Adaptable Authentication Model: Exploring Security with Weaker Attacker Models
Publication: Research - peer-review › Article in proceedings – Annual report year: 2012
Standard
Adaptable Authentication Model: Exploring Security with Weaker Attacker Models. / Ahmed, Naveed; Jensen, Christian D.
In: Engineering Secure Software and Systems: Third International Symposium, ESSoS 2011 Madrid, Spain, February 9-10, 2011 Proceedings. Springer, 2011. p. 234-247 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6542).Publication: Research - peer-review › Article in proceedings – Annual report year: 2012
Harvard
APA
CBE
MLA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - GEN
T1 - Adaptable Authentication Model: Exploring Security with Weaker Attacker Models
A1 - Ahmed,Naveed
A1 - Jensen,Christian D.
AU - Ahmed,Naveed
AU - Jensen,Christian D.
PB - Springer
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Most methods for protocol analysis classify protocols as “broken” if they are vulnerable to attacks from a strong attacker, e.g., assuming the Dolev-Yao attacker model. In many cases, however, exploitation of existing vulnerabilities may not be practical and, moreover, not all applications may suffer because of the identified vulnerabilities. Therefore, we may need to analyze a protocol for weaker notions of security. In this paper, we present a security model that supports such weaker notions. In this model, the overall goals of an authentication protocol are broken into a finer granularity; for each fine level authentication goal, we determine the “least strongest-attacker” for which the authentication goal can be satisfied. We demonstrate that this model can be used to reason about the security of supposedly insecure protocols. Such adaptability is particularly useful in those applications where one may need to trade-off security relaxations against resource requirements.
AB - Most methods for protocol analysis classify protocols as “broken” if they are vulnerable to attacks from a strong attacker, e.g., assuming the Dolev-Yao attacker model. In many cases, however, exploitation of existing vulnerabilities may not be practical and, moreover, not all applications may suffer because of the identified vulnerabilities. Therefore, we may need to analyze a protocol for weaker notions of security. In this paper, we present a security model that supports such weaker notions. In this model, the overall goals of an authentication protocol are broken into a finer granularity; for each fine level authentication goal, we determine the “least strongest-attacker” for which the authentication goal can be satisfied. We demonstrate that this model can be used to reason about the security of supposedly insecure protocols. Such adaptability is particularly useful in those applications where one may need to trade-off security relaxations against resource requirements.
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-19125-1_18
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-19125-1_18
SN - 978-3-642-19124-4
BT - Engineering Secure Software and Systems
T2 - Engineering Secure Software and Systems
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
T3 - en_GB
SP - 234
EP - 247
ER -