Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes
Publication: Research - peer-review › Conference article – Annual report year: 2011
Standard
Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes. / Borghoff, Julia; Knudsen, Lars Ramkilde; Leander, Gregor; Thomsen, Søren Steffen.
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Vol. 6733 LNCS, 2011, p. 270-289.Publication: Research - peer-review › Conference article – Annual report year: 2011
Harvard
APA
CBE
MLA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - CONF
T1 - Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes
A1 - Borghoff,Julia
A1 - Knudsen,Lars Ramkilde
A1 - Leander,Gregor
A1 - Thomsen,Søren Steffen
AU - Borghoff,Julia
AU - Knudsen,Lars Ramkilde
AU - Leander,Gregor
AU - Thomsen,Søren Steffen
PB - Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
AB - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
KW - PRESENT
KW - Block cipher
KW - Differential cryptanalysis
KW - Symmetric key
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16
JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SN - 03029743
VL - 6733 LNCS
SP - 270
EP - 289
ER -