Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes

Publication: Research - peer-reviewConference article – Annual report year: 2011

Standard

Harvard

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{ad9929f2e11743dd9cdb90471474df72,
title = "Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes",
keywords = "PRESENT, Block cipher, Differential cryptanalysis, Symmetric key",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg",
author = "Julia Borghoff and Knudsen, {Lars Ramkilde} and Gregor Leander and Thomsen, {Søren Steffen}",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16",
volume = "6733 LNCS",
pages = "270--289",
journal = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
issn = "03029743",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes

A1 - Borghoff,Julia

A1 - Knudsen,Lars Ramkilde

A1 - Leander,Gregor

A1 - Thomsen,Søren Steffen

AU - Borghoff,Julia

AU - Knudsen,Lars Ramkilde

AU - Leander,Gregor

AU - Thomsen,Søren Steffen

PB - Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

AB - At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

KW - PRESENT

KW - Block cipher

KW - Differential cryptanalysis

KW - Symmetric key

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_16

JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SN - 03029743

VL - 6733 LNCS

SP - 270

EP - 289

ER -