Cryptanalysis of the LAKE Hash Family

Publication: Research - peer-reviewArticle in proceedings – Annual report year: 2009

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We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 233. The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 242. The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 299. All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFast Software Encryption
EditorsOrr Dunkelman
Number of pages415
Volume5665
Place of publicationBerlin / Heidelberg
PublisherSpringer
Publication date2009
Pages156-179
DOIs
StatePublished

Conference

ConferenceFast Software Encryption 2009
Number16
CountryBelgium
CityLeuven
Period22/02/0925/02/09
Internet addresshttp://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/fse/fse2009.html
NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Number5665
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
CitationsWeb of Science® Times Cited: No match on DOI

Keywords

  • cryptanalysis, collision attacks, LAKE hash family
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