## Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes

Publication: Research - peer-review › Conference article – Annual report year: 2011

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**Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes.** / Borghoff, Julia; Knudsen, Lars Ramkilde; Leander, Gregor; Thomsen, Søren Steffen.

Publication: Research - peer-review › Conference article – Annual report year: 2011

### Harvard

*Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol 6733, pp. 270-289., 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

### APA

*Lecture Notes in Computer Science*,

*6733*, 270-289. 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

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*Lecture Notes in Computer Science*. 2011, 6733. 270-289. Available: 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

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### Bibtex

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### RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes

AU - Borghoff,Julia

AU - Knudsen,Lars Ramkilde

AU - Leander,Gregor

AU - Thomsen,Søren Steffen

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

AB - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

KW - PRESENT

KW - Block cipher

KW - Differential cryptanalysis

KW - Symmetric key

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

M3 - Conference article

VL - 6733

SP - 270

EP - 289

JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

T2 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SN - 0302-9743

ER -