Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes

Publication: Research - peer-reviewConference article – Annual report year: 2011

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At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

Workshop

Workshop18th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
CountryDenmark
CityLyngby
Period14/02/1116/02/11
Internet addresshttp://fse2011.mat.dtu.dk/
CitationsWeb of Science® Times Cited: No match on DOI

Keywords

  • PRESENT, Block cipher, Differential cryptanalysis, Symmetric key
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