inherently more politically driven\(^{21}\). That, together with the fact that SSDC mainly consists of technical cooperation and not cash transfers, explains why the majority of southern actors provide assistance bilaterally rather than contributing to multilateral institutions\(^ {22}\) (UN-ECOSOC 2008; UNDP 2009). Even though southern countries are involved and rely in general on UN institutions (especially the UNDP International Fund for

\(^{20}\) Southern activities are described as being less procedural, since SSDC is mainly based on project assistance and thus has quicker and more guaranteed disbursement (Better Aid, 2010; UNDESA, 2010; Park, 2011). The mutual benefits attached to cooperation do not mean higher costs. SSDC is even said to be less expensive in terms of labour costs than aid expertise from developed countries (CUTS, 2005; Fordelone, 2009; SU-SSC, 2009a; Park, 2011). According to the UNDESA report, beneficiaries see the ill effects of tied aid as weaker in the case of SSC for the following reasons: ‘simpler procedures decrease the delays caused by tying rather than using more accessible local supply channels; and cheaper costs, greater value-for-money, more appropriate skills and technology, greater transfer of skills and capacity-building impact of SSC reduces the negative effects of the cost premium of tying’ (UNDESA, 2010:84).

\(^{21}\) One illustrative example is SSDC development under President Lula da Silva of Brazil. After he took office in 2003, SSDC became part of his presidential diplomacy and subsequently increased six-fold during his first mandate.

\(^{22}\) This is not the case for all southern countries. Brazil, for instance, allocates 76% of its assistance contribution to multilateral institutions (IPEA, 2010). This participation has been explained with reference to a historical tradition in Brazilian governments to contribute to multilateral institutionalists with the objective of showing support and compliance with the order in place or achieving autonomy and credibility by directly influencing the multilateral institutions (Altemani and Lessa, 2006; Saraiva, 2007; Vigevani and Cepulani, 2007).
Agriculture Development\textsuperscript{23} and the World Food Programme\textsuperscript{24}), they still show some reluctance regarding the Bretton Woods institutions (SU-SSC, 2009b). This has been explained by the South’s under-representation in the governance of multilateral institutions (Park, 2011), but also by what has been called ’aid fatigue’, a discourse that originated after several criticisms of the DAC’s and, to some extent, UN agencies’ development projects were portrayed as donor-driven and as guided by a neoliberal ethos\textsuperscript{25}.

Though the emerging economies are far behind DAC’s aid volumes in Africa in US dollar terms, they can already be compared to northern donors such as Belgium or Austria (Paulo and Reisen, 2010). The importance of cooperation for southern countries can be illustrated by their volume share of development cooperation compared to their GNI: ‘four non-DAC donors (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China) reach the UN target of 0.7\% of GNI, a benchmark that 18 of the 23 DAC member countries do not reach’ (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011:1). In the past decade, the world has seen SSDC grow substantially (Sanahuja, 2010; Bilal, 2012). Studies have shown that it represents 10-12\% of global ODA (Woods, 2008; SEGIB, 2010; Better Aid, 2010; Park, 2011) and that the share will double by 2015 (Park, 2011). Four years ago UNDESA observed that ‘should the recent rise continue, SSC could exceed USD20 billion in 2010’ (UNDESA, 2010: 73). Walz and Ramachandran (2011) state that SSDC has been assessed to be between 8\% and 31\% of OECD-ODA global gross.

The ten major bilateral contributors that are listed in the UN-ECOSOC study (2008) are Brazil, China, India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela\textsuperscript{26}. For instance, Brazil’s international development

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Which has been largely designed and supported by the South.
\item \textsuperscript{24} See SU-SSC, 2009b, p. 188.
\item \textsuperscript{25} The main criticisms are the forced implementation of neoliberal reforms and other political conditionalities (Gore, 2000; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Eurodad, 2006; Riddell, 2007; Ranis, 2007; Woods, 2008; SU-SSC, 2009b; Fukuda-Parr, 2011); tied aid (Jepma, 1991; Riddell, 2007; Clay et al., 2008); the shortage of aid, which exacerbated developing countries’ dependence on this form of revenue (Easterly, 2006); the donor-driven form of DAC aid and lack of respect for national priorities (ActionAid International, 2006; Woods, 2008; Morais de Sá e Silva, 2010; Sato et al., 2011; SEGIB, 2011; Chandy et al., 2011); and the financial crisis, which undermined the credibility of the northern countries’ economic model (Ladd, 2010; Birdssall, 2012; Gray and Murphy, 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{26} Together with Malaysia, Thailand, Israel, Argentina, Chile, Arab agencies and Taiwan, they represent a lower limit of USD 9,504 million and a upper limit of USD 12,145 million. See UN-ECOSOC, 2008: 11.
\end{itemize}
cooperation doubled between 2005 and 2009 (IPEA, 2010) and China quadrupled its development cooperation between 2000 and 2009, almost reaching the USD 2 billion threshold (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). Latin America, considered a hub for supporting SSC, increased the number of SSDC projects by 27% between 2007 and 2008 (SEGIB, 2009) and seems to have reached a certain stability, the number of projects and activities having remained at between 750 and 850 per year since 2010 (SEGIB, 2011; 2014). Some countries like Saudi Arabia or China provide more assistance in terms of project costs than several DAC donors27.

Given the absence of data on the size of cooperation contributions, it is important to emphasise that the figures for individual countries’ shares compared to OECD-DAC’s are pure estimates of trends. According to the literature, data about SSC is badly systematized28, reasons ranging from the decentralized character of the assistance provided undermining coordination efforts to a political decision to deny the public access to information (SEGIB, 2009; Rowlands, 2008; Betancourt and Schulz, 2009; Quadir, 2013). It is therefore difficult to ‘identify and quantify the beneficiaries’ (SEGIB, 2009: 95). Given that SSDC is supposedly based on solidarity projects and cost-sharing arrangements, it is difficult to ascertain the real value in US dollar terms of southern cooperation (Chahoud, 2007; SEGIB, 2009). SSDC project cost assessments do not generally take into account the per diems, working hours and travel expenses of the participants coming from the 'donor' country and, most importantly, the cost of the expertise itself (SEGIB, 2009; TT-SSC, 2010). For instance in Brazil, studies shows that, if these factors were included, the project's costs would multiplied by ten (Schläger, 2007) or even fifteen (Costa Vaz and Inoue, 2007). This is probably the reason why so few global studies have been carried out on SSDC.

**Conclusion**

Acknowledging that an official definition of SSC recognised by all southern governments is still lacking, this article has sought to collect information on the current definitions and

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27 ‘In 2008 Saudi Arabia reported ODA outflows of USD5.6 billion, making it a larger contributor of aid than fifteen of the twenty-three DAC members. In the same year, China provided more ODA (USD3.8 billion) than eleven DAC members, and Korea and Turkey each gave more ODA than four DAC members.’ See Park, 2011.

28 Meaning that project information is not being systematically collected and uploaded into a transparent database.
principles of SSC as a way of addressing this gap by providing a common understanding of southern countries with SSC. While SSC can be defined as cooperation between southern nations, there are other elements that southern countries have raised to explain SSC, not only as geographical cooperation, but also as a concept that differs from the traditional forms of international cooperation. After analysing the literature, the article has categorized these other elements in terms of basic values, goals, structure, capacity, and forms and areas of actions.

This southern 'movement', which started in Bandung in 1955 as an act of independence and a questioning of the international economic order, has, over the years, been used as a platform on which the rights of southern countries can best be expressed. Already in 1978 with BAPA, southern countries conferred a certain importance on SSDC. The more visible aspect of SSC that is SSDC (the others being trade and FDI, which do not clash with northern standards) also embodies its conceptual meaning, showcasing the application of the SSC's basic values. According to the southern countries' narrative, SSDC follows principles and approaches categorised as respect for sovereignty, no conditionality and non-interference in domestic affairs; mutual benefits; horizontality; being demand-driven and recognition of ownership; the effectiveness and adaptability of technical cooperation and knowledge sharing; and, regional focus. This way, the article enables a better understanding of a concept that has been used in DAC country development policy actions and debates without grasping the southern countries' own perspectives. It also permits further research on SSDC conceptualisation and implementation, analysing specific project interventions against the categories of approaches and principles of SSDC.

If the SSDC approach is to be used more widely in terms of the number of projects and contribution share, as already discussed in the section above, it is essential for the OECD-DAC development community to acknowledge its development and success and therefore to understand the practicalities of SSDC projects. It is also important to issue information on southern best practices in order to provide a better understanding of the 'nature and effectiveness of South-South cooperation' (SU-SSC, 2009a:23). Studies such as Sato et al. (2011) and Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) already constitute breakthroughs in the
examination of the recipient perspective and the southern countries’ project implementation strategies and results. These studies should lead the way to other articles on other southern actors’ project designs and implementation. Indeed, while this article purports to reflect the general trends and philosophy of southern cooperation by categorising the principles and characteristics of SSC and SSDC, there exists heterogeneity among southern countries in the way they apprehend them in their practices of development assistance because of the tendency to prioritise one particular aspect over others. This is partly explained by these countries' ambitions in using SSDC in their foreign policy. Therefore, to further the understanding of SSC, the study of each southern country's approach to SSDC principles and approaches should be carried out separately to establish which principles or approaches have been prioritised by their governments, and to what extent. Indeed, some authors are concerned that the 'South' is actually following the same path as traditional aid (Betancourt and Schulz, 2009; Ayllón, 2009), and some question whether the 'South' is really motivated to create a more inclusive and sustainable development paradigm (Roy, 2010). Already in 1980, Ul Haq was asking:

*Is this another passing fad or is it a new trend, mirroring long-term realities? Is it just a by-product of the current disillusionment with the North? Is it merely a romantic notion, based on an ‘idealized’ South that does not exist? Or is there far more to it?* (Ul Haq, 1980: 743)

While this article has laid the groundwork in listing the features and specificities of SSC and SSDC, further studies should be undertaken to verify whether, and to what extent, implementation of the SSDC concept corresponds to the guiding principles and approaches that are understood to inform the concept. Given the increasing importance of SSC in traditional aid debates (Six, 2009; Mawdsley et al., 2013) and the intended strengthening of its use in UN organisations for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda (Ashe, 2014), a clear understanding of the practicalities of SSDC is essential to ensure that SSC exists not only as a 'romantic notion', but also as a complementary model with which development actors can engage for the achievements of the development goals. This can be
conducted through case studies setting a critical investigation of specific SSDC projects against the approaches and principles listed in this article.
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Article II
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Brazil's soft power strategy: the political aspirations of South-South Development Cooperation

Abstract. By trading upon the principles of South-South cooperation, Brazil is widely viewed as having gained a positive image worldwide. Brazil's South-South development cooperation was one of the foreign policy instruments it used to raise this profile. However, studies of the generation of soft power are still lacking in the international relations literature, and where empirical research exists it focuses more on the results of soft power strategies than on how soft power is created. Therefore, this article explores how Brazil’s soft power strategy is conceptualised in Brazil’s development cooperation discourse and how it is operationalised through South-South development activities. This research uses a triangulation method combining the analysis of official documents, academic studies and interviews to conclude that the Brazilian government under President Lula (2003-2011) influenced the organisation of its cooperation agency and guided it towards sectors and targets that contribute to the creation of positive outcomes. This article contributes to the debate on the state's behaviour in soft power, that is, the 'behaviour' of the Brazilian government in the design of its cooperation agency’s activities, thus also contributing to knowledge about the relationship between an agent's behaviour and the outcomes of a country’s policy of ‘soft empowerment’.

Introduction

During President Lula da Silva’s administration, Brazil’s international presence was characterised by its increased participation in multilateral institutions\(^1\) and involvement in development cooperation and humanitarian missions\(^2\) (Vigenani and Cepaluni, 2007; Ayllon, 2010; Soares de Lima and Castelan, 2012; Inoue and Costa Vaz, 2012; Christensen, 2013). This international presence has been interpreted as part of a soft power strategy in the way it improved Brazil’s prestige and legitimacy internationally (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; de Almeida, 2008; White, 2010; Hirst, 2012; Ayllon, 2012; de Mello e Souza, 2012).

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\(^{1}\) A long list of alliances demonstrates this ambition: IBSA; BASIC; BRICS; MERCOSUR; UNASUR; G4; G20.
\(^{2}\) For example, the Brazilian forces’ MINUSTAH after the Haiti earthquake.
2012; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). Soft power is an international relations theory based on the assumption that a country gains power by constructing or maintaining an 'attractive' image. This positive image influences a state's decision such that 'If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes' (Nye, 1990:169). This legitimacy is gained through attraction rather than coercion (Nye, 2008; 2011), this attraction, according to Vuving (2009), being itself produced by the power currencies of 'beauty' (a country's values and ideals), 'benignity' (a country's generosity and altruism) and 'brilliance' (a country's success).

To raise its profile internationally, Lula's government encouraged its diplomats and development actors to promote South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) projects (Silva and Andriotti, 2012; Burges, 2014). As the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (MRE) declared: 'The technical cooperation developed by Brazil was expanded following the guidelines of the policy of strengthening the South-South dialogue as an instrument of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's government's foreign policy. This cooperation aims to strengthen bilateral relations between Brazil and the rest of the world, raising the country's profile on the world stage' (MRE, 2010a: Chapter 7.1.1). The increase in SSDC projects was therefore a foreign policy strategy for Brazil to gain soft power, in the way they contributed to 'raising the country's profile'. However, the question remains on how Brazil conceived its international interventions, specifically its SSDC, in order to obtain a positive image.

While studies have examined the result of this soft power strategy in terms of international representation and support, or in terms of the image that has been created, very few

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3 For more information about soft power, see to Nye, 1990; 2008; 2011.
4 Translation from Portuguese by the author.
5 A report by the World Bank and IPEA (2012) linked Brazilian SSDC and trade in Africa to the election of Brazil as host of the World Cup and the Olympics, the appointment of Brazilian citizens as the new directors of the FAO and the WTO, and large African votes for Brazil's claim to a permanent seat at the UNSC.
6 Goncalves Rosi (2012) exemplifies the result of this soft power strategy by referring to the fact that Brazil, along with Japan, has been elected to the UN Security Council (UNSC) more than any other member state. In another study, Puente (2010) shows that almost all recipients of Brazilian SSDC support Brazil's claim for a permanent seat on the UNSC.
7 Academics maintain that Brazil has gained an image as a promoter of southern countries' rights (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Saraiva, 2007; Amorim, 2010; dos Santos, 2011; Ayllon, 2012). Some authors link Brazil's peace-making operations in Haiti since 2003 and activities in administering HIV medication to its
studies have looked at how Brazil conceived its foreign policy with the objective of creating or maintaining soft power\(^8\). This relates to one aspect of the soft power theory that has thus far received minimal attention, namely the role and importance of the agent's behaviour in its soft empowerment, in this case, Brazil's behaviour\(^9\). Academics have pointed to the misunderstandings that have resulted from varying conceptualisations of soft power, ranging from resources used, results, and a change in a subject's perception or an agent's behaviour (Vuving, 2009; Kear, 2011; Hayden, 2012). This is because soft power manifests itself in three different ways: the agent's behaviour in creating soft power (in this case how Brazil plays a role in its soft empowerment); the subjects' perception of the agent (Brazil's image is dependent on the perception of the receiver of this image, and specifically in this case the recipients of its SSDC projects); and the results of this strategy (as the example of the image of a promoter of southern countries' rights leading to international support). Apart from annual reports from a few multilateral institutions that provide an overview of Brazilian cooperation projects, there is little information about how Brazilian cooperation is used as an instrument of its foreign policy (Ayllon, 2010). This is due to the fact that there is little literature about Brazilian SSDC (Milani, 2012) in general, and that very few studies have been carried out on its foreign policy, especially in the English-language academic literature (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). Specifically there is no academic literature that deals with the direct relationship between Brazilian technical cooperation and its foreign policy (Puente, 2010:85) or with Brazil's motivations in providing SSDC (Burges, 2014). As Burges points out: 'On a theoretical level little attention has been given to what implications Brazilian motivations for providing development assistance might have for our understanding of why states, and in particular emerging power states, engage in development cooperation activities.' (2014:3).

The article's aim is therefore to discover the extent to which soft power informs the design of Brazilian SSDC, thus reversing its neglect in the academic literature at both the development studies level and the level of soft power theory. In contributing to the debate

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\(^8\) Burges (2008) has touched on the subject of Brazil's co-optation, using a critical theory approach to foreign policy through what he calls 'consensual hegemony'.

\(^9\) Gallarotti (2010) refers to soft empowerment as the result of the level of attraction produced.
by giving empirical evidence of a state’s behaviour in soft power, the article first examines to what extent the soft power strategy influenced the organisation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), and it further studies its influence on the substantive content of Brazil’s SSDC.

Methodology
This article is informed by policy reports, official documents, interviews and the academic literature, working on the assumption that they all reflect what the Brazilian government is seeking to promote in its foreign policy. This article, in addition to its analysis of the SSDC projects’ scope and location10, analyses the concept of development cooperation as described by interviewees and official documents, as well as critically assessing the official narrative on SSDC. Thus the goal here is not to assess the effectiveness of Brazilian foreign policy but to reflect on the Brazilian government’s understanding of it11. The study is complemented by semi-structured interviews with officials and development actors12 in Brazil conducted in January 2013, which was intended to build upon the limited quantitative data available on Brazil’s SSDC activities. Indeed, data on development cooperation activities are scarce. This scarcity (Puente, 2010) has been explained by the opacity (Rowlands, 2008), irregularity and superficiality (Pimont Berndt, 2009; SEGIB, 2009; Betancourt and Schulz, 2009) of the ABC when it comes to publishing information about its activities, though it is largely due to the fact that, unlike OECD-DAC members, Brazil is not compelled to publish anything. The only two existing official reports13 on Brazilian SSDC were published in 2010 and 2013 respectively by the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a federal public foundation linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Presidency. Both showcased the volumes and destinations of Brazilian SSDC activities only for the period 2005-2010.

10 The analysis of the Brazilian contribution to cooperation will concentrate only on the years 2005 to 2010, since no more recent data are available.
11 For instance, Malamud (2011) argues that Brazil’s policy to acquire regional leadership has not succeeded.
12 Ten high-ranking officials or managers engaged in the international cooperation of Brazilian institutions involved in development activities, such as ABC, IPEA, the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty), SENAI, EMBRAPA or FIOCRUZ, were interviewed. Additionally, academics from the University of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro State University and the Centre for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE) and development cooperation consultants were consulted.
I. Influence of Brazil's foreign ministry on its cooperation agency

Lula Government’s Solidarity Discourse on SSDC

One of the most significant illustrations of Brazil’s development cooperation as an instrument of its foreign policy is that it was one of the first non-traditional countries to create an agency dedicated to SSC (Correa, 2010). The Brazilian cooperation agency (ABC) falls under the administration of the Foreign Ministry (Ayllon and Surasky, 2010), meaning that Brazilian SSDC has been seen as a tool of Brazilian foreign policy (Abdenur, 2007; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010; Puente, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012), in accordance with its soft-power strategy of acquiring better visibility and legitimacy internationally (Hirst, 2012). On the ABC website, SSDC is described as 'an important instrument of foreign policy, which Brazil uses to ensure a positive and growing presence in countries and regions of primary interest'.

To ensure this 'positive presence', Brazil proclaims that its SSDC has no financial aspect or commercial ties, is demand-driven and horizontal, is not conditional on government reforms and it involves capacity-building and knowledge transfer alone (ABC, 2006; IPEA, 2010), thus in keeping with SSC principles. This claim of belonging to the SSC movement is an aspect that gives Brazil the image of a promoter of southern rights, the identity of a southern nation and an image of altruism, all contributing to the country's soft empowerment. This identity can be traced back to Lula's first mandate, where the accent was placed on recapturing the South's, and more specifically Brazil's, self-confidence, or what the Brazilian government referred to as 'auto-estima' (Silva et al., 2003; Silva, 2003).

When they were asked the reasons for Brazil's engagement in SSDC, the interviewees from IPEA, ABC and Itamaraty gave the following responses: 1. the importance of maintaining

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14 Translation from Portuguese by the author.
15 Meaning equality of partnership between two countries in the design and implementation of a project or programme.
16 The guiding principles that can be found in the literature are that it is non-conditional, works on the basis of mutual benefit, is demand-driven, brings together practical know-how relating to similar socio-cultural and economic backgrounds, and operates in a horizontal manner (Bandung Conference, 1955; UN-CTCDC, 1978; Bobiash, 1992; Chahoud, 2007; Davies, 2008; Rowlands, 2008; UN-ECOSOC, 2008; Fordelone, 2009; SEGIB, 2009; South Centre, 2009; SU-SSC, 2009; UNDP, 2009; Better Aid, 2010; Ladd, 2010; Sanahuja, 2010; SEGIB, 2010; TT-SSC, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010; Chandy and Kharas, 2011; Park, 2011; SEGIB, 2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011).
17 For more information about auto-estima, see Burges, 2005.
good relations with the greatest number of countries; 2. cooperation as the only means of safeguarding Brazil internationally, given its geographical position away from the Western world and the language barrier with its neighbours; 3. the link with the diplomatic ambition of acquiring a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; 4. the importance of contradicting any neo-imperialist discourse against the country's activities on the international scene; and, overall, 5. to stabilise other countries' economies in order to create future markets for Brazilian goods. The first and fourth objectives reflect a soft-power strategy that aims primarily at constructing a good image internationally. One high-ranking official from IPEA put it more bluntly: "the Brazilian discourse held in G77 meetings and G20 is different. Brazil is acting like a child that came from a poor area and moved to a rich neighbourhood and tried to be part of a new group and then has his car vandalised by his old friends. This is why Brazil needs to give a positive image to avoid the 'neo-imperialism' critics from southern countries." In other words, there is a need for Brazil to make sure that its development cooperation is seen by the 'recipients' of that cooperation as a model that is distinct from the northern model and that its actions are seen as motivated by southern solidarity. This is explained by the fact that the Brazilian government can sense that its position as a southern country is changing due to Brazil's recent economic development. Therefore, Brazil has to show a stronger commitment to SSDC and the implementation of its principles to emphasise its continued belonging to the 'South'.

In the official discourses of Lauro Moreira (Director of ABC, 2003-2006), Celso Amorim (Foreign Minister, 2003-2011), Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2009) and President Lula on dealing with SSC, development cooperation is said to be based on solidarity and to work in the partners’ mutual interests, emphasizing that Brazil is not a hegemonic power and will not repeat past mistakes (Amorim, 2003; Silva, 2003; Silva et al., 2003; MRE, 2008; Ayllon and Leite, 2010). As discussed earlier, soft power is created or maintained by projecting a good image and, when it comes to international cooperation, the stress on non-colonial aspirations is essential to reach that

18 The other objectives are not studied in this article, because the second pertains to geopolitical considerations, and the third and fifth are more preferred outcomes of this foreign policy engagement.
objective. In 2005 Lula's opening speech at the first meeting of the Community of South American Nations' head of states stressed this rhetoric of solidarity by taking the example of Brazil's actions in Haiti and emphasising its respect for Haitian wishes and condemning any neo-imperialist presence in the devastated country: 'We reject the superiority and arrogance, typical of those who have nostalgia for colonial adventures. We know that it is the Haitians' prerogative only to decide on their future'\(^{19}\) (MRE, 2008:60). When it comes to Africa, this solidarity discourse is enhanced by a stress on partnership and understanding of the African situation, itself generating the power currency of 'beauty' in terms of the ideals of a more equal and united world. Lula displayed this narrative at his opening ceremony speech at the 13\(^{th}\) African Union Assembly in July 2009: 'Brazil is not coming to Africa to expiate the guilt of a colonial past; neither do we see Africa as a large reserve of natural wealth to be exploited. Brazil wishes to be a partner in development projects; we wish to share lessons and experiences, to join forces and unite our abilities. This is the only way in which we can become actors and not merely victims in transforming the present world order' (MRE, 2010b:131).

Lula talked about 'brotherhood', while Chancellor Amorim referred to 'solidarity' in explaining Brazil's cooperation activities (MRE, 2010b). Both terms point to the soft power currency of 'benignity' because of the message of altruism this 'solidarity' discourse carries with it. Already at the beginning of his first mandate (2003-2007) Lula announced that solidarity would be an important aspect of his foreign policy, when he said: 'We do not want to establish any hegemonic relationships. We want to establish partnerships, companionships, to be generous with those who are poorer than us, to be loyal to those who are bigger than us and, in fact, to be a partner of all countries around the world'\(^{20}\) (Silva, 2003). During Lula's second mandate (2007-2011), Foreign Minister Amorim made the soft power strategy more explicit. The objective of the foreign policy of solidarity is even more clearly expressed using the projection of a 'humane' Brazil as a vector of long-term benefit to Brazil and showcasing a shining example of a soft power strategy: 'We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours the promotion of

\(^{19}\) Translation from Portuguese by the author.

\(^{20}\) Translation from Portuguese by the author.
development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil herself, in political as well as economic terms' (Amorim, 2010:225).

This is also reflected in the definition of SSDC on the ABC website, where technical cooperation and horizontal cooperation are used interchangeably and stated as framed by the 'solidarity' foreign policy. A report from IPEA (2010) explains that Brazil aims to cooperate in response to a partner country's requests, rather than looking for cooperation opportunities. This demand-driven approach, together with the principle of horizontality, has led to the terms 'donor' and 'recipient' being excised from Brazil’s jargon of cooperation (Puente, 2010), which places the emphasis instead on the way that Brazilian cooperation actors should address the 'recipients' of Brazil’s cooperation, and therefore making an implicit distinction from North-South Cooperation practices. This observation was also repeatedly made during the interviews conducted for this research: it is important for Brazilian development actors, as well as for southern 'recipients', that in cooperating they act towards one another and are treated like partners.

**The Translation of the Official Discourse in the ABC's Structure and Functioning**

The element of partnership between Brazil and its 'recipients' accompanies the model of cooperation the Brazilian Cooperation Agency is claiming to apply. The horizontality and the demand-driven approaches have been among the main demands of development cooperation for which 'recipients' have been asking for more than a decade. If Brazil was to apply them in its projects, one result would be the improvement of Brazil's image as a cooperation partner, thus contributing to its soft empowerment. Already, as a discourse, it situates Brazil as a 'donor' that understands the claims of the 'recipient' countries.

High-ranking officials and managers of the different institutions selected for interviews described the development project cycle in detail. This process starts with requests for technical cooperation sent to ABC (through different channels, as, for example, through presidential visits, international divisions or the form available on the ABC website). ABC

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21 See discussions about the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action or the Busan Partnership Agreement, for example, in Schulz, 2008 and Mawdsley et al., 2013.
then calls a meeting with national experts and representatives from the partner countries to look at the feasibility of the project in terms of the budget and the time availability of the Brazilian experts. After a discussion about the project, a cooperation agreement between Brazil and the partner country is signed as the foundation for the project document. As this process is described, the Brazilian project cycle tends to confirm that the Brazilian projects are following SSC principles in the way they respect the horizontal and demand-driven approaches. As a matter of fact, these are the steps in the project cycle that Correa (2010) recommends southern countries to follow if they want to apply the horizontality discourse. He continues saying that this approach is essential to avoid a divergence between discourse and reality which may be damaging to the 'donor' country’s image if it were to claim horizontality but would in practice be in control of its own assistance.

While the solidarity discourse underlines respect for the demand-driven approach, the ABC received guidelines from the MRE in 2002 and 2004 (Puente, 2010) setting out the project's priorities:

- prioritizing projects that have the additional function of expanding a positive image externally;
- choosing countries 1) where agreements were made during presidential trips; 2) in South America; 3) Haiti; 4) in Africa, especially PALOPs; 22 5) other Latin American and Caribbean countries; 6) in the CPCP 23 and 7) under triangular cooperation.

In terms of soft power, the first priority exemplifies the use of SSDC to raise Brazil’s profile, the primary objective being the creation of ‘a positive image externally’. Thus, the Brazilian authorities select which projects will be carried out, altering the meaning of the demand-driven approach and possibly the relevance and appropriateness of the projects. However, the list of the country’s priorities is so long that, even if the ABC made a selection from among the requests for technical cooperation, it would still look like no discrimination was

22 ‘Portuguese-speaking African countries’ or in its Portuguese Acronym ‘Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa’.
23 ‘Community of Portuguese Language Countries’ or in its Portuguese acronym ‘Comunidade dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa’.
being applied. This long list of priorities gives Brazil significant flexibility and enables the ABC to explain all its technical cooperation projects as being conceived as solidarity with SSDC. Therefore, the guidelines do not target short-term and visible commercial interests but rather emphasise the solidarity discourse. Burges comes to the same conclusions: ‘there is a clear sense within the foreign ministry and presidency that South-South cooperation is not being strategically positioned to boost individual bilateral relationships, but rather formed an important strut of Lula’s international platform of a Southern solidarity approach to mutual development’ (Burges, 2012:237).

While the ABC’s budget in the MRE’s is relatively low (0.05% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2010), it is important to note that the ABC’s share steadily increased after 2003 (see trend Graph 1 below). There was a 400% increase in the budgetary allocation between 2004 and 2005, and ABC’s budget went from R$ 4.5 million in 2003 when Lula took office to R$ 52 million in 2010 (while the MRE’s budget 'only' doubled during the same period). This is a significant increase and showcases the growing importance of the ABC for the MRE.

Graph 1. Evolution of ABC budget share of the Foreign Ministry’s budget (2001-2010)

In conclusion to this section, it is clear that one of the ambitions highlighted in the political guidelines and in the interviewees' narratives was obtaining a positive image of Brazil in the countries where the projects were developed. This was ensured by an increase in the ABC's budget and the use of a solidarity discourse attached to the idea of a common southern development detached from any conditions where 'partnership' is one of the watchwords. The following section considers the influence of the political guidelines over the ABC’s activities.

II. The manifestations of soft power in Brazilian development cooperation activities

The Steady Increase in SSDC Projects

This section deals with the extent of the influence of Brazil's soft power strategy on its development cooperation activities. The overall figure for the Brazilian contribution to international development between 2005 and 2009 was BRL 2.9 billion, or close to USD 1.4 billion (IPEA, 2010) and reached BRL 1.6 billion, or close to USD 923 million, in 2010 alone (IPEA, 2013). 76% of the first figure and 66.3% of the second went to multilateral institutions; the rest was distributed in humanitarian assistance, scholarships and technical cooperation. While humanitarian assistance and scholarships also contribute to setting a positive image24, this section will only look at the external contribution to development cooperation in cases where Brazil can directly influence its actions and where cooperation is explicitly used as a tool of its foreign policy (Cabral et al., 2013), namely technical cooperation.

The total amount of technical cooperation for 2009 was close to BRL 98 million, which corresponded at the time of the study to nearly USD 57 million. This relatively low figure (compared to an overall international development budget of around USD 421 million the same year) is explained by the fact that Brazil does not transfer money in its SSDC activities. Brazilian legislation does not allow public money to be transferred to other countries’

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24 Brazil's peace-keeping operations are also part of its soft power strategy (Kenkel, 2010). Nye (2008) defined peace diplomacy as a form of soft power that is followed by the Norwegian government, for example.
governments (World Bank and IPEA, 2012) and for that reason it has only focused on
capacity development and technical knowledge transfer since the 1960s (Costa Vaz and
Inoue, 2007). It is also noted in the World Bank and IPEA table (2012:37) that Brazil tries
to avoid direct transfers of money as much as possible, not only because of the legal
restriction mentioned above, but also because it is the transfer of knowledge that is at the
core of the Brazilian solidarity discourse. One of the authors of the IPEA report added in the
interview that this fact alone proves that Brazil can hardly corrupt or condition its
assistance since no money is involved 25. He continued by saying that this shows that Brazil
concentrates on its solidarity objective and has no hidden agenda. However, as already
discussed, this solidarity objective forms part of the country's long-term objective of
obtaining a positive image, which is an agenda in itself.

In terms of technical cooperation projects, it is important to note that between 2005 and
2009 the share of technical cooperation increased six-fold, while Brazil's contribution to
multilateral institutions 'only' doubled (IPEA, 2010). This reflects the strategy of acquiring
a positive image through SSDC and thus soft power. What is interesting is that managers
and high-ranking officials from IPEA and Itamaraty made a different analysis of this
increase, seeing it more as a result of soft power than as thought-through behaviour on the
part of Brazil. Indeed, they explain this increase in technical cooperation as residual to the
successes of the Brazilian government in its public policies. These successes would create
such a high level of attraction that the number of cooperation requests would increase
accordingly. A high-ranking official at Itamaraty explained: 'Succeeding in your project
brings you a good image. (...) For instance, Brazil still has a lot of inequality, so our public
policies need to be adaptable to the whole of Brazil. That way we can relate to other
developing countries. (...) The more our programmes were successful, the more requests we
received.' This is the same explanation given by the ex-director of the Energy Department at
the MRE about the increase in biofuel projects because of Brazil's world leadership in that
technology (Ferreira Simoes, 2008). This element brings a subtle complexity in the

25 The project budget only covers flight ticket fares and per diem, the rest of the technical activity, the
expertise, being borne by the Brazilian public institution. Studies shows that if the costs of this expertise were
integrated into the overall project costs, the latter would be multiplied by ten (Schläger, 2007) or even fifteen
(Costa Vaz and Inoue, 2007).
understanding of soft power: here the increase in the number of technical cooperation projects is seen as the result of successful programmes in Brazil, an example of the soft power currency of 'brilliance'. While this element is valid, the subject here is the country's behaviour: it is one thing to be successful at something, but quite another to agree to transfer this knowledge or technical capacity without conditions attached. In this respect, soft power is expressed as behaviour in the way Brazil has decided to transfer knowledge and capacities and to increase its budget for 'solidarity' projects, an example, therefore, of the power currency of 'benignity'.

The recent IPEA report (2013) counts a budget of USD 58 million for technical cooperation in 2010, a number very close to and consistent with the figures for 2009. According to a presentation given by the current Director of the ABC, Fernando Marroni de Abreu (Marroni de Abreu, 2012), in 2011 the agency spent approximately USD 26 million in technical cooperation activities and has committed itself to fund projects worth up to USD 80.5 million for the period 2012-2015. Already in 2012, Brazil was participating in 149 projects in Latin America alone (SEGIB, 2014). It should be noted that Lula's mandate ended in January 2011. The new President, Dilma Rousseff, might introduce a change in foreign policy priorities regarding development assistance and reduce the budget dedicated to SSDC projects.

**The Worldwide Presence of Brazilian Technical Cooperation**

Under Lula, there was a clear tendency to increase the number of development cooperation projects. Figure 1 in the next page shows that since 2005 Africa has received a larger share every year, though seems to have stabilized, culminating in an equal share to Latin America's in 2009. Figure 1 (next page) also provides a clear overview on the constant increase of Brazilian contributions to SSDC between 2005 and 2010. Unfortunately, the IPEA data does not provide the distribution to countries for the years 2005 to 2009, making it difficult to analyse Brazil's priorities within the Latin America and Caribbean region (which represent 33 countries). However, the 2010 IPEA report specified the 99 countries in which Brazil implemented projects: 47 African countries, 17 in Central America and the Caribbean, 11 in South America, 11 in the Middle East, 9 in Asia and 4 in Europe. For a cooperation agency that has a limited budget at its disposal, the number of
'assisted' countries is significant. The spread of activities does give a sense that specific countries are not targeted, even though Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa have the largest share of Brazilian cooperation in financial terms, the two regions representing 83% of project costs (not surprisingly, since the two regions represent 75% of the 'assisted' countries). This is also consistent with a soft power strategy involving solidarity, that is, targeting a maximum of partners by applying the following logic: the greater the number, the better for visibility.

Figure 1. Evolution of Brazilian Development Cooperation in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean between 2005 and 2010


Figure 2 in the next page shows the first ten sectors of technical cooperation for the year 2010, from cooperation in areas like communications to health programmes. Government and civil society, health and agriculture sectors, represent 70% of the technical cooperation projects. The spread in the activities covered can also be explained by the demand-driven approach Brazil claims to follow, making it impossible to prioritise sectors of assistance. The share given to health was explained by one of Fiocruz’s international cooperation managers as the result of the implementation of the solidarity discourse: 'Fiocruz is following exactly the same principles and values of solidarity written into our constitution.'
The international health agenda is quite full and aspires to solidarity in political discourse, but also and mainly in practice. This is what Brazil and Fiocruz are also looking for.’

Figure 2. First ten sectors by project share of Brazilian Technical Cooperation in 2010

In Latin American, Brazil is the country that has contributed the most in terms of the number of projects since 2009 (SEGIB, 2009-2010-2011-2012-2014), double the share of Argentina and triple the share of Mexico, these being respectively the second and third Latin American cooperation providers (SEGIB, 2012). Brazil has also been the top cooperation actor in terms of financial contributions three years in a row (SEGIB, 2009-2010-2011). Together with Mexico, it is the Latin American country with the greatest diversity of cooperation recipients and partners (SEGIB, 2012-2014; Ayllon and Surasky, 2010), mirroring the ABC guidelines of targeting the maximum number of countries and answering as many cooperation requests as possible. It also shows how Brazil stands out in its region and the relative priority it gives to SSDC compared to other South American providers, since development cooperation in Latin America mainly consists of capacity-building activities (and therefore is not linked to the 'donor’s' economic capacity).
Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa covers the health, education and agriculture sectors (de Mello e Souza, 2012). The CGEE interviewee pointed that: 'Unlike China and India, Brazil is not over-populated, not limited in terms of natural resources. On the other hand, Brazil needs a market'. In this respect, Brazil intends to create or maintain a good image in the longer term by covering sectors that have greater visibility and 'impact' locally, such as HIV prevention and medication or 'bolsa familia' projects. This social element brings forth the image of altruism, an example of the power currency of 'benignity'. According to Amamor (2013), Brazilian SSDC establishes diplomatic ties that stress symmetric relations or soft power, which, contrary to cooperation made conditional on institutional reforms, eventually facilitates investment and business exchange. These symmetric relations engage with a narrative on the similarity of climate and environment, the transferability of Brazilian technology to the African context, a common identity with the African diaspora in Brazil, and a moral debt linked to the history of slavery (Chicahava et al., 2013b). When looking specifically at African projects in Figure 3, Brazilian projects in 2010 were concentrated in the health, government and civil society, agriculture and education sectors (which combined represented 75% of all projects).

Figure 3. Sector allocation in Africa in 2010 by project share

Source: author, based on AidData website database (www.aiddata.org).

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Programmes like Fome Zero and Bolsa Família, for which Brazil has become famous, and successes in HIV projects in Africa explain the increasing cooperation requests received by the health and education sectors and their share in Brazilian development cooperation in Africa. Therefore, these programmes are an example of 'brilliance' in the way they reflect Brazil’s successes, while their implementation has contributed to the 'benignity' currency. And this was apparently ensured by an emphasis on visibility. Indeed, a SENAI manager explained that his organisation was approached by the Brazilian government to participate in the implementation of five vocational training centres in Africa. He said: 'We were enthusiastic, but the projects were, in my view, difficult to implement in the places selected: Ethiopia, Haiti, and Mozambique. In Mozambique, we wanted to go to the north because Brazilian companies were based there, but the government wanted to stay in Maputo for reasons of visibility.' While this emphasis on visibility is not specific to Brazil, it shows that Brazilian 'solidarity' projects have the additional objective of creating or maintaining a visually good image among their 'recipients'.

However, there has been a change of perspective in Brazilian SSDC in Africa. Recent studies have shown a link between commercial interests and development projects, so that the demand-driven and horizontality approaches have been disregarded. Indeed, the agriculture sector in SSDC has been criticised for not only pursuing a 'solidarity' agenda. For instance, in Mozambique it led to one programme being described as a 'Trojan horse of Brazilian economic interest' by civil society for manifesting disputable demand-driven implementation (Chichava et al., 2013a; Nogueira and Ollinaho, 2013). Pinho (2013) sees Brazil’s rhetoric on solidarity and horizontality as a means to mask the capitalist expansion of Brazil in Africa. In fact, although this tendency to hide commercial interests within SSDC projects in Africa contradicts the solidarity discourse, it is consistent with Rousseff’s policy of merging technical cooperation and trade (Rousseff, 2013). For Cabral and Shankland (2013), the combination of solidarity and commercial interest reflects two different approaches to international relations within the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), where the narratives are situated between a soft power perspective involving a moral and ethical presence in Africa and a push from Brazilian companies to pursue commercially interesting projects. However, due to a lack of data after 2010, the possible change in Brazilian SSDC’s
priority could not be investigated. Since no official report on Brazilian technical cooperation after 2010 has been released, the possible change in Brazil’s foreign policy regarding the objectives behind the use of SSDC will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis through project case studies.

**Conclusion**

The analysis informed by the interviews and official reports shows that Lula’s government used the solidarity discourse in its SSDC with the objective of obtaining or maintaining a good image in the 'recipient' countries, thus showcasing an example of a country's behaviour as an agent of its soft power. There exist many ways for a country to strategise its influence on its soft empowerment: the USA’s military cooperation (Nye, 2004), Norway through its peace diplomacy (Nye, 2008) or China through its cultural diplomacy (Lee, 2010), for example. But as Lukes (2007) remarks, still very little is known about co-optation. Brazil’s soft power strategy, in targeting SSDC, adds to the list of soft power options chosen by states in their soft empowerment efforts. The Brazilian government's behaviour is characterised by the implementation of SSC principles in the guidelines and organisation of the ABC, but also by the increase in the ABC’s budget. This behaviour was manifested in the multiplication of technical cooperation projects that were implemented in equal proportions in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2009, as well as in the large number of 'recipient' countries. In terms of organisation, Brazilian development cooperation guidelines stress the horizontality of the exchanges and the non-financial aspects of its projects, these two elements being advertised as confirmation that Brazil does not and cannot tie its cooperation to specific commercial agreements and does not follow neo-imperialist objectives. While this article shows that the proclaimed respect for 'recipients’ wishes and the solidarity approach of its SSDC play a part in Brazil’s soft power strategy, this does not cover the 'receiving end'. As explained earlier, this article only studies how Brazil conceived its soft power strategy; it has not considered the 'effectiveness' of this strategy in the recipient countries.

Another finding of this analysis is that Brazil’s soft power in SSDC can be described in two ways: as a result of the success of its national programmes (Fome Zero, HIV programmes),
resulting in an increase in cooperation requests; and as a behaviour, Brazil choosing to answer and even support more 'solidarity' development projects (the budget for technical cooperation was multiplied by six between 2005 and 2009).

When looking at the available data regarding Brazilian SSDC projects, one should take into account the limitations of the data published by the Brazilian authorities. This 'data gap' highlights the need for primary research to shed further light on the exact scope, scale and characteristics of Brazilian cooperation activities. In this article, the specification of the data remains at the overview level and does not allow an in-depth understanding of the projects' horizontality, which is central to the Brazilian government's broader foreign policy discourse. It is therefore necessary to conduct studies examining the actual implementation process of Brazilian projects and confronting this process with the 'recipients' perspective, especially since the latest studies of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa are showing a trade-oriented change in Brazilian SSDC (Chichava et al., 2013a; Nogueira and Ollinaho, 2013). Cabral et al. (2013) have raised this issue and found that the solidarity narrative is paving the way to President Rousseff's trade-oriented perspective of cooperation with Africa. Even though President Rousseff cancelled the debts to Brazil of twelve African countries last year as a gesture towards the establishment of appeasement and equal relations, her declaration on changes to ABC, which will soon integrate another agency that will combine technical cooperation, trade and investment, shows a change in the concept of cooperation. This change will certainly have an impact on the way development projects will be carried out in the future and, as a result, on Brazil's image. The distinction between commercial and cooperative activities provided Brazil with a positive image and avoided neo-colonialist reproaches. Given the criticism raised against the openly win-win nature of Chinese cooperation (Naim, 2007; de Mello e Souza, 2012), Brazil could quickly lose the positive image of equality and fraternity it has managed to build since Lula's election in 2003.
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Article III
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The production of soft power: practicing solidarity in Brazilian South-South Development Projects

Abstract. Brazil’s involvement in development cooperation and its solidarity discourse have been portrayed as some of the country’s soft power resources for the way they contributed to raising Brazil’s profile internationally. However, very few studies have been carried out analysing the implementation of Brazilian development cooperation, whereas the soft power theory suffers from a lack of empirical evidence regarding how a country’s positive image is generated and maintained. The article analyses Brazil’s soft empowerment through its development cooperation which claims to consider demand-driven and horizontality approaches. The article’s findings are supported by interviews with project participants involved in the process of conceptualizing and implementing three technical cooperation projects on biofuels. The analysis is based on the interviewees’ perceptions of the manifestation of demand-driven and horizontality approaches through these projects. The article contends that these approaches produced a positive image among the ‘recipients’, establishing that the latter’s perceptions of development cooperation emphasize the style rather than the completion of the projects’ activities analysed here.

Introduction

There has been a growing interest in South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) and in the role of Brazil as a cooperation partner in particular in the recent literature1 because of the country’s increasing international presence during the Lula period2. Under President Lula, the solidarity discourse was a central aspect of Brazilian foreign policy3 and was behind the increase in the number of bilateral development projects entered into by Brazil4. Trading on South-South cooperation

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1 See SEGIB, 2009-2012; South Centre, 2009; SU-SSC, 2009; UNDP, 2009; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010; Davies, 2010; UNCTAD, 2010; Chandy and Kharas, 2011; Park, 2011; Walz and Ramachandran, 2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; Burges, 2012; Chaturvedi et al., 2012; Chin and Quadir, 2012; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Inoue and Vaz 2012; Iselius and Olsson, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012; Mello de Souza,2012; Christensen, 2013; Mawdsley et al., 2013; Burges, 2014.
3 See Amorim, 2010; Ayllon, 2010; IPEA, 2010.
4 See Saraiva, 2010; Silva and Andriotti, 2012; Christensen, 2013.
principles\textsuperscript{5}, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) states that its projects follow the horizontality\textsuperscript{6} and demand-driven approaches. The first approach implies cooperation negotiated and developed between counterparts or partners that is not tied to a set of conditions, while the second means that the projects originated in a request from the recipient country\textsuperscript{7} and not from an offer by the ‘donor’ country.

Both the solidarity discourse and the increase in the number of technical assistance projects have been interpreted as a manifestation of soft power\textsuperscript{8} for the positive image it has conferred on Brazil internationally\textsuperscript{9}. Soft power is an international relations theory based on the assumption that a country can gain power by using other means than military or economic pressure. It is a co-optive power that works with the idea that ‘If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes’\textsuperscript{10}. This legitimacy is gained through attraction rather than coercion\textsuperscript{11}, which, according to Vuving, is itself produced by the power currencies of ‘beauty’ (a country’s values and ideals), ‘benignity’ (a country’s generosity and altruism) and ‘brilliance’ (a country’s success). Soft power is thus a matter of constructing or maintaining a positive image in the targets’ minds, in this case the recipients of Brazilian SSDC. Nye stresses the importance of the target in a country’s soft empowerment\textsuperscript{12} when he says that ‘what the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the agents’\textsuperscript{13}, Brazil being the agent and the recipient countries the targets in this case. Nye asserts that development cooperation can generate soft power if it is well administered, meaning that development assistance can produce both positive (in the form of attraction) and negative outcomes (in the form of resentment if, for example, it is

\textsuperscript{5} The principles that can be found in the literature are that it is non-conditional, works on a mutual-benefit basis, is demand-driven, brings together practical know-how relating to similar socio-cultural and economic backgrounds and operates in a horizontal manner.
\textsuperscript{6} On its website, the ABC refers to its Cooperation with Developing Countries (Cooperação entre Países em Desenvolvimento) as South-South Cooperation or Horizontal Cooperation interchangeably.
\textsuperscript{7} While it is not the author’s wish to make further use of the northern donors’ jargon, the term 'recipient' or 'recipient country' will be used in this paper with the sole justification that the term ‘partner’ might be unclear, as this term refers to both the donor and the recipient in the SSC vocabulary.
\textsuperscript{8} In power theory analysis, soft power has been related to Luke’s third face of power. See Digeser, ‘Fourth Face of Power’, 1992.
\textsuperscript{9} Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; de Mello e Souza, 2012.
\textsuperscript{10} Nye, “Soft Power”, 169.
\textsuperscript{11} See Nye, ”Public diplomacy and soft power” and Nye, The future of power.
\textsuperscript{12} Gallarotti (2010) refers to soft empowerment as the result of the attraction produced.
\textsuperscript{13} Nye, The future of power, 84.
conditional or manipulative). Using Nye’s emphasis on the importance of the target means that Brazil in this case would only gain soft power if the recipients of its SSDC projects have a good image of the country. In this article, the horizontality and demand-driven approaches are used to inform the analysis of Brazil’s generation of soft power in the way they supposedly situate the recipients as partners in and owners of the projects (pointing to the power currency of 'benignity').

Therefore, the questions are: what are the perceptions of the recipients of Brazilian cooperation regarding the proclaimed horizontality and demand-driven approaches of the Brazilian SSDC, and to what extent they have contributed to the generation of positive outcomes?

Concurrently, another foreign policy was applied under Lula’s administration, namely ethanol diplomacy. Brazil, being one of the world leaders in biofuel technology, decided to foster the distribution of biofuel knowledge in order to increase the number of biofuel-producing countries. In addition to scientific cooperation and multilateral forums promoting awareness, this diplomacy was implemented through the development of Brazilian SSDC projects in biofuel. Indeed, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA) engaged in a collaboration aimed at the proliferation of biofuel expertise to Latin American and African countries. This means that there exists a 'conflict of interest' between a foreign diplomacy that claims a solidarity approach to its development cooperation and another that pushes the implementation of projects in the direction of commercial interest. Therefore three biofuel projects are studied to examine the extent of this solidarity approach when confronted with commercial interests.

While SSDC is not a new phenomenon, very few studies have been carried out to evaluate the implementation of such projects. Therefore academics have urged researchers to look at the way Brazilian SSDC is implemented and conceptualised. In addition, Iselius and Olsson have stressed the importance of obtaining the

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14 Schutte and Barros, "A geopolítica do etanol".
15 Schutte, "Avaliação Diplomacia do Etanol".
16 Ibid.
recipients’ perspective on Brazilian SSDC in order to make good the lack of available data and project evaluation. The key issue in this debate is to obtain more empirical data about Brazilian project implementation, which in this article means describing how three Brazilian projects are conceived. In terms of soft power analysis, because there is confusion between expressions of soft power in the resources used and the agent’s behaviour, academics \(^{19}\) have called for more studies of the actual expressions and production of attraction in the way these maintain or change perceptions in the targets’ minds. As Kearn points out, before the soft power concept becomes a ‘buzz word’ in public diplomacy, it is important to understand what it is, ‘how it works, and the conditions under which it is most likely to be influential’\(^{20}\). The article therefore aims to fuel the debate about changes in perceptions by providing the example of recipients’ perceptions of projects that supposedly respect their demands and are conducted in a horizontal manner. This will make it the first article to analyse soft power’s change of perception through SSDC practice.

**Methodology**

I have selected the case study approach because Brazilian biofuel projects represent a critical case\(^ {21}\) or what Flick defines as extreme case where ‘the field under study is disclosed from its extremities to arrive at an understanding of the field as whole’\(^ {22}\) or as Flyvbjerg puts it ‘If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases’\(^ {23}\). The cases selected were what Flyvbjerg would call ‘most likely’ cases (as opposed to ‘least likely’ cases) because they are those most likely to ‘irrefutably falsify propositions or hypothesis’\(^ {24}\). If the study of these projects’ implementation process shows a demand-driven and horizontality approach in a sector where Brazil has the most incentives to influence cooperation, then one could assume that this applies to all other technical assistance projects involving Brazil.

\(^{19}\) Such as Bilgin and Elis (2008) and Kearn (2011).
\(^{20}\) Kearn, “truths about soft power”, 66.
\(^{21}\) Patton, *Qualitative research methods*, 169-186.
\(^{22}\) Flick, *Introduction to Qualitative Research*, 131.
\(^{23}\) Flyvbjerg, “Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research”, 230.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 231.
In terms of case selection, the ABC website and the MRE report\(^{25}\) listed 21 projects related to biofuels\(^{26}\) since 2007 (the year when the ethanol diplomacy started), while only 10 are listed on the MRE website under complementary agreement\(^{27}\). However, the selection was shortlisted to three projects corresponding to three biofuel technical cooperation projects in Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador\(^{28}\). All three projects consisted of biofuel production capacity building together with the transfer of genetic material\(^{29}\) and experimentation in the recipient country. In the three projects, technical cooperation took place between EMBRAPA and its national counterpart; in Costa Rica (Institute of Agricultural Innovation and Technology Transfer- INTA), Ecuador (National Autonomous Institute for Agricultural Research - INIAP) and Peru (INIA through DEVIDA\(^{30}\)). In the three countries, the negotiations started between 2007 and 2008. As of late 2013, the projects were still underway and waiting to receive genetic material. Because the analysis is interested in obtaining the recipients’ perceptions of Brazilian SSDC, the emphasis was placed on conducting interviews. These semi-structured interviews\(^{31}\) covered the project’s inception, design and implementation and were complemented by the project documents and reports when available. The 26 respondents\(^{32}\) were selected according to their role as stated in the project documents, from cooperation coordinators and high-level managers of the cooperation agencies to project managers, researchers and engineers of the recipient agricultural institutions.

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\(^{25}\) See MRE, 2007.

\(^{26}\) The information available on these two sources is very general, sometimes not stipulating an end date nor a budget.

\(^{27}\) In Brazilian law, each project has to be approved by the Foreign Ministry or at the Presidential level of each country in a document called in Portuguese *Ajuste complementar*, namely a complementary agreement which is added to the technical cooperation agreement that regulates projects between the two countries. Later on, a project document is written.

\(^{28}\) The other seven projects were disregarded because there was no response from the ‘recipient’ countries’ institutions involved in the project (four), because the projects involved triangular cooperation (one) or because they were not consistent with capacity-building projects (two).

\(^{29}\) Here the author refers to the shipment of the selected biofuel crops to the recipient countries.

\(^{30}\) The case of Peru is slightly different. The managing organisation is the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA), but the institution that carries out the experimentation on site is INIA (National Institute of Agricultural Innovation).

\(^{31}\) In this paper, quotations from the transcripts have been translated from Spanish into English by the author.

\(^{32}\) While some respondents explicitly stipulated their wish to remain anonymous, the others informed the interviewee that they would talk more freely if they knew their names were not going to be cited. Therefore, they will remain anonymous.
I. The demand-driven approach and the illustration of soft power in the alleged goodwill of the Brazilian cooperation

At the project’s inception, the demand-driven approach is essential to study in the analysis of soft empowerment: since soft power is about image construct, the fact that it is the recipient that is at the origin of the project and not the donor is an important element in the perception of an equal partnership. Therefore, this section will examine the project inception process, and more specifically how and from where the project was conceived.

According to the interviews, the institutions were contacted by Brazil before what is called the comisión mixta (CM), a joint working group meeting organised every two years where both chancelleries and interested parties gather to talk about future and current projects. At these CMs, Brazil’s delegation usually includes its diplomatic staff and public institutions (i.e., EMBRAPA, SENAI, FIOCRUZ, and different ministries) possessing the capacity to provide specific expertise relevant to the recipient country’s wishes.

In the case of Ecuador, the initial contacts outside the CM are part of an institutional understanding between the two chancelleries and cooperation agencies to improve the results of these CMs. Prior to the meeting, the Ecuadorian technical cooperation secretariat (SETECI) gets in touch with its public institutions to inform them of the venue of the Brazilian cooperation and calls for relevant project proposals, making sure they fall into the country’s national plans. SETECI then sends the different proposals to ABC in order for them to bring the relevant Brazilian public institutions (in terms of expertise and availability) to the CM. Thus, rather than spontaneously proposing their cooperation, the Ecuadorian-Brazilian cooperation process takes part in an organised arrangement where the recipient knows that every two years there is an opportunity to present cooperation projects to Brazil. The CM model portrays a dynamic of exchange that could be seen as having been initiated by Brazil. The CMs are, however, perceived by interviewees as providing a guarantee of horizontality in the manner in which they have been institutionalised in a regular setting, resulting in the establishment of a close relationship which reduces the risks.

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33 Joint committee in English.
of having the Brazilian mission steer the negotiations. For the Ecuadorians, it is an exercise in both assessing Brazilian strengths and in defining their own priorities. This prior contact with the Ecuadorian institutions seems very effective in the sense that the CMs serve as a platform on which the proposals selected prior to the Brazilian mission are designed jointly by the two technical institutions (in our case EMBRAPA and INIAP) with the help of the two cooperation agencies (ABC and SETECI) in order to have finalized and signed project documents by the end of the five-day mission. One also has to notice the size of the delegation and what it represents: for instance, when the project was designed at a CM in February 2011, the Brazilian delegation had 23 participants. By being the recipient of the proposals and not its author, Brazil signals to the Ecuadorians that they are themselves the owners of the projects. The fact that it is combined with a delegation of technical experts reinforces the recipients’ perception that the cooperation is being taken seriously. Indeed, for the Ecuadorians, Brazil stands out as a different partner from what Ecuador is used to having to deal with by answering the needs requested by the Ecuadorian institutions. This model contributes to the construction of a positive image.

In Peru, what stands out from the project document and the interviews is that it was the Peruvians who insisted on pushing the project into play during the CMs. When asked how the project with Brazil was elaborated, a high-level manager in DEVIDA explained that the idea came out of a discussion between the Peruvian International Cooperation Agency (APCI) and DEVIDA prior to the CM. The description of the project’s inception certainly shows that the project proposal was sent by DEVIDA to ABC showcasing a recipient-donor direction. These meetings with APCI prior to the CM played the role of a platform on which the Peruvian organisation presented the sectors in need of assistance. Discussions highlighted a lack of biofuel expertise, which reflects a demand-driven approach, since it is the APCI and the technical institution that decided to present a proposal to Brazil. A high-level manager in DEVIDA explained that Brazil was the right partner country to choose because it was the country with the appropriate expertise: ‘There is no question about the expertise [of Brazil]. It is the adequate, appropriate one; it has a high technical level. That cannot be denied.’ Here, another element of soft power expresses itself, namely
the prestige of Brazil (what Vuving would place in the 'brilliance' currency) and particularly EMBRAPA with regard to its knowledge of biofuel. The selection of Brazil as a relevant partner for a project in biofuel exemplifies the extent of Brazil’s good image, i.e. its soft power: Brazil is widely regarded as a leader in the region in the biofuel sector. This element of soft power, exemplified by the admiration for EMBRAPA, is constant in the three countries: when it came to talking about the relevance of Brazil in terms of its expertise in biofuel, there was no doubt in the interviewees' minds that it was the correct partner to choose. Therefore EMBRAPA's image was something created by Brazil’s success in the biofuel sector and that therefore existed before the project’s inception. This element shows another currency of soft power, that is, what Vuving (2009) refers to as the power currency of 'brilliance' (a country's success).

In the case of Costa Rica, the interviewees’ perceptions about the project idea were mixed: some called it a political interest of both countries, while others indicated that Brazil was flexible and sympathetic in answering Costa Rica's needs. Although the same kind of institutional process takes place (CM), the origin of the project is uncertain. According to the interviewees, it was the result of discussions which occurred at annual Latin American Agriculture Institutions' forums, or of the visit of a person from EMBRAPA prior to the CM, or someone from ABC. Since none of the Costa Rican interviewees could tell if there were specific goals for Costa Rica in terms of biofuel blending, the idea of a 'political' agreement seemed more plausible. This was confirmed several times when the interviewees speculated that the project was part of a political move on the part of the presidents of the two countries during a presidential visit to 'show visible results to their populations', but also for Brazil to promote the topic of biofuel. In the quote below, a project coordinator of INTA is reflecting on the reasons behind the sudden interest in developing a biofuel project. More than a recipient-driven approach, it seemed to the interviewee that EMBRAPA's involvement was due to a concern in the promotion of its knowledge on biofuel:

'That's because, when the fuel crisis began, this great issue of biofuels came up.
And probably EMBRAPA, I am speculating here, saw it as a way to sell some of its knowledge through cooperation.'
The existence of the ethanol diplomacy reflected in the quote above makes one doubt the Costa Rican origins of the project. As mentioned in the introduction, Brazil was aiming to increase the number of biofuel-producing countries and was accordingly transferring knowledge during that period. While the fact that the complementary agreement was signed by two presidents does not rule out a demand-driven approach, it is also rare for such agreements to be signed at such a high political level. The fact that it did not follow the normal setting of the CMs also creates doubts about the technical need and rather supports the assumption that it was a political move. However, it is significant that the Costa Rican interviewees believed that their institution was the initiator of the project. In the study of how soft power influences the way the recipients apprehend Brazilian cooperation, the interviewees' perceptions are essential. Therefore, the important goal is not to understand who drove the negotiations but how the recipients perceived their role in that process, as well as the way they defined their role in the selection of sectors for investigation. As a researcher of INTA participants in the project expressed it, it was the Costa Ricans who 'forced' the Brazilians to deal with their requests. This is confirmed in the project document's justification, where it is proposed that yucca and castor oil plants be studied in order to find alternative sources of fuel. Nonetheless, one project coordinator was more critical and declared that these two crops had already been selected by someone from EMBRAPA:

‘This man [EMBRAPA representative] was bringing two crops with which they wanted to work in Costa Rica, which were yucca to produce alcohol and castor oil to produce biodiesel. (...) The purpose was to find and define the objectives, although that came already tailored, let's put it that way. (...) Interviewer: And you defined these two areas? Interviewee: That came, let's say, it was not a thing proposed by us but rather they [the Brazilians] proposed we do it.'

The assertion that Brazil was driving the project's inception, together with the context of the signing, clearly indicate that Brazil had a major role in defining the cooperation project in Costa Rica, even in some interviewees' mind.

The definition of the demand-driven approach is that the idea of collaboration in a specific sector comes from the recipient country. The online guidelines for
spontaneous requests on the ABC website illustrate this approach in the way ABC leaves the recipients the choice of cooperation topic. However, the one-off projects originating from these spontaneous requests might not guarantee the fulfilment of the country's needs in the way they prevent the recipient countries' institutions from planning and coordinating according to their country's priorities. While not perfectly fitting the demand-driven approach because of an underlying dynamic that situates Brazil as the leader in these negotiations, the fact that the CMs have been institutionalised reduces the chances of an 'opportunistic' move on the part of Brazil: being aware of the regularity of the meetings, the different institutions can therefore plan future activities according to their country's priorities with the assistance of the cooperation agencies. The space given to the Brazilian counterparts is also important. The 'generosity' related by the interviewees in the apparently open discussions and the respect for the demand-driven approach (directly pointing to the soft power currency of benignity), the relevance of these projects to their national targets, the flexibility in defining the project proposal and the perceived selflessness in offering assistance are strong manifestations of how a country can produce soft power. These elements could be interpreted as vehicles of soft power in the way they supplied Brazil with the image of an adequate, flexible and generous partner, even though the demand-driven aspect of the projects is in some cases questionable.

The second component of soft power examined in this paper is the horizontality of the project's elaboration and implementation, in other words, the recipient's role and freedom during the project design and execution. To be treated as equals in the project negotiations and implementation is one of the main claims made for South-South cooperation. The recipients' perception of such a treatment is important in the construction of a positive image. The element of horizontality is developed in the following section.
II. Horizontality in negotiations and institutional processes

In this relatively new landscape of SSDC, horizontality plays a major role in establishing the Brazilian image of a new kind of partnership based on mutual respect and ownership. The recipients emphasise being treated as partners and not directed by the 'donor'. It is then essential to look at how the interviewees perceived the horizontality of the projects. There are two important moments to look at when it comes to the horizontality of cooperation relations: project formulation and project execution. Unlike the study of the demand-driven approach, which looks at how and where the project idea came from, the horizontality approach is about the equality of the exchanges between each partner, that is, Brazil and the recipient countries. Therefore it is also important to evaluate how the projects are executed and by whom.

A. Project formulation: roles and power

The case of Ecuador is the most interesting in terms of the CM procedure. While the same bi-annual events take place in Costa Rica and Peru, they are usually of a shorter duration (two days) than the one in Ecuador (five days). It is during these five days that the projects are negotiated between the two technical counterparts and cooperation agencies, which denotes a high degree of horizontality: each institution is present and negotiates freely, ending with a finalized and signed project document. The capacity to negotiate is also triggered by Ecuadorian diplomatic history: the country broke off diplomatic relations with Brazil for a period of four years because a Brazilian company, Obedrecht, failed to fulfil one of its contracts with Ecuador. This history supports Ecuadorian institutions in asking to be regarded as a partner during the negotiations.

An INIAP project manager stressed the relative speed and seriousness of this negotiation process and argued that it is a major advantage in doing cooperation with Brazil (implying that the same does not apply to other partners). When asked about the formulation process, a high-level manager of SETECI described the week spent together with the Brazilian delegation as providing a platform for negotiation and dialogue where, after being divided into working groups, the cooperation
agencies provide support and advice to turn the project ideas into a standardised project document.

This description clearly denotes a level of partnership where the two cooperation agencies are collaborating in the task and are presented as institutions possessing the same level of responsibility. This is also apparent in the explanation that one INIAP project manager gave about how the biofuel crops under study were selected: the two technical counterparts discussed the possibilities of cooperation in biofuels in 'an open meeting', and the final decision was made by the Ecuadorian counterpart. This horizontality is further accentuated when the interviewer referred to Brazil as 'the donor country'. The reaction of the interviewee, a project coordinator at SETECI, mirrors SSC’s reasoning that the words 'donor' and 'recipient' should be excised from the vocabulary of cooperation:

Interviewee: ‘(...) we do not speak about donors. Because we are talking about South-South relationship, and we talk about partners. Brazil as a partner, but an offering partner’.

In the words quoted above, the interviewee considers both Brazil and Ecuador to be partners in a project and does not accept being referred to indirectly as the recipient. As already noted, the importance of sovereignty for Ecuador also explains the horizontal setting of these CMs. A project coordinator in SETECI insisted on the importance of this new kind of cooperation. In the following quote, it is clear that the interviewee has a positive image of Brazil as a socio offerente, literally an offering partner, that is allegedly willing to help neighbouring Latin American countries:

'For us, Brazil represents a lot because of all the progress that it has made, and also because of their willingness to share and make the region grow. (...) it [Brazil] positions itself as a leader; a leader that collaborates with the region. (...) It is not the same when Ecuador receives technical assistance from a European country, for instance. They [Brazil] are more adapted to our reality, and there is more openness.'
If anyone doubted the effect of the solidarity discourse in changing or reinforcing the recipients' perceptions, this quote should be sufficient to reflect the manifestation of soft power: Brazil is presented a partner that wants to help, and even though Brazil is a leader, it is one that cares about its neighbours' development and which differs from other types of donors. Several interviews with project coordinators and managers of INIAP and project participants illustrate this perception of Brazil as an assistance provider, distinct from other types of donors in their recipient-driven approach, respecting their country's sovereignty, and willing to share its knowledge without any commercial interest attached. The image of Brazil produced by this horizontality is a good example of soft empowerment in the way the recipients interpreted Brazilian practice as serious, knowledgeable, respectful and altruistic.

What applies to Ecuador does not take place in Peru and Costa Rica. Generally the CMs last only two days, and the technical counterpart (EMBRAPA) is often not present (or if it is, it is solely for the sake of representation). The negotiations then occur before the CMs.

Though the horizontality approach of the project formulation is better ensured when it is set in an institutional framework such as the CMs, Peru still manifests a certain degree of horizontality outside the official track because of informal communications between the different entities. The project was developed on the basis of email communication with EMBRAPA or meetings with an EMBRAPA delegation prior to the CM meeting. Once every institution agreed on the content of the project, it was sent to their cooperation agencies to formalise the process. Already at this stage, what comes out of the interviews is that the relationships that have been established are ones between partners where each party has an equal role in the project design. When asked about project formulation, one cooperation coordinator from APCI described the way the project was formulated, with Brazil as a positive experience because of the horizontal bilateral relationship that frames the negotiations, 'where nobody imposes anything'. The key issue here is the reference to 'joint elaboration', as this reveals a horizontal approach. The same interviewee added that this is the essence of SSC, and indirectly confirmed that Brazilian cooperation is unconditional: 'Because South-South cooperation by definition is like
that. It is horizontal, not conditional, with no interest involved’. The project document also reflects horizontality in the roles and responsibilities of each party. The tasks assigned to Brazil and Peru are word for word the same.

In the three projects studied, the case of Costa Rica is the one that showcases the least horizontality because of the opacity of the formulation process. The interviews reflect the fact that the Costa Rican participants have not considered their role as forming part of an equal partnership. Here the CM is not institutionalised as a space of debate and negotiation, but as a framework where projects are signed. The project proposal has itself been elaborated previously at different stages between ABC, EMBRAPA and INTA, displaying no regard for the participatory process of the CMs. According to the interviewees, the project was formulated in three steps revealing a clear donor-driven approach and the control of the Brazilian actors: first a visit of a week by an ABC functionary to lay the basis for the cooperation project, followed by a two-day mission by a representative of EMBRAPA to cover the technical aspects, and finally submission of the project proposal to the ABC for approval. When asked about the topics covered during these meetings, one INFA project coordinator explained that Brazil was leading the discussions, ‘coming up with specific themes of what the cooperation should consist of’, and demonstrating the passivity of the Costa Rican participants in this process. While in general the project participants are enthusiastic about Brazil’s cooperation, the Costa Rican participants did not perceive their role as being that of a partner, unlike the participants in both Peru and Ecuador. Indeed, the following quote from a project manager in charge of technical cooperation reflects the perception that Costa Rica cannot compete with Brazil: ‘I think that one has the results depending on which partner one is speaking to. Costa Rica is not the same partner as Brazil.’ It emerged that the Costa Rican interviewees accepted this apparent control on the part of Brazil in the formulation process because of their perception of Brazil as a natural leader. This is even more stressed when the interviewees were asked about the relevance of continuing cooperation with Brazil when their project was far from being completed. One research participant in the project reacted with surprise to the question and added: ‘EMBRAPA is a very strong institution that draws attention. (...) It [Brazil] is not a country one says no to.’ This quote exemplifies the
Interviewee’s perception of the level of horizontality of the Costa Rican–Brazilian cooperation in the way in which Costa Rica’s ‘inferiority’ is expressed: cooperating with Brazil is not optional. However, the interviewees were more troubled about the lack of horizontality during the project’s implementation than during its formulation, as described in the next section.

In this section, despite the relative flexibility of Brazil and the platforms Brazil put in place for discussion, the horizontality is set by the recipient country’s attitude itself. While Brazil leaves space for negotiation and recognises the rights of its counterparts, it is the countries that insisted on being treated as equal partners (Peru and Ecuador) that demonstrated the horizontality approach the most. As such, the South-South cooperation principles of partnership and respect for the ‘recipient’s’ wishes can only be implemented between countries that have the institutional strength and setting to ensure its application.

The next section will go into the projects’ implementation in greater detail. Some projects are now more than six years old, and the majority of the activities have not yet been carried out. The analysis of how the recipients perceive this delay is fundamental in the study of the effects of soft power.

**B. Project implementation and future relations**

This section illustrates the extent of which soft power is manifested by the way Brazil is portrayed as a cooperation actor. Indeed, beyond project inception and formulation, the real manifestation of soft power lies in the participant’s perception of Brazilian cooperation in the long term. It is therefore necessary to look at the interviewees’ comments about the projects, especially the most negative aspects, namely the delays in implementation. Well aware that the three projects experienced major delays, project participants maintained a high opinion of Brazil as a cooperation partner. In addition, the recipient countries plan and seek an opportunity to continue with a second phase. This section shows both the amplitude of soft power and also its limits if Brazil were to choose another kind of cooperation model. Indeed, in the three countries, interviewees mentioned that Brazil is
changing its cooperation modalities to include a recipient financial contribution, a change that was not regarded as positive by most interviewees.

One general impression in the three projects is that the interviewees are certain that Brazil is the most appropriate country to choose if one wants to know more about biofuels. As already mentioned, this aspect derives from the prestige of EMBRAPA. All the interviewees were very satisfied with the capacity-building that consisted mainly of going on a visit to Brazil to the different research centres to understand the processing and breeding of genetically improved materials. Some went further, saying that the most important objective of the project was the exchange of experience and not the transfer of genetic material.

When asked about the reasons for the delays to the projects, the interviewees blame bad monitoring, administrative red tape, inefficient organisation and the problem of intellectual property rights in EMBRAPA. They also stressed the Brazilian agricultural experts’ overloading of work: the interviewees explained that EMBRAPA is very much in demand due to its worldwide expertise and to Brazil’s willingness to answer all its recipients’ demands. The following quote from an APCI cooperation coordinator allows us to understand one clear dysfunction on the part of the Brazilian SSDC:

'Brazil is efficient at transferring knowledge and equipment, but the institutions are over-loaded, it is too much. They can no longer serve as before. They were very efficient before. I mean, you mentioned a certain date, and the program was completed.'

The enthusiasm generated by President Lula in encouraging SSDC and the attraction produced by the solidarity discourse have backfired: Brazilian cooperation has become a victim of its own success. It would appear that the model of cooperation offered by Brazil that promotes the horizontality and demand-driven approaches has triggered world-wide demand, or at least that is what the interviewees suggested. They explained that the Brazilian authorities simply have neither the time nor the available experts. The delays caused by this fact were described by the same interviewee:
'EMBRAPA has little time to devote to all the commitments the institution has. (...) The ability to get things done on time is terrible. We had a project in Iquitos (...). It was supposed to last six months and it has already been three years that we've been waiting (...).'

But somehow it seems like the delays have not affected the quality of the project in the opinion of the interviewees. Nonetheless, the projects have experienced major delays since being started in 2007 or 2008. In Peru the project only started in 2010, and at the time of the interview the seeds had just arrived in customs. In the two other countries, Ecuador was about to sign a (Biological) Material Transfer Agreement, while Costa Rica had had no news from the Brazilian side as to when they would receive the genetic material. This lack of response from the Brazilian entities is something else that recurs in the three projects.

In the case of Costa Rica, the communication had to go through a representative of ABC at the Brazilian Embassy. And when INTA communicated its concerns about the delay in the seeds shipment, they got no answer. While they showed great satisfaction in the training they received, the Costa Ricans still had major expectations about transfers of genetic material. The insistence and frustration of a project coordinator of INTA are portrayed below: 'We sent emails, notes, several different types of communications, we've talked personally, and never succeeded. We never received an explanation.' What appears as disdain has been interpreted as a political misunderstanding, and the Costa Ricans are certain that the project will be completed. They did not make the same assessment as the Peruvian interviewees, who saw the difficult communication as manifesting a lack of horizontality. In Peru, while the project's implementation is carried out and coordinated between technical counterparts, the fact that every administrative step had to be backed up with authorizations was interpreted as too bureaucratic and too vertical. This was clearly expressed by a project coordinator at the technical department of DEVIDA when asked about the horizontality of the project:

'Interviewee: For me it is too vertical...
Interviewer: What is vertical in this project?'
Interviewee: *If you notice, it is ABC- ACPI, EMBRAPA- DEVIDA, INIA, and then come other intermediaries which interfere. I want faster communication.*

While heavy-handed bureaucracy is a handicap that runs deep in developing countries and is therefore not linked to Brazilian cooperation, the horizontality and efficiency of the project-formulation stage is not reflected in its implementation. Brazilian SSDC practice did not overcome the administrative red tape.

So what do these quotes tell us in terms of the limits or the extent of soft power? While serious (and understandable) discontent were voiced, the interviewees’ answer to 'would you consider cooperating with Brazil in the future?' is most surprising. One would assume that, given the delays, the recipients would reconsider the offer or at least impose some restructuring. That was, however, not the feedback received. They not only wish to continue working with Brazil, they also have other projects underway. The conclusion is that the model of cooperation and the interpreted horizontality and demand-driven approach is the most important element of the cooperation, not the delivery. The three projects have proved to be lacking monitoring, response and implementation. But Brazil, by virtue of its image as a caring cooperation partner in the recipients’ minds, has been ‘forgiven’. Thus Brazil’s image is dependent on its model of cooperation as opposed to the delivery of the activities. But as one high-level manager in SETECI explained: *we also have to see to what extent Brazil continues with this policy and does not begin conditioning or linking it to commercial issues*.

Indeed, this altruistic image perceived by the local staff involved in Brazilian development projects could be coming to an end because of the future arrangements that Brazilian development actors shared with the recipient countries at the last CM, suggesting that the solidarity era was embedded in Lula’s presidency specifically. Brazil has always covered the cost of the projects, from the plane tickets to the technical hours of the Brazilian institutional experts involved in SSDC projects. This is something that was important under Lula’s presidency and in the first years of President Rousseff’s government. But the Brazilian delegation has informed the recipient countries that they will have to contribute to the projects’ costs. While this approach has been put forward as the basis of ownership success, the DEVIDA
Interviewees were the only ones who approved and promoted this change. The other interviewees were worried about the financial capacity of their institutions and countries. One cooperation coordinator at APCI declared that the time when Brazil would be covering the costs was over and that they will have to come back to what happened before Lula’s government (and thus before the solidarity discourse). Some interviewees were told that ABC was involved in too many projects, resulting in a lack of availability of the technical staff and of money in ABC’s budget. While most of the interviewees understood the reasons behind it, they doubted being able to cover the costs on their side, especially when Brazil informed them that this condition would also apply to current projects. The Ecuadorian respondents were those who reacted the most to this news. One high-level manager in SETECI deplored this change, saying that it would have an impact on Brazilian–Ecuadorian technical cooperation. Indeed, when asked about what happened in the last CM, another project coordinator in SETECI explained the new terms and made Ecuador’s position very clear: Brazil cannot change the conditions of projects that have already been negotiated and signed. The Brazilian delegation said to SETECI that this was linked to a restructuring: ‘They’re doing a restructuring of the ABC. I have understood that the approach is that it will be conditional and linked to commercial issues.’ This restructuring was made public by President Rousseff in May 2013, when she announced that the ABC will involve not only technical cooperation but also trade and investment. One SETECI project coordinator was worried about the consequences of such cooperation, saying that they would reject cooperation that contained economic conditions, and that it would no longer be SSC but NSC. One high-level manager in APCI expressed fear of the effect such a change in Brazilian cooperation would have on SSC as a whole. The worry and even the criticism expressed of this new clause could easily damage the positive image constructed by the feeling of partnership and ownership of the projects.

The horizontality at the implementation stage suffered from a lack of monitoring, a rigid formal setting and a lack of appropriate response, together with a unilateral change of conditions in the cost settlement. Compared to the project formulation stage, in which both parties were involved and proved quite effective at designing...
the project together, the struggle to get activities done at the implementation stage shows a serious professional problem. However, the major damage to Brazil’s image is that produced by the changes to the terms of the cooperation. While the interviewees still have a positive image of Brazil as a cooperation partner, that will depend on the extent to which Brazil respects their wishes and acknowledges their inputs into the project. By unilaterally changing the terms, Brazil has seriously weakened its positive image. The interviewees still regard Brazil as a cooperation partner that is distinct from traditional donors, but this perception can only be maintained if the cooperation is not conditioned by commercial interests.

**Conclusion**

This paper has explained how Brazilian projects have been formulated and implemented from informal technical meetings to the institutionalised negotiation platform, the CMs. It has also shown the extent of the horizontality and demand-driven approaches of the negotiation and execution processes: the country which can demonstrate the most horizontal and recipient-driven project is Ecuador because of its institutional strength. This implies that for the South-South Cooperation principles to be fully applied, the two countries involved need to have sufficient capacity in terms of coordination and representation. In Costa Rica, the origins of the project are questionable and the overall implementation phase of the Peruvian project reflects a lack of horizontality. But this assessment does not reflect the interviewees’ perception of the projects. The fact that they are looking forward to developing new projects with Brazil, even though it did not manage to deliver, shows how soft power may have a long-term impact.

This long-term positive image built on the model of cooperation, interviewees interpreted as demand-driven and horizontal, has had the additional impact of keeping the positive image of Brazil intact, despite the serious deficiencies that have been demonstrated in these projects. But when studying soft power one should not look at the actual results of the project but at the subjects’ (here the recipients’) perceptions, since what the targets think constitutes Brazil’s soft power: soft empowerment is produced by the recipients’ image of Brazil. It transpires from the
analysis that the interviewees placed much greater importance on the way the projects were designed than their actual results. The recipients in this study favoured the style rather than the content, 'championing' Brazil for the way it treated their partners. The benignity currency that is apparent to generosity and altruism is exactly how Brazilian cooperation was interpreted by the recipients. This is the second contribution of this study: the perceived horizontality and demand-driven aspect of the exchanges between Brazil and the recipient countries are of the greatest importance for the interviewees (especially for Peru and Ecuador) when doing cooperation. This element should be seriously considered in the northern aid debates in the way this preference for style rather than content implies a 'fatigue' of the current (northern) cooperation model. Not only for development practitioners, the conclusions of this study also fuel the debate about the manifestation of soft empowerment: the recipients' perception that cooperating with Brazil is different because it treats them as partners improved and strengthened Brazil's image in the interviewees' minds, showcasing empirical evidence of the soft power currency of beneﬁnity.

But the new conditions on payment and the restructuring of the ABC could have a damaging impact on the country's image. As Nye stresses, *soft power depends upon credibility, and when governments are perceived as manipulative (...) credibility is destroyed* 35.

Following the logic of the critical case, the level of horizontality and demand-driven aspect of the solidarity discourse should even be higher in Brazilian projects with no particular commercial interests. As Patton puts it, *While studying one or a few critical cases does not technically permit broad generalizations to all possible cases, logical generalizations can often be made from the weight of evidence produced in studying a single, critical case* 36. Much more is to be learned about other practicalities of Brazilian SSDC and the possible new developments implied by the restructuring of the ABC. Further research on recipient perceptions of SSDC and the possible outcomes of this soft empowerment is necessary.

36 Patton, *Qualitative research methods*, 174-175
While secondary to the analysis, the ethanol diplomacy proved to be less visible than expected within the cooperation projects given the commercial interest in it and the political decision to promote it. The ethanol diplomacy was to some extent behind the offer of assistance in Costa Rica, but it did not affect the horizontality of the projects, or at least not as assumed, with pressure coming from the Brazilian entities to start the experimentation and trigger future biofuel crop plantations in the recipient countries. It was the recipient countries’ institutions that insisted in getting the activities completed. While it is also clear that ABC and EMBRAPA were overwhelmed by the wave of cooperation requests, it would be relevant to study the reasons why the MRE did not use the projects’ platforms to promote its agenda.
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